Modern Heterosexism and Social Dominance Orientation:

Do Subdomains of Heterosexism Function as Hierarchy-enhancing Legitimizing Myths?

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T. G. Morrison & M. A. Morrison (Eds.)
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Address correspondence to:

N. Eugene Walls
Graduate School of Social Work
University of Denver
2148 S. High St.
Denver CO 80208
Phone: (303) 871-4367
Fax: (303) 871-2845
Email: ewalls2@du.edu
Abstract

Subdomains of modern heterosexism are examined to determine if they function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths as social dominance theory predicts. Using an undergraduate sample of 456 female and 195 male students (N=651) from 6 colleges and universities, the study finds that three of the subdomains (aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, and paternalistic heterosexism), along with hostile heterosexism, function as predicted. However, positive stereotypic heterosexism (i.e., endorsement of positive stereotypes) appears to function somewhat differently. The findings support existing literature that suggests that modern forms of prejudice function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, while raising questions about how the endorsement of positive stereotypes might function to support social stratification.
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Introduction

Group inequalities in social, political, and economic outcomes have existed in virtually all post-hunter and gatherer societies (Davis & Moore, 1945; Kerbo, 2003). However, societies have varied significantly in the manner and extent of inequalities, by which characteristics are salient markers of status among social groups, and by who is included and excluded within these groups (Hofstede, 1984; Sidanius, 1993). In terms of these inequalities, societies can be conceptualized as systems of group-based social hierarchies where dominant groups receive a disproportionately large share of positive social values (e.g., political power, high social status, wealth, and material resources) and subordinate groups receive a disproportionately large share of negative social values (e.g., low social status, poverty, societal sanctions, and stigmatization; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). These inequalities in the social structure and its institutions are maintained, at least in part, by attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies that justify the stratification (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Jost, 1995). Given the long-standing and almost universal nature of these systems of inequality and the prejudice, stereotypes, violence, and coercion that accompany them, these issues have been topics of a considerable amount of research within the social sciences (Fiske, 1998).

The current study extends this scholarship by examining whether modern forms of prejudice function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths within the context of the social dominance theoretical framework. The relationships between various subdomains of modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2002) or modern heterosexism (Walls, in press), social
dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and support for lesbian and gay rights are investigated as a way to explore the relationship between modern prejudice and public policies that challenge existing social inequities.

A review of the literature will outline, first, the points of social dominance theory that are salient to this study, as well as a brief discussion of modern heterosexism and a description of the domains of modern heterosexism. Following that will be an examination of what is currently known about the relationship between social dominance orientation and both hostile and modern forms of heterosexism. Finally, findings relating social dominance orientation and public policies regarding lesbian women and gay men will be reviewed.

Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) was developed as an attempt to synthesize many of the theoretical approaches to understanding prejudice and discrimination. The theory argues that every complex society is organized by systems of social group-based hierarchies in which at least one social group has dominance over others, and at least one group occupies a subordinate position. The approach contends that there is a set of fundamental and general processes that undergird the emergence and maintenance of group-based stratification within societies even though there is variation in the degree to which societies are hierarchically organized and around which groups are granted status. Two components of social dominance theory that are salient for this study are social dominance orientation and legitimizing myths.

Social dominance orientation is defined as “...the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to outgroups” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742), and is captured by the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Those who are high in social dominance orientation are more likely to justify
stratification and the existing system of privileges and discrimination, while those who are low in social dominance orientation are more likely to support ideologies and values that seek to dismantle social stratification (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Empirical research has supported social dominance theory’s hypothesized relationship between social dominance orientation and various forms of prejudice toward a variety of social groups, and across a variety of cultures (Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation has been shown to be predictive of racism/ethnic prejudice (Pratto et al., 1994; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005), nationalism (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), the Protestant work ethic (Christopher & Mull, 2006), and political conservatism (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004) among other constructs. Likewise it is predictive of support for lesbian and gay rights (Cerecedes, 2003; Pratto et al., 1994), women’s rights (Heaven, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994), social welfare programs (Pratto et al., 1994), and affirmative action (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Haley & Sidanius, 2006; Jost & Thompson, 2000).

In order to minimize intergroup conflict, the group-based inequalities in a society are legitimized through ideologies which justify discrimination and the existing stratification (Jost & Banaji, 1994, Jost & Major, 2001; Sidanius, 1993). Within the context of social dominance theory, the term legitimizing myths is used to capture the concept of these system-justifying ideologies. Formally defined as “…values, attitudes, beliefs, causal attributions, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for social practices that either increase, maintain or decrease levels of social inequality among social groups” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 104), legitimizing myths are the cultural scripts that link individual belief to social practice. They may function to either enhance or attenuate stratification resulting in hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths.
Legitimizing myths also may take a number of different forms. They may be ideologies such as the Protestant work ethic, the belief that the U.S. is a meritocratic society, or the endorsement of democratic egalitarian values. They may be cultural beliefs such as the belief that intelligence is a fixed capacity that can be accurately measured by intelligence tests. Or, they may be stereotypes and prejudices about a social group.

One goal of social dominance theory has been to connect individual level differences with both cultural-level scripts and support or opposition to macro-level public policies. As such, the theory suggests that legitimizing myths mediate the relationship between individual level endorsement of social dominance orientation and support for (or opposition to) public policies that seek to attenuate stratification. In other words, part of the relationship between social dominance orientation and public policies is a result of the causal relationship between social dominance orientation and the various legitimizing myths. Social dominance orientation should, according to the theory, have both a direct relationship with public policy support, as well as an indirect relationship through legitimizing myths. In this way, legitimizing myths become the cultural scripts that connect the micro- to the macro-level.

Individuals who have a high social dominance orientation embrace hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and reject hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths. This endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths should, likewise, be related to higher endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing public policies and rejection of hierarchy-attenuating public policies. The opposite of this pattern should hold true for individuals who have a low social dominance orientation. The formal model for this relationship is represented in Figure 1.
Prior to the discussion of the literature on modern forms of prejudice toward lesbian women and gay men, a word on the choice of the term *heterosexism* is in order. Prejudice toward lesbian women and gay men has been called a number of terms, including homophobia (Blumfield, 1992; Smith, 1971; Weinberg, 1974), homoerotophobia (Churchill, 1967), homosexuality (Hansen, 1982a, 1982b; Lehne, 1976), heterosexism (Morin & Garfinkle, 1978; Pharr, 1988), homonegativism (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980), homo-hatred (Appleby & Anastas, 1998), homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2002) and sexual prejudice (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Herein, the term *heterosexism* will be used, and is conceptualized as the system of attitudes, behaviors, policies and norms toward lesbian women and gay men (both at individual and institutional levels) that support the subjugation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals and communities, and the concomitant privileging of heterosexual identities. The term heterosexism has been chosen over the numerous other options for a number of reasons. First, it parallels the construction of other words used to denote systems of subjugation based on social location, position, and identity, such as racism, sexism, and classism. Second, it is one of the two most widely known ways of referring to anti-gay prejudice in the existing academic literature (Appleby & Anastas, 1998). Third, heterosexism was chosen over the term homophobia as homophobia has been criticized by numerous scholars as connoting an irrational psychological disorder -- a phobia. Finally, while some scholars have championed the use of the term homophobia to represent individually-held prejudices and behaviors, and heterosexism to denote institutional-level processes including the privileging of heterosexuality, the use of the terms in such a manner obscures the integrated
nature whereby individual attitudes and behaviors foster and justify institutional and systemic processes, which concomitantly reinforce and support individual attitudes and behaviors.

