THE MYTH OF SHARED GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT. In terms of the role of myth in decision making, this paper focuses on the way myth obfuscates critical issues related to shared governance in higher education. The result of that obfuscation is a minimization of the realities that work against shared governance by favoring an untenable view based on an idealistic and unattainable vision of shared governance. First, however, a critique of myth is in order to demonstrate not only that myth is no more than ordinary interpretation but also that it is insufficiently based on rationality and can become a dangerous instrument in the hands of policy makers.

INTRODUCTION

In the literature about administrative decision making, myth has been touted as an effective means for garnering positive outcomes (Sementelli, 2006). The efficacy of myth is generally attributed to its power as a meta-narrative to provide an overarching interpretative framework for understanding the nature of organizations and thereby providing principles of organizational behavior that promote humane and positive decision making (Cowley, 2006; Herzog, 2006). Contrary to that happy view of myth, this paper argues that such a view not only allows for but also actively promotes nefarious administrative decisions.

After demonstrating that myth as meta-narrative is a harmful approach to administrative decision making, the paper will focus on shared governance in higher education as a particular arena of

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administrative decision making, showing that shared governance, as it is articulated in the American Association of University Professor's Red Book, shares features of myth that are harmful to any reasonable and effective concept of shared governance in higher education. This paper focuses on the Red Book because it is the definitive document for the organization that claims to represent the professoriate and to be the standard bearer for shared governance throughout the academy in the United States. However, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) is an advocacy group, not an administrative body, and as an advocacy group, the AAUP's claims are in themselves susceptible to mythic analysis.

As will be shown, the myth of shared governance as outlined in the Red Book actually stymies shared governance because the myth is based on a misrepresentation of faculty status, a denial of faculty self-interest, a false dichotomy between faculty and administration, and a blatant disregard for faculty workload. As in other arenas of administrative decision making, myth, when applied to shared governance in higher education, does not promote effective governance based on perspicuous decision making. This paper begins its argument by demonstrating not only that myth is no more than ordinary interpretation but also insufficiently based on rationality and thus can become a dangerous instrument in the hands of policy makers.

MYTH AS ORDINARY INTERPRETATION

One way to unify conflicts in interpretative schemas is to appeal to some meta-interpretation that helps explain how various themes or strands of understanding persist over time. By establishing such a meta-interpretation, similarities in schemas can be highlighted and differences can be downplayed. Myth claims to be such a meta-interpretation that functions by establishing unity at the price of specificity. This is not to say, of course, that myth neglects historical details. Quite the contrary, myth appeals to historic details—a select set of details—to establish a meta-narrative. As such, myth is an interpretation of interpretations of various narratives. The great appeal of myth is not that it provides a cohesive understanding of what exists by assiduously considering all the dimensions of historical and literary interpretations. Rather, the appeal is that myth takes enough data points of various narratives and connects them to
produce what at first seems a plausible explanation. In other words, myth functions exactly the way any interpretative schema functions but claims to provide a basis for understanding all other interpretative schemas by establishing a meta-narrative.

However, myth cannot function meaningfully as a meta-narrative as it cannot transcend the ordinary function of interpretation. That is, myth is never more than one way of thinking about something, or of “making sense of something that didn’t before make sense” (Stecker, 1995, p. 14), or of assigning a meaning to something ambiguous (Zemach, 1997, p. 115). Other ways of looking at a situation remain, each of them generative, potentially, of its own mythology. Unless some facts are agreed upon that render one or the other invalid, reasonable people may always see things either way; and one may always disagree with accepted facts as well. So it is that “all understandings are interpretations” or “interpretations of interpretations,” (Derrida, 1972, pp. 264-265) even those understandings afforded by myth.

Even those who advocate myth as meta-narrative have difficulty sustaining their argument. For example, McWhinney and Batista (1988) make the claim that myths are meta-narratives. Re-mythologizing, according to them, “recaptures the original source energy of organizations and communities; it summons back to consciousness the founding ideals and the oft-told tales that helped establish and maintain an organization’s identity, thus linking the primal energy with present conditions” (p. 46). And even though McWhinney and Batista use a Jungian approach to myths, which relies upon archetypes, the “indwelling core myth” is susceptible not only to reinterpretation given a current historical reality but also must integrate communities with their own mythologies, presumably conflicting mythologies based on antagonistic ontologies. How all this is accomplished is a bit vague, but somehow primal energy will be released to fulfill the task. However, even a release of primal energy will not solve the problem of archetypes that can be transformed and still maintain their archetypal character or status as a meta-narrative.

Cowley (2006), Frances (1995), Hughes (1995), and Mitroff and Kilmann (1975) also advocate the use of myths as meta-narratives to solve management problems, attempting to shoehorn advice about organizational culture into the Cinderella slipper of myth. But their explication of myth leaves readers with no more than ordinary
interpretation. It appears, therefore, that myth suffers from delusions of grandeur. Proponents of myth as a useful tool in corporate decision making devoutly wish that myth could function as a grand narrative even though myth cannot fulfill that wishful thinking. The problem of failed wish fulfillment might be excused somewhat if myth was little more than a benign, albeit misguided, attempt to solve decision-making challenges. Such is not the case because the most pernicious function of myth is to transcend rationality and open the door to the use of raw power in service of myth, i.e., the abuse of power under the guise of the transcendent good. The evocative imperative to follow one's bliss is little more than license to obey the dictates of some internal locus of authority that is beyond the checks and balances of reasonable questioning.

IRRATIONALITY OF MYTH

Amazingly, many of those who support the use of myth in public policy decisions openly acknowledge myth as irrational. For example, Herzog (2006), in discussing four phases of performance budgeting, argues that performance budgeting suffers from a theory-reality gap and notes that myth “can reference performance budgeting features that exist in theory but not in practice” (p. 85). Indeed, Herzog asserts, “An institutional myth includes idealized or glamorized conceptions that cannot be scientifically or objectively verified or placed into practice” (p. 85).

