Toward a Multidimensional Understanding of Heterosexism:

The Changing Nature of Prejudice

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ABSTRACT

Extending the theoretical understanding of modern prejudice into the realm of heterosexism, it is argued that shifts in the manifestation of prejudice against lesbians and gay men have occurred resulting in an increasingly multidimensional modern heterosexism. Four subdomains of modern heterosexism are identified that are conceptually and empirical distinct from the more traditional hostile heterosexism: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism. The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory is offered as an instrument to capture the four theorized subdomains of modern heterosexism, and an examination of reliability and validity of the scale is presented.

KEY WORDS: homophobia, heterosexism, prejudice, stereotypes, gay, lesbian, modern prejudice, positive stereotypes
TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF HETEROSEXISM: THE
CHANGING NATURE OF PREJUDICE

Introduction

Group inequalities in social, political, and economic outcomes have existed in virtually all post-hunter and gatherer societies (Davis & Moore, 1945; Kerbo, 2003; Tumin, 1953). Societies have, however, varied by the manner and extent of inequalities, as well as by which characteristics emerged as salient markers of status among social groups (Dumont, 1970; Hofstede, 1984; Sidanius, 1993). In terms of these inequalities, societies can be conceptualized as systems of group-based social hierarchies where dominant groups receive a disproportionately large share of positive social values (e.g., political power, high social status, wealth, material resources) and subordinate groups receive a disproportionately large share of negative social values (e.g., low social status, poverty, societal sanctions, stigmatization; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

The inequality in the social structure and its institutions are maintained, at least in part, by attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies that justify the stratification (Bem & Bem, 1970; Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Jost, 1995). While these ideologies may take on a number of different forms, one form that has been studied extensively in the social psychological literature is that of prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes (Fiske, 1998).

Some of the more recent work on prejudice and stereotypes has examined the ways in which they have actually changed over time. What has historically been a predominately hostile cluster of attitudes toward lower status groups has evolved, in some cases, into a set of attitudes with more ambivalent and/or positively-valenced components. While much of this scholarship
has examined attitudes toward people of color and women, theoretically these shifts in the manifestations of prejudice could apply to many other social groups, including attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Walls & Rodriguez, 2002).

**Modern Prejudice**

Since the 1970’s scholars began theorizing that racial attitudes in the U.S. were undergoing a shift whereby traditionally hostile forms of racism were being supplanted by more subtle and nuanced forms of attitudes that continued to support and maintain stratification based on race and ethnicity while appearing to be less “racist.” Included among these new attitudes were beliefs, for example, that discrimination was a thing of the past, that African Americans were making unreasonable demands, and that race was given too much attention in the media. These various conceptualizations of modern racism have gone by numerous names including symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & McConahay, 1973), aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), modern racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976), and subtle racism (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).¹

Along with the various names were various understandings of what was driving this new manifestation of prejudice. Some envisioned it as a conflict between developing norms that made whites less comfortable expressing direct racism, and continuing anti-Black affect and beliefs. Others--building on the idea of stigma (Katz, 1981)--suggested that modern racism was ambivalence resulting from a belief that African Americans were deviant, while at the same time feeling that African Americans were disadvantaged and so, therefore, deserved help. Still others saw it as a conflict between antipathy toward African Americans and truly held egalitarian values, a conflict that gets played out at a more subconscious level so that traditional forms of racism cannot be expressed without challenging one’s egalitarian self-image. This, the theory
argues, results in expression of racism when situations are ambiguous and the behaviors can be explained in non-race related justifications, combined with the suppression of racism when behavior cannot be explained away by non-race related factors (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

About a decade after the emergence of the dialogue on modern racism, a similar discussion began to take place in the realm of prejudicial attitudes about gender. Central to this discussion was the development of a number of instruments designed to capture modern sexism. Among these instruments were the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), the Neo-Sexism Scale (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995), and the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). As with modern racism, some theorists argued modern sexism resulted from shifting norms regarding expression of prejudice, while others attributed its emergence to holding both hostile and benevolent attitudes toward women, concurrently. Instead of believing, for example, that women are inferior to men, modern sexists might claim that women’s gentle nature make them a poor fit for leadership positions, or that women had gone too far in their demands for equality. Regardless of the specific model of modern sexism embraced, empirical evidence has supported both the existence of modern sexism, as well as its relationship to other social science constructs and discriminatory behaviors (see for example, Sibley & Wilson, 2004; Yakushko, 2005)

Paralleling the scholarship of modern prejudice in the arenas of race and gender, this paper extends this multidimensional understanding of prejudicial attitudes into the realm of sexual orientation. Specifically, it argues for a theoretical framework of modern heterosexism comprised of four specific subdomains: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism. Additionally, it provides an
instrument, the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory as a way to capture modern heterosexism.

**Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men**

Exploring changes in attitudes toward homosexuality in the U.S. over the last three decades, Loftus (2001) finds that Americans have become more supportive of civil liberties for lesbians and gay men, and Adam (1995) reports that there has been an overall significant improvement in general attitudes over the last decade. Current research on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men among university students mirrors these recent national findings, which, like survey findings on attitudes towards race and gender, reports a rejection of the traditional, negative attitudes about homosexuality (Balanko, 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, & Sears, 1999; Simon, 1995; Simoni, 1996; Waldo & Kemp, 1997).

Looking at other trends, however, it becomes apparent that this improvement in attitudes is just part of the story. Concurrent with the increased support of civil liberties for lesbians and gay men is the continued belief that homosexuality is immoral (Loftus, 2001). Findings of relatively high suicide rates and suicide attempts among lesbian and gay adolescents and adults in Canada and the U.S. continue to exist (Bagley & Tremblay, 1997; Cochran & Mays, 2000; Gibson, 1989; Paul, et al., 2002; Remafedi, French, Story, Resnick & Blum, 1998). Lesbians and gay men continue to be one of the top social groups targeted for hate crimes and harassment (Berrill, 1992; Houser & Ham, 2004; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001; Whitley, 2001), and there has been an increase in highly publicized violence against the population (Lacayo, 1998). Out gay men earn less real income than heterosexual men (Badgett, 1995; Blanford, 2003; Kenneavy, 2003), and gay men who come out during adolescence have significantly lower levels of educational achievement than do heterosexual men (Barrett, Pollack, & Tilden, 2002). At the
institutional level, there have been a number of referenda and legislative battles that have resulted in negative outcomes for the community, including the recent discriminatory amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. Norris (1991) concludes in his study on attitudes about lesbians and gay men that a paradox exists between notions of heterosexual supremacy and the widespread support for egalitarianism. This conclusion mirrors the tension between conflictual values that have been theorized to be central to the foundation of some understandings of modern racism (Katz & Hass, 1988).

Morrison and Morrison (2002) offer three possible explanations for this apparent paradox. First, existing studies of attitudes toward homosexuality could be subject to social desirability. That is, as a way of avoiding being perceived as prejudiced, individuals report more favorable attitudes toward lesbians and gay men than they actually hold. However, empirical studies testing social desirability influence have found no support for this relationship (Herek, 1988; Khorrami, 2002; Reinhardt, 1995; Roderick, McAmmon, Long, & Allred, 1998). A second explanation might be sampling bias; much of the research on attitudes toward homosexuality has relied on convenience samples that may be liberally biased. However, work based on nationally representative samples (Loftus, 2001) has found similar patterns. Their final explanation—and one that seems most plausible—is that existing heterosexism measures capture only a subset of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. Existing measures, while capturing more hostile forms of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, do not tap into the full range and changing nature of attitudes that justify and maintain social stratification based on sexual orientation.

Strategies for the Measurement of Heterosexism
Early measurement instruments. Attitudes about homosexuality, and lesbians and gay men have been measured in a number of different ways in the literature, including the use of single (or few) question non-scale items (Bethke, 2000; Irwin & Thompson, 1977; Loftus, 2001; Nyberg & Alston, 1976 - 1977; Reynolds, 2003), which can prove to be problematic when concepts are multidimensional in nature. A second approach used by a number of researchers in the 1970s was to develop their own scales (Henley & Pincus, 1978; Levitt & Klassen, 1974; Millham, San Miguel, & Kellogg, 1976). These scales, however, were typically not evaluated for psychometric properties. Although this is a move toward multi-item measurement, there is little evidence other than face validity that these scales measure what they purport to measure.

Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, researchers developed a number of psychometrically tested instruments to capture attitudes toward lesbians and gay people. The vast majority of these scales measure only negative attitudes and, as such, do not consider the full spectrum of more subtle prejudicial and stereotypical attitudes as hypothesized by the modern prejudice scholarship. Primary among these instruments are Hudson and Rickett’s (1980) Index of Homophobia, the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Scale (Larson, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980) and the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (Herek, 1988).

More recent measurement instruments. More recent entries into the measurement of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men have included a number of new instruments that, like previous scales, capture only negatively-valenced attitudes (Eliason & Raheim, 1996; Erickson, 1995; Morrison, McLeod, Morrison, Anderson & O’Connor, 1997; Raja & Stokes, 1998). Answering the call to capture the full range of the construct of homophobia (O’Donohue & Caselles, 1993; Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999), however, a number of scholars have broadened the measurement to include behavioral aspects, positive attitudes, subtle negative attitudes,
knowledge about lesbians and gay men (Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Szczerba, 1997; Worthington, Dillon, & Becker-Schutte, 2005). Of these, only Morrison and Morrison’s (2002) Modern Homonegativity Scale has been built specifically on the theoretical foundation laid by modern racism and sexism scholarship. The Modern Homonegativity Scale still captures somewhat negatively-valenced attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, however these attitudes are not based on moral and religious objections (as they are in “old-fashioned” homonegativity). Like the current author, Morrison and Morrison (2002) argue that there has been a shift in how prejudice against lesbians and gay men gets expressed in certain contexts. In the four studies they conducted to examine the reliability and validity of the scale, factor analysis identified a unidimensional structure that was distinct from old-fashioned prejudice against lesbians and gay men. Even so, the Modern Homonegativity Scale fails to capture at least two additional subdomains of attitudes that can be predicted from the modern prejudice literature.

The Current Measurement Instrument

The disparities between survey findings indicating that anti-gay attitudes are at an all time low and the continued prevalence of anti-gay behavior and structural disadvantages create a conundrum for social science researchers. Models developed by researchers in the realms of modern sexism and racism, combined with Jackman’s (1994) insights into intergroup relations and the psychological need to justify existing systems of stratification (Jost & Thompson, 2000) offer intriguing possibilities to understanding this paradox. Combining these theoretical frameworks, at least two distinct subdomains (in addition to hostile heterosexism) can be predicted that may play a role in the maintenance of the stigmatization of non-heterosexual individuals, behavior and communities: paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism.
The studies presented below develop and validate a measure of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards lesbians and gay men that: (a) is informed by the existing theoretical literature on prejudice and the measurement of social attitudes; (b) extends the conceptualization of modern forms of prejudice into the realm of attitudes about lesbians and gay men as a way of understanding paradoxical findings in the literature; (c) incorporates recent findings regarding the psychological need to justify systems of stratification, and, (d) demonstrates its psychometric quality via its reliability with various samples, relationship to constructs hypothesized to be related to anti-lesbian and anti-gay attitudes, and ability to distinguish between groups hypothesized to differ on attitudes about lesbians and gay men.

Scale Preparation

Defining the concepts. Following the classical process of scale development (DeVellis, 1991; Spector, 1992; Walsh & Betz, 1995) the initial undertaking was to develop a definition of heterosexism. Numerous definitions abound for both the term homophobia and heterosexism (Appleby & Anastas, 1998) and the concepts have been studied and debated in the literature (Neisen, 1990; Young-Bruehl, 1996). Herek’s (1992) definition of heterosexism, “an ideological system that denies, denigrates and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 89.), is a useful definition, but seems to imply only negative or, possibly, apathetic components of ideologies. As positive stereotypes and other forms of modern heterosexism that may be less negatively-valenced may play a role in the maintenance of social stratification based on sexual orientation, a definition that included these aspects of attitudes is needed. Making only a slight adjustment to Herek’s definition sufficed: an ideological system that denies, denigrates, stigmatizes [or segregates] any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. By adding “or segregates” to the definition, the original
definition has been broadened to capture the primary manner in which theory suggests that both positive stereotypes and paternalistic heterosexism function to maintain stratification.