The term *hostile heterosexism* is used within this paper to capture traditional anti-gay attitudes based on pathologizing lesbian women and gay men either psychologically, socially, or morally, regardless of which terminology or measure the original author used. Similarly the term *modern heterosexism* is used as an umbrella term capturing the various theorized domains of heterosexism based on the ideas of modern prejudice theory. The decision to use these two terms in this manner is not meant to deny nuanced differences in theoretical understandings of, or the measures capturing, the attitudes and beliefs within each type of heterosexism, but to underscore the differentiation between old-fashioned and modern heterosexism clusters.

**Modern Heterosexism**

Modern prejudice theorists argue that the way in which prejudicial attitudes toward historically marginalized groups gets expressed has changed. The overt expression of racism, sexism, and heterosexism that was much more prevalent and open in the recent past of the U.S. has decreased (Bachrach, Hindin, & Thomson, 2000; Balanko, 1998; Farley, 1997; Jones, 1999), and been replaced by forms of prejudice that are much more subtle and covert (McConahay, 1986; Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995; Walls, in press). Historically, old-fashioned heterosexism has been based on ideologies that pathologize homosexuality. These ideas have emanated from a number of sources including religion (homosexuality as immoral and sinful), cultural constructions of hegemonic masculinity (homosexuality as weak and submissive), and natural law (homosexuality as unnatural), to name a few. Modern heterosexism, on the other hand, is not based – at least rhetorically – on the pathologizing of homosexuality. Instead modern heterosexism embodies
arguments that support the continued subjugation of same-sex oriented people and the
privileging of heterosexuality through rhetoric that is grounded more in justifications within the
sociopolitical realm rather than the character of the lesbian and gay person or community.
Modern heterosexism is less overtly pathologizing and hostile. Examples of justifications that
modern heterosexists might currently deploy, for example, include suggesting that lesbian
women and gay men are militant, demanding too much, too quickly. They might suggest that
discrimination and prejudice against the community is a thing of the past. They might claim that
they have nothing against gay people, but – out of a sense of protection – that they would never
want one of their children to be lesbian or gay. Finally, they may invoke supposedly positive
stereotypes about lesbian women and gay men.

Building on the theoretical foundation laid by modern racism and sexism researchers,
Morrison and Morrison (2002) developed a scale – the Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS) –
to capture negative attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men that are not based on moral and
religious objections (as they are in “old-fashioned” homonegativity). The scale performed well
psychometrically in the four initial studies undertaken to test its reliability and validity, and
factor analysis identified that the scale was unidimensional as theorized. Two additional studies
have further supported the psychometric properties of the instrument (Morrison, Kenny, &
Harrington, 2005). In both publications, the authors found that modern homonegativity emerged
as a separate domain, distinct from old-fashioned homonegativity.

Cowan, Heiple, Marquez, Khatchadourian, and McNevin (2005) examined modern
heterosexism by using a modified version of the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995) where
they replaced the term women with gays and lesbians. Their derived scale had acceptable
reliability and functioned as predicted. A recent study by Morrison and Bearden (2007)
Modern Heterosexism

A final study that sought to extend the ideas of modern prejudice into the area of heterosexism was completed by Walls (in press). Similar to Morrison and Morrison (2002), Walls developed and examined an instrument, the Modern Heterosexism Inventory (MHI), over a series of four studies. Walls, however, argued that modern prejudice theory suggested more than just one domain of modern heterosexism and theorized the existence of four specific subdomains: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism. As the current study utilizes the MHI, a brief summary of the four subdomains is presented next and the scale is included in Appendix A. For full discussion of the different domains, see Walls (in press).

In contrast to hostile heterosexism, which uses rhetoric relying on traditional negative stereotypes to pathologize lesbian women and gay men, aversive heterosexism is couched in less inflammatory language. Aversive heterosexist rhetoric might argue that the lesbian and gay movement is wanting too much, too fast, or that the movement is militant. The aversion here is not necessarily a cognitive and emotional aversion to lesbian and gay people per se (although it could be), but rather aversion to the political and cultural demands of the movement or the pace of those demands. While much of white opposition to integration of African Americans in the southern U.S.A. in the 1960s was based on old-fashioned racist notions, some resistance from
more moderate segments of society was, at least rhetorically, grounded in concern about the tactics and pace of social change, as well as the implications of that change on stability and established interests. Famous examples of such rhetoric include the "Call for Unity" and "An Appeal for Law and Order and Common Sense" letters written by religious leaders in Birmingham, Alabama to which King responded with his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail." Kopkind (1971) also demonstrates a similar political process whereby the Kerner Commission Report (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968) was watered down by political moderates who believed the initial recommendations were too radical and threatened established interests.

Due to use of the term *aversive*, it might be tempting to assume that aversive heterosexism is akin to Gaertner and Dovidio's (1986) conceptualization of aversive racism. However, it should be noted that Gaertner and Dovidio's (1986) construct is based on the idea of a conflict between the values of egalitarianism and anti-black sentiments held at an unconscious level by the same individual. While an individual's aversive heterosexist discourse may very well emerge from a similar intrapsychic conflict about lesbian and gay people, aversive heterosexism has not been conceptualized in terms of its psychological etiology, but rather in terms of the social manifestation of particular forms of rhetoric that justify continuation of social stratification based on sexual orientation.

The second form of modern prejudice is *amnestic heterosexism*. Endorsement of amnestic heterosexism is a shift to a cluster of attitudes that appear less hostile than aversive heterosexism. The amnestic heterosexist might suggest that discrimination is a thing of the past, and that lesbian women and gay men are treated fairly in contemporary society. The amnestic heterosexist may be making these claims out of ignorance, out of refusal to acknowledge factual
information, for political mobilization reasons, or even out of life experience where they see many successful lesbian women and gay men.

The third form of modern heterosexism is *paternalistic heterosexism*. Individuals may express this set of cognitive and affective components toward lesbian women and gay men as a conceptual social group or as concern for specific lesbian or gay (or potentially lesbian or gay) individuals. The conceptualization of paternalistic heterosexism requires both an expression of concern combined with an indication of preference for heterosexuality. A paternalistic heterosexist may express, for example, that while she does not have anything against gay or lesbian people, she would rather her daughter not be a lesbian because it would make her daughter's life harder in some way.