Thus, the relationship of myth and governance is extremely unclear, especially after Herzog (2006) admits, on the one hand, that good governance “often becomes comfortable with institutional myth,” but, on the other hand, affirms that the “theory building required to displace the myth will require ‘heavy-lifting’ by scholars and practitioners” (p. 86). In other words, being comfortable with institutional myth is tantamount to “fantasiz[ing] about the value of performance budgeting” (p. 86) sans a proper understanding of the reality or practice of performance budgeting. Myth, it appears, fosters a specious distinction between theory and practice, favoring theory over the reality of practice. Myth then appears to be a sort of deception, particularly to those who claim myth is valid. Yet, inexplicably, Herzog proclaims that myths “have many, many advantages in performance budgeting. . . . Myths can inform politics or might serve as a mechanism to improve governance. For example,
performance budgeting myths can promote understanding, mediate oppositions, justify budget decisions, and lend legitimacy to governmental institutions” (p. 85). How remarkable that myth can be simultaneously mistaken about the theory-practice gap (thus, offering a deceptive view of reality) and helpful in bridging that gap.

Schwartz (1985) openly acknowledges the dilemma inherent in the view that myths are illusions and, therefore, irrational, but also are useful self-deceptions. As Schwartz affirms, myths assert that a particular type of person or an organization itself is powerful and immortal. However, “despair arises from the fact that myths are vehicles for repression, instruments of denial. They only get their evocative meaning by denying what they deny. But the act of denial cannot be a part of their cognitive meaning, for that would be to assert what is denied; and it was precisely to deny what is denied that the myth was asserted” (p. 35). In other words, “it is this very process of psychological avoidance that constitutes the vitality of the myth” (p. 35). Myths, then, according to Schwartz, are lies, self-deceptions, and fraudulent denials of reality. However, Schwartz does realize that the remedy to myth is truth telling and all its attendant consequences: “whether to tell the truth and run the risk of creating a valid but devastating anguish or whether to go along with the myth and give up on the vocation of truth” (p. 41).

Pondy (1983) also affirms that myth does not rest on a rational basis, not only because “the rational bias of the formal organization paradigm has for the most part precluded the investigation of myths and metaphors in formal organizations” (p. 158) but also because “myth frequently involves fantastical elements (e.g., man-eating ogres) subject to neither the constraints of logic nor empirical falsifiability” (p. 159). According to Pondy, that function of myth is useful because “the social system can get on with its activities, rather than continuing to question its origins and legitimacy” (p. 163). If myth represents a settled opinion not based on rational considerations and if the function of myth is to “place explanation beyond doubt and argumentation” (p. 173) so that an organization can get on with its affairs, how can myths facilitate change that is not in accordance with the settled opinion? Pondy’s argument appears to depend upon a status quo analysis that really does not entertain any change that is not in accord with the myth’s irrational basis.
Morgan (1980) is on to something when he notes the importance of metaphor in solving organizational puzzles, but submits "any one metaphorical insight provides but a partial and one-sided view of the phenomenon to which it is applied" (p. 611). This is so because metaphor is "based upon but partial truth; it requires of its user a somewhat one-sided abstraction in which certain features are emphasized and others suppressed in a selective comparison" (p. 611). The task of administrators, therefore, is not to look for a myth—a grand metaphor—that underlies some heroic past in an organization, but to use various metaphors intelligently, not to manipulate but to promote a holistic view of the organization. This approach will entail replacing "the view that scientific knowledge is in some sense 'foundational' with the realization that science may be able to generate many different and perhaps contradictory knowledge about the same phenomenon, all of which may have some merit" (Morgan, 1983, p. 606). Thus, as in any complex organization, easy answers, as supplied by an appeal to myth (or a positivist rationality that admits to no limitations that time cannot solve), should be eschewed. Rather, managers should favor a reasoned approach to decision making that recognizes the need to apply critical-thinking skills to solve problem that generally represent competing goals or aims while acknowledging that some problems are endemic to the human condition. Such an approach clearly does not need to introduce myth into the decision-making process, unless to demythologize.

If, as some claim, myth can be useful to organizations, then perhaps worries about myth as irrational, no matter how substantive, could be set in abeyance so that praxis would not be encumbered by theory. If myth really did promote effective decision making, then it might be permissible to hold one’s nose at repugnant theoretical underpinnings that resort to some sort of mysticism. But the irrational basis of myth is not benign; rather it has proven to be extremely harmful to society, promoting ideologies that are morally noxious.

Take, for example, Stigliano’s (2002) devastating analysis of Mircea Eliade’s use of myth to promote fascism, deride Jews, and demonize democracy. Eliade accomplished his nefarious task by rejecting “the universal rationality of European Enlightenment philosophy, which he saw as eroding humanity’s connection to the
'divine'" (p. 32). He opted for myth as the means of promoting a decontextualized meta-narrative that could interpret historical events, "meaning that myth and ritual are not to be understood as historical or cultural formations but are transcendent in origin" (p. 33). Myth does not answer to rational critique but stands above rationality because it is transcendent and self-affirming. The pliability of myth, in some strange way, allows it to be intuitively grasped, probably because the concepts it espouses (in Eliade’s case the cycle of decay, destruction, and rebirth) are so abstract that they can be applied to a variety of historical contexts. Myth offers an abstract schema with explanatory power that is not confined to any particular historical situation. Thus, "myth provided the framework that fascism needed, presenting itself as immune to critique because it was transcendent" (p. 34) and heroic. As heroic, fascism provided political salvation by identifying the non-heroic (Jews and democracy) and offering a means (military power) to abolish the non-heroic from the heavens. If Mussolini is the great liberator-hero, then “totalitarianism gives a society a spiritual wholeness” (p. 34).

Raglan’s (1955) view of myth as “an account of the rite told as a narrative of what somebody once did” (p. 454) also raises questions about the “transcendent” quality of myth. What someone once did, for example, was to sacrifice humans to propitiate the gods. Over time, an animal was substituted for the sacrificial victim, and the ritual of animal sacrifice is made sacred because it explains in narrative language a symbolic truth rooted in the human psyche. Yet Raglan admits that myths “as a rule are untrue historically, because most rituals have been developed gradually, and not as the result of some historical incident” (p. 454). Most troubling, however, is the link between savagery, such as human sacrifice, and the need to authenticate such practice by the sterilizing process of myth making. In effect, myths tell us something about human darkness, and if what those myths tell us is true, deeply rooted in the human psyche, they should not be considered celebratory and revelatory in any positive sense but as grim cautionary narratives of human depravity. To glorify myth rooted in ignorance, treachery, and injustice is to erroneously elevate ignorance, treachery, and injustice to eternal truths that lift and support the human spirit, satisfying some “deep” need of the human heart.
Even Hughes (1995), who advises managers to use myths as a way to positively influence organizational culture, recognizes the danger in myth: “It is conceivable that seemingly innocuous stories could be used to encourage beliefs in policies and practices and generate commitment to an organization in much the same way that propaganda was used during the Second World War” (p. 9). For example, Hughes examines the rat race metaphor as applied to organizations, noting that such a metaphor is mythical. “We are certainly not rats in a race” (p. 9). Rather, the power of such a metaphor is that it “provide[s] a visual meaning, create[s] a means of understanding so that we can persuade others to see the world from our point of view” (p. 9). Such metaphors “entice and persuade others to agree, without reflecting, with our interpretation and understanding” (p. 9). Although it is surely the case that people in various ways uncritically accept metaphors because they do not examine them carefully, that fact of human existence does not offset the obligation to reflect on the implications a metaphor advances. Indeed, if anyone uses a metaphor consciously to persuade others by bypassing critical analysis; that rhetor assumes the unenviable character of a charlatan, whether myth seems a respectable term or not.