In determining the scope of attitudes and the resulting subdomains that the definition of heterosexism would cover, the literatures on intergroup relations, contemporary forms of sexism and racism, measurement and scale construction issues, and heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men were consulted. In addition, scholars in the areas of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination provided supplementary input. Initially, it was theorized that modern heterosexism consisted of at least two primary subdomains, in addition to the traditional “old-fashioned” heterosexism (hostile heterosexism): paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism.

The term hostile heterosexism\(^5\) was adopted to denote the existing conceptualization of homophobia as negative myths, attitudes, and beliefs about lesbian and gay persons. Specifically, hostile heterosexism is defined as negative attitudes, myths and beliefs that function by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. By combining the scope and outcomes of Herek’s (1992) definition with the specificity of negative attitudes, myths and beliefs of previous definitions of homophobia (Fassinger, 1991; Morin & Garfinkle, 1978), this definition captures the traditional set of cognitive and affective components that are characterized by their aggressive, hostile nature. Hostile heterosexists may believe, for example, that gay men are pedophiles, or that lesbians hate men.

Glick and Fiske (2001) use the term benevolent sexism to indicate discriminatory attitudes toward women that are justified with a chivalrous (protective) explanation. Specifically they define it as, “a subjectively favorable, chivalrous ideology that offers protection and
affection to women who embrace conventional roles” (p. 109). In the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), the authors further indicate that three sub-components exist under the rubric of benevolent sexism: heterosexual intimacy, protective paternalism and gender differentiation. The initial two subdomains of modern heterosexism arise from two of these three subcomponents: paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism.

Paternalistic heterosexism is defined as subjectively neutral or positive attitudes, myths and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional or cognitive well-being of nonheterosexual persons while concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. Individuals may express this set of cognitive and affective components toward lesbians and gay men as a conceptual social group or as concern for specific lesbian or gay (or potentially lesbian or gay) individuals. In addition to concern, this conceptualization also necessitates an indication of preference for heterosexuality. Paternalistic heterosexism should vary as a function of social distance (Bogardus, 1927) with individuals expressing the highest levels for their own family members. The paternalistic heterosexist may endorse a “live and let live” attitude about gay and lesbian co-workers, for example, but would be “concerned” about having a lesbian or gay child. Because it is anticipated that the paternalistic heterosexist would desire to avoid being labeled homophobic, their concern would most likely be couched in terms of protecting their child (or other paternalistic target) from the unfair social realities that lesbians and gay men (potentially) face.

The second subdomain theorized to exist, positive stereotypic heterosexism is defined as subjectively positive attitudes, myths and beliefs that express appreciation of stereotypic characteristics often attributed to lesbians and gay men which function by denying, denigrating,
stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. Positive stereotypic heterosexism reinforces stereotypes, albeit with a focus on alleged or factual appreciation for the stereotypic characteristic(s). Beliefs that gay men are creative or that lesbians are more independent than heterosexual women, for example, would fall into this domain. While the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1996) uses the term gender differentiation to denote this subcomponent of benevolent sexism, examination of the questions formulated to tap into this attitudinal family indicates some type of positive evaluation of women as compared to men, not just differentiation between the sexes. For example, one question asks, “Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.” It seems that what Glick and Fiske label as gender differentiation, actually taps into positive stereotypes of women which, granted, may very well perform the function of differentiating genders in a traditional model of gender.

Developing the question pool. A pool of twenty-three questions to cover the theorized subdomains was developed through consultation with researchers with expertise in discriminatory attitudes research and scale construction. Questions that sought to capture the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subdomain included items such as, “Homosexual men have more sophisticated tastes than heterosexual men in art, music and literature.” To capture the more complex notion of paternalistic heterosexism, questions such as “I would prefer that my child NOT be homosexual because he/she would be unfairly discriminated against.”