The last domain of modern heterosexism is *positive stereotypic heterosexism*. This domain represents the endorsement of positive stereotypes (e.g., gay men are creative, lesbian women are independent). Positive stereotypic heterosexism reinforces stereotypes, albeit with a focus on alleged or actual appreciation for the stereotypic characteristic(s). While long overlooked by researchers, an increasing number of scholars are beginning to question the role that positive stereotypes may play in maintaining systems of stratification (Czopp, 2004, in press; Morrison & Bearden, 2007; Walls, in press).

Social Dominance Orientation and Heterosexism

*SDO and Hostile Heterosexism*

Across different types of negatively-valenced prejudice against various social groups, social dominance orientation has been found to be one of the strongest predictors (Altemeyer, 1998). Likewise, while limited, the studies that have been published on the relationship between
social dominance orientation and hostile heterosexism suggest that social dominance orientation functions similarly.

Using various measures of hostile heterosexism (e.g., Attitudes towards Lesbians and Gay men [Herek, 1988], Heterosexual Attitudes toward Homosexuals [Larson, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980]), a few studies have demonstrated that higher levels of social dominance orientation are associated with increased levels of traditional, anti-gay prejudice (Kilianski, 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Bertram, 2000; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, 2000; Whitley & Lee, 2000). Further, while anti-egalitarianism and social dominance orientation are not the same theoretical concept, they are closely related, with attitudes toward egalitarianism occasionally being used as a proxy for social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In line with the findings on social dominance orientation and hostile heterosexism, researchers have found consistently that hostile heterosexism is associated with increased anti-egalitarian attitudes and values, or conversely that pro-gay attitudes are associated with egalitarian attitudes (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Brewer, 2003; Wilcox & Wolpert, 1996, 2000). Hegarty, Pratto, and Lemieux (2004) have argued – much in line with the symbolic racism literature – that a tension exists between the norm of egalitarianism and anti-gay affect resulting in what they call heterosexist ambivalence. Likewise, Ellis (2002) found that undergraduate students expressed high levels of endorsement of egalitarianism until it clashed with their ideological beliefs regarding lesbian women and gay men at which time their anti-gay/anti-lesbian beliefs appeared to override their commitment to equality.

**SDO and Modern Heterosexism**

While there is not extensive research on modern forms of prejudice within the social dominance theoretical framework, what has been done has focused primarily on symbolic racism
Modern Heterosexism (Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; see relatedly, Arriola & Cole, 2001) or modern sexism (Sibley & Wilson, 2004). These studies have tended to indicate that modern prejudice functions as predicted by social dominance theory.

One study that has been published that examines social dominance orientation and various forms of heterosexism was completed by Worthington, Dillon, and Becker-Schutte (2005). They examined five subdomains of heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men. Two of those subdomains – hate and religious conflict – mirror traditional forms of hostile heterosexism, and in line with previous findings using more established measures of hostile heterosexism, higher levels of social dominance orientation were significantly correlated with both subdomains. One subdomain, knowledge of LGB history, symbols, and community, captured respondents’ awareness of lesbian and gay culture and was – as expected – negatively related to social dominance orientation. Likewise the two remaining subdomains also were negatively related to social dominance orientation. They captured support for lesbian and gay civil rights, and what the authors termed internalized affirmation – a five-item factor which reflects “…a personalized affirmativeness and a willingness to engage in proactive social activism” (p. 108).

While Worthington et al. (2005) found relationships in the expected directions between subdomains of heterosexism and social dominance orientation, their study has a number of limitations. First, they did not examine the mediating effect of prejudice on the relationship between social dominance orientation and public policy support that the theory predicts. While this may be seen simply as an avenue for future research, social dominance theory predicts hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths function specifically as mediating variables between SDO and public policy support. As such, in order to examine whether various domains of
attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men functioned as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, the test of mediation is vital. The second limitation is that Worthington and colleagues' (2005) conceptualization of heterosexism fails to examine subdomains of attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men that have been suggested as integral components of modern heterosexism by either Morrison and Morrison (2002) or Walls (in press), or by the modern prejudice literature in general. These include clusters of attitudes such as believing that the lesbian and gay rights movement is too militant, or that discrimination is a thing of the past. With regard to the actual psychometrics of the measure used, Worthington et al. (2005) acknowledged a number of inconsistencies across their studies, and potential issues with inflation of validity measures, leading them to recommend further examination of the psychometrics of the scale. Finally, the Worthington et al. (2005) scale does not discriminate between attitudes toward lesbian women and attitudes toward gay men which have been shown to be an important difference (Herek, 1988, 2000; LaMar & Kite, 1998; Whitley & Kite, 1993).

Social Dominance Orientation and Lesbian and Gay Rights

While in general, higher degrees of social dominance orientation predict support for discriminatory public policies and opposition to values of harmony, openness and equality (Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Heaven & Connors, 2001; Knight, 2004; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sibley & Liu, 2004), the vast majority of this research has not examined policies seeking to ameliorate inequities based on sexual orientation. The small amount of research that has been undertaken suggests that respondents higher in social dominance orientation are – as predicted by the theory – less likely to support lesbian and gay rights (Pratto et al., 1994), same-sex marriage (Cerecedes, 2003), and same-sex civil unions (Saucier & Cawman, 2004).
Heterosexism and Lesbian and Gay Rights

Hostile Heterosexism and Lesbian/Gay Rights

More, though still limited, scholarship exists on the relationship between attitudes regarding lesbian women and gay men, and attitudes toward lesbian and gay rights. Higher levels of hostile heterosexism, not surprisingly, have been found to be predictive of opposition to lesbian and gay rights (Wood & Bartkowski, 2004; Yang, 1997), civil unions (Saucier & Cawman, 2004), equalizing age of sexual consent laws for heterosexuals and lesbian women/gay men (Moran, 2001; Waites, 2000, 2001), restrictive policies regarding HIV and AIDS (Dunlap, 1989; Jelen & Wilcox, 1992; Price & Hsu, 1992), and opposition to civil rights for transgender men and women (Tee & Hegarty, 2006). Likewise, stronger endorsement of negative stereotypes of lesbian women and gay men also has been associated with decreased support for a composite measure of gay and lesbian rights which included attitudes about adoption, serving in the military, and filing joint taxes (Wood & Bartkowski, 2004).