Clearly, myths have the power to squelch necessary change by fostering formal structure that is self-perpetuating, even at the expense of what an organization purports to endorse. As Cowley (2006) admits, a “myth/metanarrative tends to depersonalize power, and in doing so, it creates two problems. First, it makes the forces of domination so subtle as to be nearly invisible; second, and related, it makes opposition and resistance extremely difficult” (p. 56). As will be seen later in this paper, the AAUP’s approach to shared governance relies upon the power of the two problems created by myth to promote a view of shared governance that is both subtle in its domination and difficult to resist.

Those two problems Cowley cites have a further deleterious effect, for as Meyer and Rowan (1977) affirm, “the formal structures of many organizations in postindustrial society . . . dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities” (p. 341). This means that an institution, once validated by rules, is not necessarily interested in determining whether the organization is supposed to produce is being
produced. Rather, the rules that support the organizational structure are self-authenticating. “For example,” Meyer and Rowan note, “apart from whether schools educate students, or hospitals cure patients, people and governmental agencies remain committed to these organizations, funding and using them almost automatically year after year” (p. 351). The critical distinction, then, is between “Formal structures that celebrate institutionalized myths . . . [and] structures that act efficiently” (p. 355). The outcome of this distinction between formal structures that celebrate institutional myths and structures that act efficiently is that the myth of the organization’s goals trumps the realization of those goals. Thus, “Hospitals treat, not cure, patients. Schools produce students, not learning” (p. 357), and the efforts institutions expend to maintain the myth that supports the organizational structure is effort directed against the organization’s mission to cure patients or educate students, a point that should not be lost on the AAUP’s approach to education. To add to the harm, the organization resists any measure that would call into question the myth, which, again, is an unreflective position the AAUP endorses. Myth, as Meyer and Rowan frame it, is subversive, undermining organizational effectiveness, detracting from providing services that, ironically, are given lip service by the myth. In such organizational situations, myth is not positive; exposing and killing myth, however, is not only positive but also essential.

Swabey (1939) further critiques myth, when she says, “since they are unscientific, myths prove often a source of error. In so far as they are accepted literally, they may breed confusion tending to social disaster” (p. 170). “For,” as Swabey affirms, “a myth is essentially a story evolved from an idea, a tale in a sense contrary to fact and incapable of verification, which is nevertheless related as if true and serves to rouse popular faith in its efficiency” (p. 169). She criticizes the myth of democracy that vests equality in rationality alone, not taking proper account of a person’s “appetites and self-interest” (p. 184). Thus, the notion that all men are created equal “in a natural sense is sentimental pretense. But that ‘men are to be treated with equal consideration,’ ‘given an equal chance,’ ‘rid of disparities of birth and circumstances so far as possible,’ all of this may be a statement of a feasible political program. Only by rejecting equality as an asserted fact is the way opened to accept it as a maxim or guiding idea for social endeavor” (p. 185). As will be seen, the AAUP asserts the infallibility of academic freedom as the foundation for
shared governance, without allowing any questions about the reasonableness of the organization’s view of academic freedom. Thus, the AAUP establishes an argument about the political nature of the academy that has broad effects. In short, the implications of political myths are far reaching, and to suggest that myth is simply a matter for scholarly dispute is to ignore the potentially negative and heinous consequences of basing a political system on myth. Although the argument thus far has been based on a critique of selected sources, Abel’s (2011) thorough analysis of myth as unnecessary and not useful in public administration decision making supports the argument here.

It would be incorrect, however, to assume from what has been written thus far that myth, variously defined, does not have power to profoundly influence public policy and administrative decision making. Clearly, citizens responded enthusiastically to the myth that promoted fascism in Italy, and Germans responded passionately to the myth that supported the Third Reich. When all is said and done, myths, though grounded in falsehoods that distort historical reality and sniff at rationality, have the power to persuade. Gabriel (1991) affirms the powers of myths saying, “If organizational stories are accepted and studied as wish-fulfillments, their value may be even greater than if they are seen as elaborations on actual events. We may then approach them as myths, whose interpretations can reveal people’s feelings towards their organizations; we may then begin to understand why managers find it easier to slay dragons than to kill myths” (p. 441). Myth (or myths) it appears is a human attempt to superimpose on reality personal preferences that do not have to be based in fact, can bypass rationality, and can become the driving force in an organization’s decision making. Thus, decision making is reduced to little more than ensuring that the participants in the Roman Circus have sufficient bread to enjoy the gore.

THE IRRATIONALITY OF SHARED GOVERNANCE

The claim that myth is basically opposed to rationality is particularly interesting when one turns his or her attention to the academy and explores shared governance because the lack of rationality regarding myths mitigates against myth-making in the academy, an institution built upon the rational discovery of
knowledge. But because shared governance, as variously defined, often appeals to irrationally, it can properly be called a myth.

Unfortunately, as in the case of attempts to define myth, so too, finding a commonly accepted definition of shared governance is a bit of a fool’s errand. One would think that the Red Book, the bible of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), would provide a clear, concise definition of shared governance, but such is not the case. “College and University Government,” the section in AAUP Policy Documents & Reports (2006) (called the Red Book because of its scarlet cover), does not provide a definition of shared government but, rather, contains a philosophical discussion of shared governance based on the foundational principle that professors possess academic freedom and all else in the university issues from that supposed right.