Pilot Studies

Two initial pilot studies were conducted to examine the structure of the scale and its relationship to a well-tested scale capturing hostile heterosexism, Herek’s ATLG-S. What emerged from the examination of the data from the pilot studies were a number of
recommendations. The subscales had performed as predicted in relationship to the ATLGS, indicating that both subdomains were distinct from hostile heterosexist attitudes. However, the unexpected performance of some items prompted additional examination of the literature on prejudicial attitudes, resulting in the addition of a third cluster of attitudes: apathetic heterosexism.11

Morrison and Morrison (2002) had identified a cluster of attitudes that they termed modern homonegativity that captured attitudes that were distinct from traditional condemnation of lesbians and gay men based on moral and religious reasons. Likewise in his analysis of the arguments offered by those supporting discrimination against lesbians and gay men, Burridge (2004) found a consistent claim that their opposition to same sex civil unions was not based in “homophobia,” but rather was attributed to “other factors.” Similarly, in examinations of the rhetoric used against repeal of Section 28 in Great Britain—a repeal that would have equalized age of consent for sex for both opposite sex and same sex partners—Waites (2001) suggests that the arguments for anti-lesbian/anti-gay discrimination had undergone “refinement” such as discussion of the repeal of Section 28 as “lowering the age of consent” versus “equalizing the age of consent.” Moran (2001) noted that opponents of the repeal spoke carefully to avoid condemnation of homosexuality—instead of talking of sin, they talked of the “lack of moral equivalence” between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Clearly, on both the individual level and at the level of political rhetoric, a somewhat different configuration of attitudes had emerged.

Based on this literature, apathetic heterosexism was defined as attitudes, myths, and beliefs that dismiss or trivialize the importance of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing, and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity,
relationship, or community. Additional questions were developed and added to the developing scale resulting in the MHI (v.3).

**STUDY ONE**

Study one further investigated the psychometric properties of the MHI (v.3), including the impact on the factor structure of the addition of the theorized Apathetic Heterosexism subscale. Hypotheses concerning the measure’s theorized relationships with several other variables were tested, and the scale’s ability to differentiate group membership was also explored.

**Hypotheses**

*Apathetic heterosexism.* Beliefs that homosexuals do not face discrimination, that the lesbian/gay rights movement is pushing “special rights,” and the use of the language of “reverse discrimination” have been part of the political framing used by conservatives opposing political advances on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons (Farhadian, 1999; Lugg, 1998). Much of this rhetoric has been disseminated through churches and organizations associated with the religious right (Apostolidis, 2001; Gallagher & Bull, 2001; Stein, 2001). The Apathetic Heterosexism subscale attempts to capture this constellation of beliefs, and as such, a number of relationships between the subscale and political and religious variables are hypothesized.

Recent literature on political ideology has suggested a continued link between conservative political ideology and higher incidences of prejudice (Lieber, Woodrick, & Roudebush, 1995; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Peck, 2003; Stone, 2000), and numerous studies have shown conservatism as a strong predictor of anti-gay prejudice in particular (Estrada & Weiss, 1999; Mohr & Rochlen, 1999; Victor, 1996). Based on these findings and the political
nature of the dissemination of the ideas captured in the conceptualization of apathetic heterosexism, it was predicted that higher levels of conservative ideology would be predictive of higher scores on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale.

The link between religion and political attitudes has been well-studied and while not all Protestants, nor all Catholics were of the same mind concerning, for example, the Civil Rights Movement (Loveland, Walls, Myers, Sikkink, & Radcliffe, 2002), it has been documented that conservative Protestants were less supportive of the Civil Rights Movement than other denominational groups (Ammerman, 1990; Fenton & Vines, 1967; Wald, 1997). In addition, Burnham, Connors & Leonard (1969) found that Catholic students were less likely than students from other religious denominations to be in the ‘low prejudice’ category. Examining religion and support for African American activism among whites, Loveland, and colleagues (2002) find that only two groups stood out as overwhelmingly supportive of the Civil Rights Movement: Jews and those with no religious affiliation, a group which will be referred to as seculars.

Similar patterns have been found across religious traditions with regard to anti-gay attitudes (Kunkel & Temple, 1992) with respondents from fundamentalist Protestant traditions frequently found to have some of the highest rates of homophobia (Hunsberger, 1996; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002) and seculars and Jews found to be the most supportive of lesbian and gay rights (Fisher, Derison, Polley & Cadman, 1994).

Based on the findings about religious traditions and prejudice, as well as the role that the religious right has played in the anti-gay political arena, it was anticipated that seculars would score significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative Protestants. In addition, based on the previous historical literature about the mixed support of
civil rights for African Americans, it was anticipated that other religious faith traditions (Catholics, liberal/mainline Protestants) would not differ significantly than conservative Protestants.