It should be noted that few studies have examined the impact of hostile heterosexist attitudes on actual civic engagement behaviors that seek to directly affect public policy. One study that moved beyond the link between hostile heterosexism and public policy attitudes to an examination of political behavior was done by Saucier and Cawman (2004). They linked higher levels of hostile heterosexism with voting patterns, active opposition to Howard Dean’s candidacy for governor of Vermont, and increased support for Take Back Vermont, an organization seeking to abolish same sex civil unions in that state. In their analysis of the arguments offered by those supporting discrimination against lesbian women and gay men, Saucier and Cawman found a consistent claim that the opposition to same sex civil unions was not based in anti-gay/anti-lesbian attitudes per se, but rather was attributed to other factors – a
pattern parallel to the one found in the aversive racism literature (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Likewise, in examinations of the rhetoric used against the repeal of Section 28 in Great Britain – a repeal that would have equalized age of consent for sex for both opposite sex and same sex partners – Waites (2001) suggests that the arguments for anti-lesbian/anti-gay discrimination had undergone “refinement” such as discussing the repeal of Section 28 as “lowering the age of consent” instead of “equalizing the age of consent”. Moran (2001) noted that opponents of the repeal spoke carefully to avoid condemnation of homosexuality – instead of talking of sin, they talked of the “lack of moral equivalence” between heterosexuality and homosexuality.

Modern Heterosexism and Lesbian/Gay Rights

Like most of the scholarship on heterosexism, the empirical work on the relationship between attitudes regarding lesbian women and gay men and public policies has focused predominately on hostile heterosexism. In the one study identified that examined the relationship directly, Morrison et al. (2005) found that modern heterosexism (as measured by the Modern Homonegativity Scale) was negatively correlated with support for lesbian and gay rights using the Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights scale (Ellis, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2002). They tested the relationship between modern heterosexism toward lesbians with support for lesbian rights, and the relationship between modern heterosexism toward gay men with support for the rights of gay men. In both cases, the predicted relationship held. While it is clear that rhetoric used to legitimize support for the continuance of discriminatory policies based on sexual orientation is shifting away from traditional hostile heterosexist justification, other than the one study cited above, little is known about the relationship between modern forms of heterosexism and lesbian- and gay-related public policies.
Hypotheses

*Social Dominance Orientation and Heterosexism*

Based on the existing literature, it is anticipated that higher scores on the SDO scale will be associated with higher scores on the Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men (short form, ATLG-S; Herek, 1988), a measure of hostile heterosexism. This relationship, if found, would mirror previous findings.

Given the empirical evidence of the relationship between social dominance orientation and modern forms of racism, sexism, and heterosexism, it is anticipated that higher scores on the SDO scale also will be associated with higher scores on all four measures of modern heterosexism (MHI-Amnestic, MHI-Aversive, MHI-Paternalistic, and MHI-Positive Stereotypic).

*Social Dominance Orientation and Lesbian and Gay Rights*

Social dominance orientation has consistently been negatively correlated with support for policies that seek to decrease levels of social stratification. Therefore, it is anticipated that higher scores on the SDO scale will be associated with lower scores on the measure of support for lesbian and gay rights.

*Heterosexism and Lesbian and Gay Rights*

Hostile heterosexism has consistently been shown to predict opposition to lesbian and gay rights when measured by a number of different instruments capturing homophobic attitudes. ATLG-S scores, therefore, should be negatively related to the measure of support for lesbian and gay rights.

Research examining the relationship between modern forms of heterosexism and support for lesbian and gay rights is limited. One study found – as hypothesized – that increases in
modern heterosexism (as measured by the Modern Homonegativity Inventory [Morrison & Morrison, 2002]) were associated with decreased support for gay and lesbian civil rights (Morrison et al., 2005). While not specifically using a measure of lesbian and gay rights per se, one other study examined the relationship between modern heterosexism and perceptions of hate crimes against lesbian women and gay men. The authors found that increases in their measure of modern heterosexism were associated with increased levels of approval of hate crimes, and decreased levels of perception of hate crimes as harmful and offensive (Cowan et al., 2005). In addition to these two empirical studies, a number of studies have demonstrated that opposition to public policies promoting equity for lesbian women and gay men has frequently been justified through rhetoric that moves away from condemnation of homosexuality as immoral (as would be expected in hostile heterosexism) toward justifications that appear less hostile (Burridge, 2004; Waites, 2001). This type of shift in political rhetoric supports the argument from the modern prejudice literature that when expression of prejudicial attitudes becomes stigmatized, new rhetoric and ideologies evolve that justify the continuation of social stratification based on rationale that appear “less” prejudicial. It could reasonably be argued that three of the four forms of modern heterosexism examined in this study – aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, and paternalistic heterosexism – fall under this rubric. Therefore, it is anticipated that higher scores on the MHI that capture these three domains of heterosexism (MHI-Amnestic, MHI-Aversive, MHI-Paternalistic) will be associated with decreased scores on the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights. Only one additional subtype of heterosexism remains: positive stereotypic heterosexism.

As positive stereotypic heterosexism is subjectively experienced as favorable, it might seem reasonable to expect that many of the respondents who endorse positive stereotypes of
lesbian women and gay men may consider themselves non-heterosexist. As such, these respondents may very well be supportive of lesbian and gay rights. This rationale would lead to the hypothesis that those with higher levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism should be more supportive of lesbian and gay rights. However, another argument – with increasing empirical support – suggests the opposite (or a least a more complex) relationship.

Research on the model minority stereotype about Asians (e.g., Asians are good students, Asians are good in math) has demonstrated that priming for these positive stereotypes can negatively affect Asian Americans' emotional state and performance on tasks related to the stereotype content under certain conditions (Chng, Ding, & Perez, 1998; Crystal, Chen, Fuligni, & Stevenson, 1994; Shih, Ambaday, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002) similar to the effect of negative stereotypes in stereotype threat contexts (Steele & Aronson, 1995). In their study of the model minority stereotype, Lin, Kwan, Cheung, and Fiske (2005) found that the more non-Asian respondents in their study stereotyped Asians as being highly competent, the less willing they were to be roommates with Asian American students. Czopp and Monteith's (2006) work on endorsement of positive stereotypes of African Americans suggests that some whites may use complimentary stereotypes (e.g., African Americans are natural athletes, African Americans are musically talented) as a way to establish moral credentials (Monin & Miller, 2001) that they are not racist, which in turn gives them greater permission to voice their hostile attitudes about African Americans.

From a more structural perspective, Czopp (2004) found that white males were more likely to encourage African American student athletes than white student athletes to pursue professional sports careers at the expense of their academic performance. This suggests that positive stereotypes may play a role in maintaining structural occupational segregation by
encouraging pursuit of careers that have a lower likelihood of success. Walls (2007) has demonstrated that positive stereotypes are correlated with decreased support for ameliorative public policies – at least for those who score low on hostile forms of prejudice. Finally, Jost and Kay (2005) found evidence that positive stereotypes can function as cultural scripts that justify and legitimize social stratification.

Given the increasing amount of evidence that endorsement of positive stereotypes plays a role in maintaining social stratification, it is hypothesized, in accordance with social dominance theory, that positive stereotypic heterosexism will function as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth. Therefore, higher scores on the MHI-Positive Stereotypic scale should be associated with lower scores on the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights.