The fact remains, however, that shared governance has no standard definition. Kezar (2007), for example, observes, “There is no single or generally accepted definition of governance, as it has been described as structures, legal relationships, authority patterns, rights and responsibilities, and decision-making patterns” (p. 1). That shared governance in the academy can be characterized in so many ways militates against establishing a common definitional ground and accounts, in part, for difficulties in attempting to nail down a definition that can be analyzed. However, because the Red Book is an authoritative document that purportedly represents the professorate, one can consult it to understand philosophically what shared governance means and has meant historically to AAUP members.

THE MYTH OF SHARED GOVERNANCE

The “College and University Government” section in the Red Book is not offered as a blueprint for shared governance but a talking piece for working out shared governance in a particular institutional setting. However, even though a number of principles articulated in that section are uncontroversial, in toto the documents that comprise the section function as a myth in that they idealize the past by attempting to overlay history with a self-serving viewpoint and establishing principles that are beyond rational questioning. In fact, to bring those principles into question undermines the principles because they are based on unstated assumptions that are not true. In other words, the
Red Book offers a view of shared governance that is both idealized and patently false. In particular, academic freedom is the bulwark of the Red Book's myth, and academic freedom must take on a pivotal role in shared governance because shared governance is really no more than the protection of the assumed prerogatives of academic freedom that are beyond dispute or rational investigation.

That academic freedom is, in Bowen's (2005) words, "a grundnorm, not unlike natural rights or human rights" (p. 6) due to the fact that "in the absence of an institutional endorsement of academic freedom, shared governance is meaningless because the only 'sharing' that will occur is what a college or university administration will permit" (p. 6). Two points can be made about such a position. First, if, indeed, academic freedom is akin to natural rights, it is beyond question. Natural rights, as generally understood, are apparent in the way nature works. After all, "all men are created equal" is not presented as speculative but as an assertion of what must be the case. (Recall that Swabey characterized that famous dictum as "sentimental pretense," a myth.) Intuitively, either a person recognizes the validity of natural rights or has a faulty intuition. Second, shared governance protects academic freedom from those who would undermine it: administrators. The tension Bowen set up certainly puts a particular twist on the word shared. Does he really mean to say that administrators, indeed, are the decision makers in higher education, but they are not to be trusted to make good decisions because they do not uniformly recognize and honor natural rights? If that is the case, shared in shared governance really means something like "wresting authority from those who are vested with authority so that professors control the decision-making process that affects the institution in which they are employed."

Bowen, it appears, interprets the Red Book reasonably well. According to "On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom," in the Red Book "a sound system of institutional governance is a necessary condition for the protection of faculty rights and thereby for the most productive exercise of essential faculty freedoms" (p. 141). Shared governance, according to the AAUP, is the proper protection for academic freedom. The explicit relationship between faculty freedoms (notably academic freedom) and shared governance, however, is cast in collegial terms, although the clear intent of promoting shared governance as the AAUP defines
it is to protect faculty rights, not to promote collegiality across the academy. For example, in the “Statement of Government of Colleges and Universities,” the argument is made that the “variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence among governing board, administration, faculty, students, and others. The relationship calls for adequate communication among these components, and full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort” (p. 136). So far so good. Bonhomie seems to be the order of the day. Everyone cooperates and communicates with everyone else in the organization. This appears to be an endorsement of collegiality.

Of course, the Red Book recognizes that some sort of weighting system will need to be applied to the various efforts, noting, “differences in the weight of each voice . . . should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the particular matter at hand” (p. 136). This notion of weighting is, of course, problematic, when, in fact, as Bowen acknowledges, administration in charge of the university has the power and authority to legally make decisions about how the university functions. But recall, administrators are potentially (and, for all practical purpose, actually) roadblocks to academic freedom, which it appears is the sine qua non of the entire university. Everything depends on the preservation of academic freedom.

It should not be surprising, then, that the division of labor envisioned in the Red Book puts faculty in the driver’s seat: “The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process” (p. 139). What’s left? If the central function of a university is to educate students, the faculty, given the mandates of the Red Book, run the university. Indeed, regarding faculty status and matters related to it, the “primary responsibility of the faculty for such matters is based upon the fact that its judgment is central to general educational policy” (p. 139). The core courses are ruled by faculty, according to the AAUP. Why is this so? Presumably faculty has the judgment necessary to make the best decisions about the core. In what is this judgment grounded? Faculty status. In other words, faculty has the judgment necessary to make informed decisions because they are faculty, which certainly is a notable example of
circular reasoning. And who grants faculty status? Faculty. A bit of a closed club, one could argue, but myth functions as a closed club because myth does not brook rational examination. Rather, myth transcends rationality and is, therefore, beyond question.

The Red Book's contributors attempt to moderate what would be considered an outrageous claim by reverting to the weight argument. Thus, "since the faculty has the primary responsibility for the teaching and research done in the institution, the faculty's voice on matters having to do with teaching and research should be given the greatest weight" (p. 141). What exactly does "greatest weight" mean? It appears to mean almost all weight because in the Red Book is the statement, "that is, the administration should 'concur with the faculty judgment except in rare instances and for compelling reasons which should be stated in detail'" (p. 142). Faculty by virtue of their status as faculty have the right to make judgments, and those judgments can only be questioned in "rare instances and for compelling reasons which should be stated in detail." That is, faculty do not have to provide compelling reasons stated in detail to justify their judgments because they are faculty. However, anyone who has the temerity to question faculty decisions is obligated, according to the AAUP, to provide a reasoned argument (and most probably a lengthy reasoned argument) that had better be approved by the faculty or else it will be unacceptable. But, in fact, much of this is posturing on the part of the AAUP because administration has the power and authority to make decisions, whether faculty agree with those decisions. Certainly, a wise administrator would seek faculty counsel regarding a variety of issues, but the relationship of faculty to administrators is the relationship of advice and consent. The Red Book would turn that relationship into demand and consent.