**Paternalistic heterosexism.** Given that paternalistic heterosexism has at its core a concern based on *unfair* constraints that someone might experience were s/he lesbian or gay, it was anticipated that exposure to minority group members would work in the opposite manner with scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale than would be expected from the literature on hostile heterosexism. As such individuals who have lesbian and/or gay friends would, it was predicted, have higher scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale than individuals who do not.

This expectation--that individuals with lesbian and gay friends would have higher rates of heterosexism on one of the subdomains than people who do not have such friends--may seem counterintuitive. While the expression and the experience of paternalistic heterosexism may indeed be subjectively positive because of its emphasis on the unfairness that lesbians and gay men (may) face, it maintains a preference for heterosexuality (albeit for ‘good’ reasons). While Allport’s (1954) strict definition of prejudice focused on antipathy, as Glick and Fiske (2001) point out, he does conclude that the “net effect of prejudice…is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage” (p. 9). Expressing a preference for heterosexuality--regardless of the reason--is still a segregating preference.

However, unlike, the relationship between hostile heterosexism and casual interaction that is documented in the literature, it was additionally hypothesized that casual interaction alone would not have a statistically significant relationship with the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. In order for one to develop a concern that lesbians and gay men face discrimination, it
was reasoned that a more personal relationship needs to be experienced. Knowing that the waiter at your favorite restaurant is gay might humanize lesbian and gay people somewhat, and potentially result in a lessening of hostile heterosexism, but it would do little, it seems, to increase one’s awareness of the barriers that lesbian and gay people often experience in their daily lives. Therefore it was suggested that having only casual interaction with lesbian and gay people would not impact the score on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale.

As the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale captures concern about one’s child being lesbian or gay based on perceived unfairness of discrimination against lesbian and gay persons, it was also anticipated that political ideology would work in the opposite direction for paternalistic heterosexism than it does for apathetic heterosexism. As such, more politically conservative respondents should be lower on Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale scores than more politically liberal respondents.

Positive stereotypic heterosexism. One complicating factor with regard to positive stereotypic heterosexism is that the vast majority of the characteristics of positive stereotypes, while subjectively positive qualities (e.g., compassion, creativity, athleticism), are typically gender-nonconforming as applied to lesbians and gay men. For example, in general women are typically perceived to be more compassionate than men, but one positive stereotype of gay men is that they are more compassionate and caring than heterosexual men. So, positive stereotypes could operate in ways that are positive based on the actual appreciation of the subjectively positive quality, or they could operate in ways that are negative based on negative reactions to gender nonconformity.

Basow and Johnson (2000) point out that the structure of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are different for men and women and that they serve different social psychological
functions. Herek (1986) argues that anti-gay attitudes are a result of fears about one’s masculinity for heterosexual men. Men, in a defensive attempt to shore up their maleness, distance themselves from gay men and express more anti-gay attitudes (Tucker, 1996). Women do not need to assert their heterosexuality in the same way (Rich, 1980). Heterosexual femininity is not as tied to possessing gender-appropriate traits as is heterosexual masculinity (Basow & Johnson, 2000). Given that positive stereotypes are gender-nonconforming, it was hypothesized that males would endorse positive stereotypes more frequently than would females.

Higgins’ (1987) and Pelham and Swann’s (1989) work on self-discrepancy, found that self-discrepancy on important traits led to low self-esteem, anxiety and threat, which then resulted in defensive attitudes. Applying these findings to the arena of gender, Theodore and Basow (2000) find that self-discrepancy on masculinity for men is, at times, a reaction to a threat to one’s self. Given this, it was predicted that men who perceive themselves as having more feminine interests would endorse more positive stereotypes. However, this relationship would not--it was predicted--occur for women, as women with more masculine interests are not as likely to be labeled homosexual as are men with more feminine interests. Table 1 summarizes the above hypotheses.

Sample and Procedure

Study one was administered at a medium-sized public university in the Midwest. The sample consists of 277 undergraduates taking introductory sociology courses. The sample consisted of 63.9% females and 36.1% males. Racially, Caucasians made up the majority of the sample (82.7%), followed by African Americans (7.9%), Hispanics (3.6%) and the remaining proportion of the sample consisted of Asians/Asian Americans, Native Americans and
multiracial individuals (5.79%). Most of the respondents were first or second year students (83.4%).