**Mediating Role of Heterosexism.**

The final hypotheses regard the central relationships predicted by social dominance theory. Figure 1 outlines the theoretical relationship whereby social dominance is directly associated with support for public policies that promote or challenge stratification, and social dominance is indirectly associated with support for those public policies through hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths such as prejudicial attitudes. In line with this theoretical understanding of the manner in which legitimizing myths function, it is predicted that the variables capturing all five subdomains of heterosexism (ATLG-S, MHI-Amnestic, MHI-Aversive, MHI-Paternalistic, and MHI-Positive Stereotypic) will partially mediate the relationship between the SDO scale and the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights. If supported, these results will suggest that social dominance is associated directly with opposition to gay and lesbian rights, and indirectly through modern subdomains of heterosexism, acting as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths.
Methodology

Participants

Participants in the study were undergraduates taking introductory social science courses at six U.S. colleges and universities. As one option to complete a course component on social science research, students could participate in the web-based study. Five of the research sites were private universities, consisting of two Catholic-affiliated schools, one Mennonite-affiliated college, one Baptist-affiliated university, and one university not affiliated with a religious denomination. The sixth school was a medium-sized public university in the Midwest.

The overall sample consisted of 651 undergraduates taking introductory social science courses, a sample size larger than the number needed to be adequate for testing of small to medium structural equation models which is approximately 400 (Boomsma, 1983). Of the 651 respondents, 70.1% were female and 29.9% were males. Caucasians made up the majority of the sample (81.1%), followed by Hispanics (6.7%), African Americans (5.4%), Asian/Asian Americans (3.9%), biracial (2.3%), and less than 1% each of individuals who identified as Native Americans, or other. The majority of respondents were first year students (54.2%), 25.5% were sophomores, 12.9% were juniors and the remaining 7.4% were seniors.

Ages ranged from 18 to 56, with a mean of 20.4 years ($SD=4.5$). Approximately 3% of the students identified themselves as lower class, followed by 19% as working class, 66% as middle class, and 12% as upper class.

With regard to religion, respondents were asked a series of questions. First, they were asked, "What religion do you consider yourself?" with a response set of Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, No religious belief/agnostic/atheist, and Other, please specify. They were then asked, "If you are a Christian, which of the following categories best describes you?".
The response set for this question was based on the religious tradition schema developed by Steensland et al. (2000) and included Catholic, Conservative non-traditional (Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Christian Science, etc.), Evangelical Protestant (Baptist, AME, Church of God in Christ, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, etc.), Liberal non-traditional (Unitarian, Unity, Humanistic, Spiritualists, New Age, etc.), Mainline Protestant (Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, United Churches of Christ, Disciples of Christ, etc.), and Non-denominational. Finally, as a check on respondents’ self-classification, they were asked the open-ended question, "What is the actual name of the church you attend or consider yourself to be part of (this information is for denominational classification purposes only)?" Combining the answers to these three questions to obtain a classification of religious tradition, it was found that 38.1% of the sample reported religious affiliations as Catholic, 34.1% with churches in denominations classified as conservative Protestant, 14.4% reported no religious affiliation, 11.6% as mainline or liberal Protestant, and the remaining 1.7% as other non-Christian religious affiliations.

To determine political affiliation, respondents were asked, "On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following best describes your views?" with a response set from Strongly liberal to Strongly conservative. Combining the categories of strongly liberal, somewhat liberal, and slightly liberal into one category, and the three corresponding categories at the conservative end of the continuum, almost 35% of the respondents consider themselves politically liberal, 24% moderate, and the remaining 41% conservative.

The online survey was programmed in such a way as to decrease the likelihood of missed items or failure to complete the survey. For all missed items on the survey, the online program would prompt respondents to insure that they had intended to skip the question. Therefore, the
range of missing data on items went from no missing values on the first four items of the survey to a maximum of eleven missing values (1.69%) on the income question. The vast majority of items had between three missing cases (0.5%) and seven missing cases (1.1%). Maximum likelihood multiple imputation was utilized using the LISREL 8.71 program (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2002) to address issues of missing values.

Measures and Instruments

The measures selected were drawn from published studies examining social dominance, prejudicial attitudes, and/or public opinions. All scales used have demonstrated adequate psychometric qualities.

Hostile heterosexism. Negatively-valenced prejudicial attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men were captured using the short form of Herek’s (1988) Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (ATLG-S). This scale and its long form version are among the most widely used scales to measure attitudes about lesbian women and gay men in the last twenty years (for recent examples, see Ellis et al., 2002; Span & Vidal, 2003; van de Meerendonk, Eisinga & Felling, 2003). The scale consists of ten items, five capturing attitudes toward lesbian women, and five capturing attitudes toward gay men. The scale contains items such as, "Female homosexuality is a sin," and "I think male homosexuals are disgusting." The response set used was a seven point Likert scale yielding a range of scores from 10 to 70. Higher scores indicate higher levels of hostile heterosexism. The scale and its longer version have undergone extensive testing for factor structure, item analysis, construct validity and reliability (Herek, 1984, 1987, 1988; Stoever & Morera, 2007; for a review of the empirical evidence of the validity of the short form of the scale, see Herek, 1994.)
Modern heterosexism. The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI; Walls, in press; see Walls and Rodriguez, 2002 for earlier versions) captures four subdomains of modern heterosexism – aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism. The reliability of the overall scale is reported at .82, while the reliabilities of the subdomain scales were reported at .84, .64, .89 and .90, respectively. The instrument consists of 23 questions with six items capturing aversive heterosexism, four capturing amnestic heterosexism, seven capturing paternalistic heterosexism, and six capturing positive stereotypic heterosexism (see Appendix A). The response set for the paternalistic heterosexism scale includes a seven point Likert scale with an additional response for those who do not have preference for a heterosexual child over a gay or lesbian child to indicate such. The response set for the remaining three scales are seven point Likert scales. Scores for each scale are standardized to a seven point range where higher numbers represent greater endorsement of that domain of heterosexism. The scales have performed as hypothesized with constructs such as authoritarianism, hostile heterosexism, interpersonal contacts, political ideology, gender role discrepancy, and religiosity.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale is a 16-item measure resulting from the testing of items on 18,741 respondents in 45 samples from eleven different countries. Some of the samples used for psychometric testing were probability samples, while others were convenience samples. Respondents have included secondary students, undergraduates and more than 4,500 non-student adults. (See Sidanius & Pratto [1999] for full details on samples.) The measure captures general preference for inequality among social groups and support for hierarchy. Questions include statements such as "Inferior groups should stay in their place" and "Some groups of people are
simply inferior to other groups.” The response set used was a seven point Likert scale yielding a possible range of scores from 16 to 112. Higher scores on the SDO scale indicate higher levels of social dominance orientation.

SDO has demonstrated strong reliability including one study using a one-month time interval between administrations of the scale ($r = .86$, $p < .01$; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have demonstrated that the scale captures a construct that is distinct from political conservatism, authoritarianism, and a number of personality constructs including propensity for cruelty (Altemeyer, 1998), neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience, and extroversion (Pratto et al., 1994).