That the Red Book is a document that has evolved over time means that its fundamental precepts were established during a particular historical setting. Indeed, when John Dewey envisioned the AAUP, faculty were personally vulnerable to unwarranted administrative decisions that could unreasonably curtail the freedom necessary to function effectively as teachers and scholars. However, broadly speaking, such is not the case at present. Numerous federal laws protect the rights of citizens, including academics, to seek legal redress for discrimination based on age, gender, religious convictions, and so forth. Workplace harassment has become a
matter of legal concern, and laws have been enacted to protect people from being harassed and after reporting unlawful activities, such as harassment. So while one might understandably sympathize with the historical context in which the Red Book originated, one would be pressed to turn a blind eye to the overreaching doctrines contained in the Red Book, even overreaching when they were first penned. Thus, one could argue successfully that academic freedom and its handmaiden, shared governance, were attempts to superimpose a worldview on an historical situation grounded in a legitimate issue that was treated idealistically. Even if the doctrines announced in the Red Book ever fit the academy, and Fish (2007) doubts that such doctrines could ever work, they certainly do not fit the current historical situation. They were and are ahistorical. They purport to be timeless truths, grounded in natural rights, when, in fact, they are idealistic responses to a particular historical situation. They seek to redefine reality in their own image.

DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE MYTH OF SHARED GOVERNANCE

Not only is the Red Book mythical in its origin and continued propagation, but it also is out of sync with the reality of academic life. In particular, the myth of shared governance assumes too much regarding professorial status, thus misrepresenting academic credentialing; denies the basis for faculty self-interest, substituting a false notion of academic freedom as a corporate goal to cover individualistic self-interest that motivates faculty; makes a false dichotomy between faculty and administration, thus ignoring the faculty status of administrators; and disregards the reality of academic workload, thus requiring faculty to fulfill a heroic function to satisfy a false notion of shared governance.

Misrepresenting Faculty Status

That the myth of shared governance assumes too much regarding professional status, consequently misrepresenting that status, is patently clear when questions arise about how faculty are prepared to credibly accomplish all their responsibilities regarding the curriculum. So how are they prepared? Academic training, as it has been practiced since the advent of the AAUP, has been based on the German model of scholarship. That model, so assiduously copied by virtually every doctoral-granting university in the United States, is
focused on content knowledge with the goal of producing scholars who will create new knowledge. Until recently, nowhere in a program of study leading to the credentials of scholarship has any formal training been devoted to teaching, serving on committees, advising students, evaluating curriculum, investigating university structure (including the workings of students affairs, the business office, legal affairs, and so forth), hiring colleagues, and preparing students to write and speak effectively, particularly in general education courses. Yet, apparently by osmosis, doctoral students, upon being handed their terminal degree, are capable of making sage decisions about effective teaching, committee work, all issues related to the curriculum, and anything pertaining to students related to academics, such as admission requirements. What Huber (1992) satirically says of how professors are prepared to teach applies to a whole range of professorial duties: “teachers are apparently supposed to know how to teach because they have been watching teachers do it since first grade—kind of like learning how to play tennis by sitting in the grandstand” (p. 124).

But perhaps such an assessment is too harsh. Perhaps such an assessment is based on a misreading of the myth of shared governance. But, then again, perhaps not. If in the Red Book there were reasonable distinctions among faculty, such as the judgment of a seasoned faculty member and a junior faculty member, at least part of the assessment could be tempered to say that the weighting so coveted by the AAUP would first extend to the judgments of faculty as regards their faculty status based on time and grade. Unfortunately, faculty are considered as a whole in the Red Book, and the naïve argument about weighting blithely passes over major distinctions that do make a difference in the actual operation of the academy. Senior professors tend to rule, and their rule can stifle the academic freedom of junior professors (Reeson, 2007; Williams & Ceci, 2007). Indeed, they may rule from an ill-informed perspective if they have not kept current with the flow of events in higher education, basing curricular decisions, for example, on an outmoded view of what should be included not only in the core but also in their disciplines. To suggest that professors, due to their rank and longevity, are competent in all areas of the curriculum is to confuse formal authority with legitimate authority. A professor could indeed be formally “senior” but not legitimately versed in higher education to make informed judgments. Professors—young and old, seasoned and
callow, tenured and tenure track, diligent and slothful, intellectually vibrant and intellectually dull, engaged and disengaged—are considered as a whole in the Red Book and granted equal status regarding their share in shared governance.

But even if by virtue of rank, tenure, temperament, and performance, professors have been students of higher education, having kept current in trends regarding curriculum, for instance, the way most professors learn to fulfill their duties is happenstance, and the trial and error approach to teaching is a weak guarantee that professors, as their careers progress, will become master teachers, which surely should be the goal of those employed full time to teach. Even professors' self-assessments of their skill as teachers is a testimony to their lack of insight about effective teaching. As Cross (1977) reported, regarding her study of professors, "An amazing 94 percent rate themselves as above-average teachers, and 68 percent rank themselves in the top quarter on teaching performance" (p. 10), results that are statistical fantasies. But such self-assessment should not be surprising vis-à-vis the general problem of inflated self-assessments (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). What is surprising is that professors, who by training are taught to base their academic claims on research, would fall into the trap of neglecting the extensive literature on teaching effectiveness in making appraisals about their teaching efforts. This is true, remarkably, even of professors who are scientists (Brainard, 2007).

What is even more surprising is that an entire enterprise—higher education—which is based on the fervent belief that knowledge production requires valid and reliable research would eschew research about teaching in making decisions about pedagogical effectiveness. Yet, nothing in academic life requires professors to demonstrate that they are effective teachers via their knowledge of pedagogy, understanding of principles regarding student learning, or evaluation of student learning based on research related to formative and summative evaluation. Professors almost universally "learn" to lecture (or, perhaps, to engage students in collaborative learning), to construct learning exercises of various sorts, to grade students' work, and to assess their own efforts by modeling a favorite professor's methods (and concomitantly eschewing an ineffective professor's habits) and attempting hit and miss to muddle their way to a teaching
style that works for them (and, they believe, for their students, although that may not be the case).

For example, Buchen (1998) provides a fairly accurate report of how professors are inducted into their teaching responsibilities:

When I entered the academic profession, I can truthfully say I was not aware of any faculty model to follow. Indeed, spared the requirement of taking methodology courses (a blessing but also a limitation), I did not even have a professional sense of how to structure the transmission of subject matter to students. I was told my knowledge not my methodology was my rock and salvation. As far as putting together a syllabus, the standard advice was to dig out one's old notes or recall the way the course was taught by one of your favorite teachers. Aside from not being the wisest course of action, the other suggestions of colleagues generally were piecemeal Band-Aids. It never occurred to me that matters might be handled any other way than the sink or swim method. Later on when I had to take my turn as department chair and was responsible for "acculturating" new members of the department, I reflected on what would my start have been like if I had a model to follow. What would it have contained? What would it have done for me? Why is a model important at all? (p. 1).