Support for lesbian/gay rights. Six questions were asked to determine respondents’ level of support for lesbian and gay rights. Questions were based on recent political issues that have been in the media regarding public policies directly affecting lesbian women and gay men because of their sexual orientation. These questions include: (1) “Lesbian women and gay men should NOT be allowed to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces”; (2) “I favor laws to protect lesbian women and gay men against job discrimination” (Rosenstone, Kinder, Miller, & National Election Studies, 1996); (3) “Same-sex couples should have the right to marry one another” (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 1998); (4) “Private same-sex sexual behavior between consenting adults should be illegal in the U.S.”; (5) “Lesbian women and gay men should be NOT allowed to adopt children even if they meet all the other criteria required of adoptive parents”; (6) “It is necessary to pass laws to make sure that lesbian women and gay men have equal rights” (CBS News/The New York Times, 1993). Responses to questions 1, 4, and 5 were reverse-coded. The response set was a seven point Likert scale resulting in a possible range of scores from 6 to 42. Higher scores indicate greater support for lesbian and gay rights.
Results

In addition to the tests to determine whether the five subdomains of heterosexism function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths as predicted by social dominance theory, differences in the school subsamples were tested and are briefly discussed. Following that is the examination of the various scales reliabilities in the sample, broken down by gender, and this section ends with the tests of mediation. Analyses other than structural equation modeling were completed using Stata 9.2 (StataCorp, 2005), ScoreRel CI (Barnette, 2005), and MedGraph-I (Jose, 2003). LISREL was used for the structural equation modeling. Bonferroni adjustments were used to decrease likelihood of a Type I error. Mediation testing was conducted using a process similar to the four steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, the path coefficient between SDO and the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights was examined for significance. Then, the coefficient between SDO and the measure capturing the specific domain of heterosexism was similarly examined. In the third step, the relationship between the measure capturing the specific domain of heterosexism and the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights was examined for significance, controlling for SDO. Finally, the difference in the path coefficient between SDO and the measure capturing support for lesbian and gay rights with and without the mediator variable was examined for significance using Sobel's (1982) test. Additionally two other measures are reported which represent slightly modified tests similar to Sobel's (Aroian, 1947; Goodman, 1960). For detailed information on the differences between the tests, see MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002).

Subsample Differences

Data were collected at six different universities and colleges as a way to increase variability within the sample. The universities were chosen such that there was institutional
variability in terms of characteristics such as religious affiliation (Catholic, Mennonite, Baptist, and secular), gender composition (coed and all female), social class (public and private), and political orientation (conservative, moderate, and liberal). As such, some of the variability on the dependent variable or on the mediating variables could be a result of such differences. To determine if differences existed, the dependent variable and the mediating variables were examined in two ways. First, the bivariate relationships were examined to determine if school differences emerged. Then, for variables in which school differences emerged, multivariate relationships were examined controlling for the above-mentioned characteristics that varied between the schools and on which purposive sampling of schools was based.

In the bivariate examination, no differences emerged on the primary dependent variable, the measure of support for lesbian and gay rights, nor on the mediating variables, MHI-Amnestic and MHI-Paternalistic (analyses not shown). Differences did, however, emerge on the mediating variables, ATLG-S, MHI-Aversive, and MHI-Positive Stereotypic whereby one or two schools differed significantly from the others. All significant differences, however, disappeared once religious affiliation, social class, gender, and political orientation were added to the analyses.

*Descriptive Statistics and Scale Score Reliabilities*

Table 1 shows the reliability coefficients with 95% confidence intervals, means and standard deviations for the SDO, the support for lesbian and gay rights scale, the ATLG-S, and the four scales of the MHI. Additionally, information is included on the percentage of the sample that scored above the midpoint on each of the separate scales. Inspection of the mean scale scores indicates that, on average, males score higher on SDO, ATLG-S, and all four scales of the MHI, and females score higher on support for lesbian and gay rights (analyses not shown). Gender differences were examined using t-tests, with results indicating that male and female
participants differed significantly \((p<.05)\) on all scales with the exception of the paternalistic heterosexism. Table 2 lists the correlations for all scales.

**Mediation Results**

*Hostile heterosexism.* Hostile heterosexism functions as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth as predicted by social dominance theory. Figure 2 illustrates the structural relationship between social dominance orientation, hostile heterosexism, and support for lesbian and gay rights. Increased levels of social dominance orientation positively related to increased levels of hostile heterosexism \((p<.001)\) and negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights \((p<.001)\). Likewise, hostile heterosexism is negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights \((p<.001)\). Hostile heterosexism partially mediates the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights, reducing social dominance orientation’s relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights from a \(t\)-value of -8.43 in the bivariate relationship (not shown) to a \(t\)-value of -3.35. A Sobel's test value of 6.06 (Aroian value = 6.06, Goodman value = 6.07) indicates significance.

*Aversive heterosexism.* Aversive heterosexism also appears to work in the manner predicted by social dominance theory. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship. In the model, higher levels of social dominance orientation are associated with higher levels of aversive heterosexism \((p<.001)\), and lower levels of support for lesbian and gay rights \((p<.001)\). Aversive heterosexism is negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights \((p<.001)\) and partially mediates the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights (i.e., a \(t\)-value of -8.43 in the bivariate relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights is reduced to that of a \(t\)-value of -4.55). The mediation effect is
significant as indicated by a Sobel's test value of 6.03 (Aroian value = 6.01, Goodman value = 6.04).

Amnestic heterosexism. Social dominance orientation is positively related to amnestic heterosexism ($p<.001$), and negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights ($p<.001$). Amnestic heterosexism is negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights ($p<.001$). The addition of amnestic heterosexism to the model reduces the t-value of -8.43 for the bivariate relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights to a t-value of -5.26. Amnestic heterosexism partially mediates the relationship resulting in a Sobel's test value of 4.65 (Aroian value = 4.63, Goodman value = 4.68). This model is illustrated in Figure 4.

Paternalistic heterosexism. Paternalistic heterosexism functions as predicted. Figure 5 shows the results of the model. Social dominance orientation is significantly correlated with paternalistic heterosexism ($p<.001$), and support for lesbian and gay rights ($p<.05$), while paternalistic heterosexism is negatively correlated with support for lesbian and gay rights ($p<.001$). The relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights is partially mediated by the addition of paternalistic heterosexism to the model represented by a drop in t-value from -8.43 in the bivariate relationship to -3.34. A Sobel's test value of 2.60 (Aroian value = 2.51, Goodman value = 2.55) indicates significance.

Positive stereotypic heterosexism. The last subdomain of heterosexism to be examined is positive stereotypic heterosexism. The hypotheses that increased levels of social dominance orientation are associated with increased levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism ($p<.001$), and with decreased support for lesbian and gay rights ($p<.001$) are supported (see Figure 6). Contrary to what was predicted, however, positive stereotypic heterosexism moves from a
significant negative relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights in the bivariate relationship \((t=-2.64, \text{ not shown})\) to a level of non-significance \((t=-0.52)\) in the full model. This suggests that the endorsement of positive stereotypes may either function entirely differently than predicted by social dominance theory or have a more complex role in the maintenance of social stratification than do negatively-valenced forms of prejudice, be they hostile or modern.