Buchen goes on to say that a model would not only have helped him "structure my relationships with students" (p. 2) but also enabled him to have a method of grading that would adequately assess students, contributing quality to their education.

As a high stakes component of teaching, grading also is of critical importance to the higher education enterprise, as professors will readily and necessarily acknowledge because their own professional credentials are grounded in evaluations they were given—in the form of grades—throughout their years of formal education. Yet, inexplicably, professors are given little, if any, formal training in grading. Much like a famous Supreme Court Justice, professors, it appears, know good (and substandard) work when they see it. Questions about reliability and validity are, in accordance with the dictates of myth, disregarded because professional judgment is beyond dispute. Even the means used to promote student learning
are a matter of professional judgment, so when Hobson (1998) sounds a warning note about ineffective assignment construction, surely he is raising an issue that falls on mythic deaf ears. He notes, “lackluster assignment construction contributes greatly to students’ difficulties in completing assignments to their own satisfaction and that of their professors. Assignment construction also affects grading ease and reliability” (p. 52).

Given the importance of assignment construction, one would expect that faculty be given professional assistance, especially during doctoral preparation but surely afterwards if the doctoral program omitted such an important aspect of professional preparation. After all, if professors are in charge of the curriculum as insisted in the Red Book, they must have the skills necessary to professionally assess student learning, including assignment construction and effective grading. Because, as unequivocally asserted in the Red Book faculty are preeminent in the educational enterprise, one would think that the following kinds of knowledge would be invaluable in providing professors with the appropriate knowledge base needed to participate in shared governance at the level prescribed in the Red Book:

- Preparing a syllabus (Grunert, 1997),
- Lecturing (Bligh, 2000),
- Structuring collaborative learning assignments (Barkley, Cross, & Major, 2005; McManus, 2005; Wulff, 2005),
- Leading classroom discussions (Brookfield & Preskill, 2005),
- Teaching large classes (Stanley & Porter, 2002),
- Preparing students to write (Bean, 2001) and speak (Quigley, 1998) effectively,
- Teaching online (Ko & Rossen, 2004; Weiss, Knowlton, & Speck, 2000),
- Motivating students to learn effectively (Svinicki, 2004),
- Evaluating student learning (Achacoso & Svinicki, 2004; Angelo & Cross, 1993; Banta, Lund, Black, & Oblander, 1996; Walvoord & Anderson, 1998),
- Possessing general knowledge about teaching effectiveness (Bain, 2004; Brookfield, 1990; Davis, 1993; Lowman, 1995; Nilson, 2003; Roth, 1997),

- Advising (Kramer, 2003),

- Executing committee work effectively (Woodrow, 1985),

- Understanding legal issues related to higher education (Jenkins, 2004),

- Evaluating the general education curriculum (Allen, 2006),

- Understanding the history of higher education (Cohen, 1998; Lucas, 1994), and

- Being familiar with the organizational structure of higher education (Bensimon, Newmann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Bergquist, 1992; Birnbaum, 1988).

As has just been shown, scholarly works are readily available to provide professors with the broad knowledge base needed to make wise, insightful, and learned governing decisions based on research, and one would think that research would be essential for those who lay such stress on the necessity of research for vitality in the academic life. However, the myth of shared governance was developed on the assumption that professors are capable of fulfilling their rather exalted and super-ordinate role in shared governance without the least bit of formal training regarding such specific duties. For the AAUP, an organization purportedly dedicated to excellence in education, particularly because it represents faulty interests (albeit under the guise of shared governance), to make professorial judgment the gold standard for running the university is to perpetuate a myth with disregard for legitimate arguments about inadequate preparation of faculty to do so, including inadequate faculty development during a faculty member's career. But myth is not susceptible to reasoning, an irony almost beyond comprehension when applied to the professoriate.

Nothing that has been said about the great defects in the way professors are prepared to execute their whole range of duties regarding shared governance should be construed to endorse an uncharitable perspective that professors are incompetent. Because professors tend to be learned people, not due to credentialing but
because of their native abilities that have been honed over time, they many times find ways to overcome the deficiencies imposed upon them by their lack of education regarding the full range of duties they are expected to perform—and perform well. Thus, the import of what has been said about those deficiencies does not disallow the development of great teachers. As Bolin (1995) argues, “it is not the things that teachers do in themselves that make great teachers, but the intangible something that transcends all of the variables—the way they craft their practice” (p. 31). Or as Bok (1991) asserts, “Great teachers emerge not so much by mastering a standard technique as through the special quality of their minds” (p. 15-16). The same could be said about excellent advising, superb committee work, and other aspects of professorial duties. But it is also fair to acknowledge that, as Bok (1991) also asserts, teaching can be improved.

Because many of the greatest teachers seem to succeed spontaneously, using methods that are often peculiar to themselves, it is tempting to conclude that teaching is simply too private and personal to be improved by purposeful, organized means. But that is clearly not the case. Much teaching is ineffective or uninspired either because instructors spend too little time preparing, or because they do not know what they are doing wrong, or because they are not aware of other ways to motivate, to illuminate, and ultimately to move their students to master a body of knowledge. These are all deficiencies that universities can help to remedy, either by challenging those who give too little time to their teaching, or by aiding instructors who need help in finding how to teach more effectively, or by experimenting more systematically to discover new ways to help students learn (p. 16).

Take away the one tail of the curve, the great teachers, and the vast middle of those left can find solace in the fact that the mystery of teaching is greatly tempered by solid practices professors can learn to improve their teaching.

The problem, however, is not whether teaching, student learning, advising, committee work, and so forth can be improved—they can—but whether a claim as august as is made in the Red Book about the seemingly credentialed authentication of professors to perform all the duties required of them to take the rightful place in shared
governance is credible—it isn’t. The claim is mythic, based on a misrepresentation of professorial credentials.

Denying Faculty Self-Interest

The misinterpretation of faculty status due to false assumptions about faculty credentials appears to be a ploy to advance faculty self-interest by giving faculty power to do what they believe is in their best interests, but cloaked as the best interests of higher education. Myth certainly tends to superimpose a view of reality that is not commensurate with the facts of reality, so declaring that faculty self-interest is consubstantial with institutional interests makes sense in mythic terms. However, to create the myth of shared governance, the AAUP has to deny the reality of faculty self-interest, and as such must deny, as Schwartz said, what they deny. In other words, the AAUP must deny the fact that faculty self-interest is not based in communal living but rather is based on solitude, and shared governance denies the extremely vital role of solitude in academic life.

Bergquist (1992) makes clear the role of solitude in academic life by noting, "Many faculty and administrators enter American colleges and universities precisely because they wish to be left alone to pursue their own teaching, research, writing or ideas" (p. 170). Fellowes (2003) confirms the general premise that faculty want to work according to their own dictates. He compares his professorial life with his life in business and says, "For most of my academic career I had been an independent contractor. Entering the business world, I began to appreciate that most of the world's work is not done by individuals, but rather by organizations, with individuals complexly interacting and fractionally contributing to the completion of shared tasks" (p. B16). Fellowes presents an alternative to the myth of shared governance by stressing the corporate nature of work in an organization and the fractional contributions organizational members make to ensure the organization achieves its goals. The myth of shared governance appears to fractionalize the role of everyone but the faculty, which ends up fracturing the hope of effective shared governance.

A corollary of the independent contractor mentality is self-importance, which is often nurtured in graduate school. As Eble (1990) notes, "Graduate school education often tends to foster arrogance about one’s little learning rather than humility toward one’s
greatest ignorance” (p. 20). Not only are professors entitled to pursue their own interests, even at the expense of the greater good of the academy (appealing to the guise of knowledge production to justify individual self-interest as contributing significantly to corporate self-interest), but also they can tell with unmistakable authority why they are entitled to such perks, even when they do not quite have all the facts right. But myth does not depend upon facts. Little wonder that the Red Book brims over with self-confidence about professorial rights, asserting in tones that brook no questions to its authority that professors are entitled to the lion’s and lioness’s share of authority in corporate decision making.

O’Brien (1998), however, is much closer to the truth about the faculty role in shared governance when he writes,

Faculty specialists have neither the taste for nor the training in the problems of the university-as-a-whole. The very purpose of appointing a distinguished chemist is not to have him be bothered with the budget and how many courses in French are needed for a proper education. If the university-as-a-whole . . . is at issue, what principles should be appealed to for “rational” decision? Lest anyone immediately assume that someone else possess this remarkable metaphysical talent—deans or presidents, students or trustees—I cheerfully admit that they are probably equally incapable of formulating more than an outline of a sketch of a possible scenario for the university overall. The difference, of course, is that presidents and trustees do make—or try to make—these decisions about the university institution under whatever conditions of enlightenment they can muster. (p. 19)

O’Brien’s point is not only that faculty are not trained to deal with global issues related to the university but also that they should not be expected to deal with those issues at the decision-making level. Faculty are not, therefore, precluded from giving advice about issues from their perspective, but their perspective tends to be limited because it focuses on their individual self-interest.

Creating a False Dichotomy between Faculty and Administration

Yet another error in the myth of shared governance is the false dichotomy between faculty and administration, thus ignoring the
faculty status of administrators. In most institutions of higher education in the United States, chairs, deans, provosts, and presidents have come through the academic ranks. Yet, they are part of academic administration, and, according to the myth of shared governance, are now enemies of academic freedom. In fact, the skills necessary to be an effective teacher are the skills necessary to be an effective administrator. As Fish (2003) notes, “Administration is, at its heart, an intellectual task” (p. B20). Corrigan agrees (2002), “Academic administration for me is simply the extension of my role as educator, and both are extensions of my role as citizen” (p. 9). The major distinction between typical faculty perceptions of the university and the necessary administrative perspective of the university is not intellectual versus anti-intellectual. Rather the difference is between part and whole. As Hoppe (2003) explains,

... the most critical factor to look for in aspiring academic leaders is fortitude: the will to make the right decisions for the right reasons. Unfortunately, some faculty who move into leadership roles are unable to make the right (and often tough) decisions because they are too tied to their faculty colleagues and to commonly revered privileges of the academy. For example, the role of an academic department chair requires a faculty member to balance a tightly held commitment to faculty freedom and loyalties with the need to hold a broader view of the university, its budgetary constraints, and its obligations to the whole. Many faculty cannot distance themselves enough from their faculty myopia to see the big picture and to make decisions that serve the university rather than just the faculty. As a faculty member moves through the academic pipeline, the distancing becomes increasingly critical. (pp. 5-6)

Fant (2007) emphasizes the transformation Hoppe talks about—seeing the big picture—when he describes how his view of the university had to change when he became a dean:

The dean really does have a completely different view of the academic universe. More than ever, I am painfully aware of the finitude of the budget. I am reminded constantly of the competition that exists between equally valid requests for personnel, for travel money, for additional scholarships, and
so forth. I am particularly sensitive to requests that reflect a genuine need that could transform a program.

As an administrator, I've learned to pursue fairness as a goal rather than uniformity. My experience has been that when administrators try assiduously to maintain uniformity among all of their stake holders, they end up cultivating mediocrity. A bar that is set with everyone and every situation in mind is a low bar indeed (p. C2).

In other words, effective administrators (and ineffective ones are available for critique) assume a global, big-picture perception of their university and use the tools of effective teaching to explain that perception and use that perception in decision making. Diacon (2007) says of deans, “Often they can see the forest in ways that professors cannot. They have a bigger picture both to paint and to interpret” (C3).

The myth of shared governance, however, completely ignores the fact that administrators, by and large, come from the faculty ranks, have often been successful as faculty members (contrary to the myth that they are failed academics), and know of what they speak. For some inexplicable reason, the Red Book's account gives virtually no credence to the faculty status of administrators, which, one would think, would be a positive attribute of administrative decision making regarding shared governance. Perhaps, however, the failure of those who compiled the Red Book to grant validity to the academic credentials of administrators is not so inexplicable when myth is invoked. Myth does not need to account for all the facts. Indeed, myth can omit pertinent facts that would call into question the myth. For example, should the academic experience of administrators as faculty members be acknowledged that would weaken the insidious picket line between faculty and administrators, and the heavy weighting of faculty opinion would be countered by an equally heavy weighting of academic administrators who view the academy from a global perspective. If administrative acumen based on professorial experience were given due weight, faculty could not, in all honesty, dismiss administrators so easily, as the myth of shared governance does.
Disregarding Faculty Workloads

Finally, the myth of shared governance disregards the reality of academic workloads, thus requiring faculty to fulfill a heroic function to satisfy a false notion of shared governance. As Brasseur (1998) points out, “it is incorrect to claim that faculty are apathetic, in my view (on average). What is a major problem is too many important issues to deal with at all times, making it extremely difficult to focus on any one issue for any length of time, including issues of university governance. Nevertheless we try as hard as we can within the time constraints. The university professor is simply too scattered—too much is expected” (p. 1). Rice (2006) agrees, particularly regarding junior faculty:

Junior faculty consistently report having to cope with what they regard as ‘over-flowing plates.’ As higher education begins to take seriously the demands for change in undergraduate education, early-career faculty are feeling extraordinary pressure and are beginning to question whether the career that has evolved is even viable. Questions are being raised about whether the best of a new generation can be attracted into the profession. We can no longer pursue an add-on approach to the changing faculty role; something more comprehensive is required (p. 11).