### A System of Heterosexuals

In this paper, the functioning of hostile and modern forms of heterosexism has been examined within a social dominance theoretical framework. In line with prior research, higher levels of social dominance orientation were positively associated with higher levels of all of the domains of heterosexism, and negatively associated with support for lesbian and gay rights. Similarly greater levels of all domains of heterosexism were negatively associated with support for lesbian and gay rights. This suggests that one way to decrease prejudicial attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men might be to attempt to decrease levels of social dominance orientation; that is, to challenge ideas that some groups in society deserve more than other groups. It also suggests that work toward decreasing levels of social dominance orientation, as well as directly challenging attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men could have a positive impact on increasing support for lesbian and gay rights.

Shifting our attention to the various tests of mediation, the findings suggest that the more negatively-valenced forms of modern heterosexism (aversive, amnestic, and paternalistic) function very well as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths similar to the functioning of hostile heterosexism. However, because all tests of mediation indicated partial, rather than full mediation, a relationship continued to exist between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights in the models. Would this remaining relationship between social
dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights continue to exist if tests of multiple mediations in the same model had been conducted, or are there other hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths (e.g., endorsement of traditional gender roles) that explain the remaining relationship between the two? Given the linkages between heterosexism and sexism, it seems that it is reasonable to assume that factors other than just prejudice toward lesbian women and gay men (in all of its various forms) might be functioning as mediators between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights.

The final domain of modern heterosexism which captures the endorsement of positive stereotypes, however, appears to function somewhat differently than is predicted by social dominance theory. Given Walls’ (2007) findings that the endorsement of positive stereotypes operate differently depending on the level of hostile prejudice, this finding is not surprising, and suggests that more research needs to be conducted to better understand the role of positive stereotypes in supporting social stratification. It is possible that positive stereotypic heterosexism has a moderated mediation effect on the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights, such that the relationship is different for those who are high on hostile heterosexism than for those who are low on hostile heterosexism. Or the moderating variable may be the subject's own sexual orientation. It could be that a mediating relationship exists, but only for heterosexuals.

The other primary implication of these findings is that – as other scholars have suggested – prejudicial attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men are multidimensional (i.e., rather than there being a single form of heterosexism, these attitudes are better conceptualized as a system of heterosexisms). The empirical and anecdotal evidence consistently indicates that the face of prejudice against lesbian women and gay men has changed – and is continuing to change. The
shift from the more traditional hostile attitudes to an ideology that may appear to be less harsh and prejudicial is embedded within a context where the open, direct expression of prejudice is increasingly stigmatized. This shifting decrease in the expression of hostile prejudice may be an attempt to avoid stigmatization, a protection of self- or group-esteem, a protection of a non-prejudiced self-identity, a desire to justify an inequitable social structure, or some combination thereof. What is evident, however, is that it is no longer adequate to talk of heterosexism to indicate only hostile forms of prejudice. Doing so will likely exclude a large part of the landscape of prejudice as it is experienced and expressed today.

The changing nature of prejudice also implies another caveat. The instruments used here to capture modern prejudice against lesbian women and gay men will – at some point in the future – be outdated and in need of revision. Using these instruments in the current context however will help create a public record of the shifts in prejudice so that we – as scholars – can not only understand what prejudice looks like in a certain sociohistorical context with a certain population, but we also can begin to study the factors that foster shifts in the specific manifestations of prejudice.

Finally, the effects, dynamics, processes and content of positive stereotypes are an area of research within which little has been undertaken. Pioneers in this area like Jackman (1994) have convincingly argued that positively-valenced attitudes may be more functional in the long run at maintaining the oppression of certain groups than attitudes that are outright hostile. Similarly, researchers such as Czopp (in press, see also Czopp & Monteith, 2006) have demonstrated empirical support for the need to look more closely at the endorsement of positive stereotypes. As we grapple with the increasing multicultural nature of our world, we must not categorically
dismiss positive stereotypes, nor underestimate the role they may play in reinforcing social stratification.

There are several limitations to the study that warrant mention. The most obvious limitation of the study is its reliance on an undergraduate, convenience sample which has been one of the major criticisms of much social psychological research (Myers, 1983; Wintre, North & Sugar, 2001). Since all studies depart from the ideal research design in some ways with various trade-offs having to be negotiated by the researcher, the important question is, then, in what ways might this study’s departure from the ideal influence its findings and the ability to infer from the results? An examination of the empirical literature regarding the relationships between prejudicial attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1996; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Whitley & Lee, 2000), social dominance orientation (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994; see also Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto, Sidanius, & Stallworth, 1993; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin, Liu & Pratto, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Whitley & Lee, 2000), and public policies (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991) suggest that differences between undergraduate samples and non-student adult samples are minimal. The empirical findings of the above studies suggest, first, that the idea that young adults have substantially less stability in sociopolitical attitudes than other age groups is weakly supported. Second, they suggest that the relationships between the attitudinal constructs used in this project and attitudes regarding homosexuality are likely to be stronger in the U.S. adult population than among college undergraduates in the U.S. Therefore, findings with college undergraduates provide a conservative estimate of the relationships between constructs found in the adult population.

Another limitation for the study concerns the role of gender and sexual orientation in the results. Research has clearly shown that both the gender of the subject as well as the gender of
the target of the attitudes has an impact on the results of studies examining attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men (Herek, 1988, 2000; LaMar & Kite, 1998; Whitley & Kite, 1993). It is possible that gender is a moderating variable in the results found here and future research should examine whether gender influences the relationships. Similarly, the survey did not ask about participants’ sexual orientation. It is reasonable to assume that the relationships between the variables of interest in this study may vary depending on the sexual orientation of the participant. For example, in his study of positive stereotypes of women, Walls (2007) found an interaction effect between endorsement of positive stereotypes and levels of hostile sexism on the support for women's rights among males in his sample, but not among females.