Myth, however, requires a hero because myth is not about reality but the ideal, and the ideal is unattainable. But mythically it makes perfect sense that professors should be engaged in what constitutes two full-time jobs: professor and administrator. That dual career must be what the AAUP envisions because the Red Book demands that professors make significant administrative decisions. Or does it? By implication, one would be hard pressed to differentiate professorial prerogatives from administrative fiat because professorial judgment, according to the myth of shared governance, constitutes the sine qua non in the academy. If administrators are necessary, their sole function is to endorse and enact professorial judgments. Administrators become professors’ secretaries.

However, what the Red Book never acknowledges is that professors are not interested in taking responsibility for decisions. Leatherman (1998), citing Tom Ingram, notes, “He believes that most faculty senates are ‘dysfunctional.’ He argues, as many others do,
that they are notoriously slow to act, reluctant to make hard decisions, and eschewed by the top scholars on the faculty" (p. 3). Whether faculty senates (and individual senators representing their colleagues) are reluctant to make hard decisions, they really shouldn't have to because "those who are put in governance positions [governing boards and presidents] do the governing. Nor should this be a cause for complaint unless they do it badly, which usually means not doing enough of it" (p. 7). In other words, faculty can share in governance, but not as the myth of shared governance would frame their role. Faculty are not the decision makers, but they should be part of the decision-making process, not the major part, as the Red Book would have it.

The faculty role, however, may be even narrower than many suggest, if Sperber's observations are normative. After retiring from 33 years of college teaching, Sperber (2007) thought he would miss teaching, but after two years of not teaching he realized he did not need

... the many commitments that go along with teaching. ... Not only showing up on time for class and office hours—some of my colleagues never mastered that aspect of the job—but also keeping all the extra appointments and study sessions with students, listening to ridiculous excuses, dealing with plagiarism, etc., etc. I had been free of all that for more than two years, and returning to it did not make a lot of sense to me (p. C4).

What did make sense was learning, and Sperber began to relish the opportunity to function as a student again. He notes, "The pressure to teach what you know well is relentless; indeed, the university pays teachers to do exactly that. However, that payment precludes professors from doing the kind of learning that a student gets to do" (p. C4).

Perhaps the greatest travesty of the myth of shared governance is that the role of learning that propelled the vast majority of faculty into professorial life is not highlighted. For the majority of faculty, learning remains the greatest pleasure of academic life. But if the myth of shared governance did acknowledge forthrightly the student status of faculty, academic freedom would be turned on its head because the love of learning, not the acquisition of political power, would be the burden of the AAUP. In such a scenario, shared governance would be
radically redefined in collegial terms that would have little resemblance to the myth of shared governance promulgated by the Red Book.

**OUTLINE OF COLLEGIALITY AS THE HEART OF SHARED GOVERNANCE**

The burden of this paper has been to show that the use of myth in administrative decision making is inappropriate, even extremely harmful, and the AAUP notion of decision making in higher education is mythic and, therefore, not a positive approach to shared governance. However, the question remains about what would be a positive model of decision making regarding shared governance. Although this paper has made some statements regarding positive shared governance, it is appropriate at this point to suggest in outline what might constitute the heart of shared governance.

In short, collegiality is central to effective shared governance in higher education, and collegiality requires a mutual respect for those with whom a person works. Bennett (1998, 2003) articulates a model of collegiality, which has many positive features that fit shared governance. At this juncture of this paper, the purpose in pointing toward Bennett's model is not to suggest that it is the only model of collegiality but to note that one model of collegiality directly related to higher education exists and offers many helpful recommendation for the governance of higher education. However, any model that has as its foundational premise animosity and antagonism driving shared governance is doomed to failure because the academy is founded on the free interchange of ideas that is both vigorous and respectful. If either rigor or respect is omitted from shared governance, the result is not mutuality but unhealthy relationships that bespeak of fracture and the failure of productive compromise. When one party in any relationship always must prevail, the relationship is reduced to a master-servant contract that inevitably leads to abuse and mistrust, given the human nature of both masters and servants. As has been noted, the Red Book's purpose is to impose a master-servant relationship on shared governance in higher education, which, has led, quite logically to unionization of faculty and the perpetuation of adversarial roles that are far removed from the ideal for which the academy stands, collegiality.
CONCLUSION

Given the myth of shared governance propagated by the AAUP, little wonder that the organization is in decline (Wilson, 2007). Little wonder that the AAUP became aligned with unions and collective bargaining in 1972, an alignment that does little to increase collegiality in governance but drives a deeper wedge between professors and administrators, defining shared governance in terms that bespeak of shared contention. Indeed, the use of myth in decision making has led to totalitarian governance, a position the AAUP appears to endorse via the Red Book. A heroic struggle between the cosmic forces of good (professors) and evil (administrators) is the stuff of myth, and the AAUP, in that regard has the “right” stuff.

Instead of using myth to explain the notion of shared governance advocated by the AAUP, one could simply say that the AAUP’s vision of higher education is founded on an overreaction to a historical situation. That overreaction attempted to provide legitimate protection to professors’ academic freedom. However, once the ground staked out by the overreaction was self-deeded, the arguments that supported the property acquisition became dogma, and dogma attracts true believers, those who have a heroic bent, a bent often nurtured in the academy with its grim determination to build theories, no mater how ludicrous or outlandish, including theories of shared governance. The myth of shared governance turns out to be, as in Greek drama, tragic. The hero, the audience learns, is blind, and the kingdom fails.

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