The findings and limitations of the study suggest potential avenues for future study. Replication of the study with a non-undergraduate sample could address some of the issues of generalizability and further support (or challenge) the notion that relationships such as the ones that emerged in this study are conservative tests of the same relationships in the general population. Additional work on the possibility of a moderated mediation effect based on either levels of hostile heterosexism, gender, or sexual orientation may provide more clues as to the way in which positive stereotypic heterosexism functions in the maintenance of social stratification based on sexual orientation. More complex models, such as combining all of the tested mediation effects into a single model, might also offer additional insight into the ways in which a system of heterosexisms functions as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. Finally, other potential mediating variables – particularly those around issues of gender – could be examined to determine whether other factors influence the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights.
Notes

1. One might question why a domain pertaining to negative stereotypes was not included in the MHI. While not conclusive, the research on the relationship between negative stereotypes of lesbian women and gay men, and what has been termed hostile heterosexism in this paper suggests a fairly robust relationship (Gentry, 1987; Jackson & Sullivan, 1990; Sigelman, Howell, Cornell, Cutright, and Dewey, 1990; Simon, 1998). For example, the stereotype that gay men are sexually promiscuous is related to prejudicial attitudes that suggest gay men are immoral or perverse. Thinking about the relationship between positive stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes raises a number of interesting research questions, including whether or not endorsement of positive stereotypes should be included in a measure of modern heterosexism. The answer may, in part, depend on whether heterosexism is conceptualized as either beliefs or attitudes, and the relationship between the two. In line with much of the social psychological literature, I see stereotypes and prejudice as different, but related. The distinction that stereotypes are cognitive beliefs and prejudices are evaluative attitudes (Azjen, 1989; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) is somewhat problematic. For example, the negative stereotype that gay men are pedophiles, I would argue, has embedded within it a negative evaluation (unless we want to suggest that being called a pedophile is non-evaluative). I adhere more closely with the model suggested by Zanna and Rempel (1988) whereby prejudicial attitudes are evaluations of an object that emerge from a combination of cognitive beliefs (including stereotypes), affective information, and past experiences. In theorizing a domain of heterosexism that I call positive stereotypic heterosexism, I am suggesting that there is a cluster of stereotypes (beliefs about characteristics common to lesbian women and gay men that are, in general, seen as positive attributes) that form a
prejudicial attitude (positive stereotypic heterosexism) that functions to support social 
stratification based on sexual orientation. For more on the complex relationship between 
stereotypes and prejudice regarding lesbian women and gay men, see Simon (1998).
References


StataCorp. (2005). *Stata Statistical Software: Release 9.2*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics and Alpha Coefficients for All Scales

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<th>Group</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>% above</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>scale midpoint</td>
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<td>Hostile Heterosexism (ATLG-S)</td>
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<td>Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>1.17</td>
<td>11.92%</td>
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<td>Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>74.17%</td>
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TABLE 2. Intercorrelations among Scales

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<td>1. ATLG-S</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2. MHI - Amnestic</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
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<td>3. MHI - Aversive</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. MHI - Paternalistic</td>
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<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
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<td>5. MHI - Positive stereotypic</td>
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<td>0.30***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
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<td>6. SDO</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Lesbian/Gay rights</td>
<td>-0.83***</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>-0.70***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Figure Captions

**Figure 1.** The effects of social dominance orientation on hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating social policies as partially mediated by hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths.


**Figure 2.** Hostile heterosexism as a partially mediating factor in the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights

**Figure 3.** Aversive heterosexism as a partially mediating factor in the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights

**Figure 4.** Amnestic heterosexism as a partially mediating factor in the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights

**Figure 5.** Paternalistic heterosexism as a partially mediating factor in the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights

**Figure 6.** Positive stereotypic heterosexism as a (non-significant) mediating factor in the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights
Social Dominance Orientation

0.74***
(0.12)

-0.21***
(0.06)

Hostile Heterosexism

-0.89***
(0.04)

Support For Lesbian and Gay Rights

Note: ***p<.001, Bonferroni adjusted. Standard errors in parentheses. Measurement model omitted from diagram.
Note: ***p<.001, Bonferroni adjusted. Standard errors in parentheses. Measurement model omitted from diagram.
Note: ***p<.001, Bonferroni adjusted. Standard errors in parentheses. Measurement model omitted from diagram.
Note: ***p<.001 *p<.05, Bonferroni adjusted. Standard errors in parentheses. Measurement model omitted from diagram.
Note: ***p<.001, Bonferroni adjusted. Standard errors in parentheses. Measurement model omitted from diagram. Path between positive stereotypic heterosexism and support for lesbian and gay rights is non-significant.
### Appendix A
Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory

For this first group of questions, please check the answer that best matches your agreement or disagreement with the statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lesbianism is given too much attention in today's society.</td>
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<td>2. Gay men are treated as fairly as everyone else in today's society.</td>
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<td>3. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at physically defending themselves.</td>
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<td>4. Lesbians make too much noise about their sexuality.</td>
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<td>5. Gay men take better care of their bodies than do heterosexual men.</td>
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<td>6. Most people treat lesbians as fair as they treat everyone else.</td>
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<td>7. Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down everyone else's throat.</td>
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<td>8. Lesbians are more independent than heterosexual women.</td>
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<td>9. Things would be better if lesbians would quit trying to force their lifestyle on everyone else.</td>
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<td>10. Gay men no longer face discrimination in the U.S.</td>
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<td>11. Lesbians have become too radical in their demands.</td>
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<td>12. Gay men are more compassionate than heterosexual men.</td>
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<td>13. Lesbians excel at outdoor activities more than heterosexual women.</td>
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<td>14. There is too much attention given to gay men on television and in the media.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Discrimination against lesbians is virtually non-existent in today's society.</td>
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</table>
For this second group of questions, we **ASSUME** that you have a son/daughter or we ask you to **IMAGINE** that you have a child if you do not have one. Please check the answer that most closely matches your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Also note, that sometimes the question refers to having a daughter and sometimes to having a son.

If you agree with **ALL** parts of the statement then your answer should be on the agree side of the scale. If you disagree with **ANY** part of the statement then your answer should be on the disagree side of the scale. If you are just as happy having a gay/lesbian kid as a heterosexual kid, then you can check the **OK with Gay Kid** answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at auto maintenance and repair.</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. I would prefer my daughter <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because she would <strong>unfairly</strong> be stopped from adopting children.</td>
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<td>18. I would prefer my son <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because most churches would <strong>unfairly</strong> reject him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. I would prefer my daughter <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because she would face <strong>unfair</strong> discrimination.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. I would prefer my son <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because he would <strong>unfairly</strong> be denied the right to marry the man he loved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. I would prefer my daughter <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because religious institutions <strong>unfairly</strong> reject lesbians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. I would prefer my son <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because it would <strong>unfairly</strong> be harder for him to have or adopt children.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. I would prefer my son <strong>NOT</strong> be homosexual because he would <strong>unfairly</strong> be discriminated against.</td>
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</table>
Scoring

Questions 3, 5, 8, 12, 13, and 16 capture positive stereotypic heterosexism.
Questions 2, 6, 10, and 15 capture amnestic heterosexism.
Questions 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 14 capture aversive heterosexism.
Questions 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 capture paternalistic heterosexism.

To score the positive stereotypic heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, and aversive heterosexism scales, total items substituting 1 to 7 for strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree, respectively. Divide by the number of items in the scale to get a standardized score where higher numbers represent greater agreement.

To score the paternalistic heterosexism scale, total items substituting 1 to 8 for okay with gay kid, strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree, respectively. Divide total by eight to get an average score. To standardize score so that it is on a metric comparable to the other three scales, multiply the average score by seven, then divide by eight.