With regard to age, 78.34% were of traditional college age and the remaining 21.66% were 25 years old or older. Ages ranged from 18 to 51 with a mean age of 22.4 years for the sample ($SD = 5.91$). Most respondents self-identified as middle class (56.5%) followed by working class (37.3%), upper class (3.6%), and then lower class (2.5%). Protestants made up the highest percentage of the sample (46.9%), followed by Catholics (27.1%), seculars (16.9%) and the remaining 9.2% classified themselves as “Other Christians” or as “Other Non-Christian.”

**Results**

**Factor structure.** An exploratory iterative factor process with oblique rotation was used to examine the factor structure of the 25-item scale. Examination of eigenvalues, the scree plot, and theoretical considerations all three indicated that three factors should be retained. Examination of the factor loading patterns indicated that eight of the 25 items had factor scores of less than .50 and were thus dropped from the scale resulting in a 17-item scale covering the three subdomains. As all of the remaining 17 items had clearly-indicated high loadings, they were maintained.

Factor 1 accounted for 40.4% of the variance in the measured variables, factor 2 accounted for 27.4%, and the final factor for 8.7%, prior to rotation. These correspond to the three subdomains of positive stereotypic, paternalistic, and apathetic heterosexism, respectively.

**Descriptive statistics and reliability.** The range for the six-item Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale goes from 0 to 100, and has a mean of 67.09 with a standard deviation of 27.52. The Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale consists of eight items with a range from 0 to 100. It has a mean of 28.68 and a standard deviation of 22.95. The new three-item Apathetic
Heterosexism subscale has scores from 0 to 100, a mean of 32.10 and a standard deviation of 20.86.

The Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale was calculated at .82, with internal consistency estimates of .89, .90, and .64 for the Paternalistic Heterosexism, Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism, and Apathetic Heterosexism subscales, respectively. Both the Paternalistic and Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale alphas were similar to versions of the scale used in the two initial pilot studies. The Apathetic Heterosexism subdomain’s alpha was slightly lower than desired at .64.

Hypotheses Testing

Apathetic heterosexism. The potential range of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale is 0 to 100. The modal category is 0, capturing almost 10% of the sample respondents and indicating the lack of endorsement for any of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale items. Table 2 shows the models testing the hypotheses related to this subscale.

Based on the conceptual definition of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale and the documented relationship between conservative political views and the rhetoric regarding lesbian and gay issues, it was predicted that higher levels of conservative political ideology would be associated with higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. The political ideology variable measures liberal-conservatism on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Extremely Liberal to Extremely Conservative. Higher scores indicate higher levels of conservativism. Mean for the sample on the scale is 3.97, the median indicates a moderate political orientation, and the standard deviation is 1.43. The full range is represented in the sample with 31.2% indicating some level of a liberal orientation, 39.6% self-reporting as moderate, and the remaining 29.2% indicating a conservative orientation.
This predicted relationship was significant at the .001 level. Political ideology explains 4.1% of the variation in the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale with each increase of one category on scale representing approximately a 3-point increase in the subscale. The typical difference between a respondent who answered Extremely Liberal and a respondent who answered Extremely Conservative, then, is 18 points, or 18% of the subscale.

Examining religious tradition, it was suggested that seculars would score significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative Protestants. Conservative Protestants, given their documented relationship with anti-gay rhetoric that denies the significance of sexual orientation on social stratification, should be more likely to embrace the denial of discrimination captured in the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale.

Seventeen percent of the sample reports a secular orientation to religion, while approximately 25% indicate a conservative Protestant religious tradition. Conservative Protestants were designated as the reference group and dummy coded variables for Catholics, Mainline/Liberal Protestants, Seculars, and Other Non-Christians were included in the model. As predicted respondents falling into the secular category were significantly less endorsing of apathetic heterosexism. On average seculars were almost 8 points lower on the subscale than were conservative Protestants. Also as predicted, none of the other religious traditions were significantly different than conservative Protestants on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale.

**Paternalistic heterosexism.** Like the previous subscale, the full range of the subscale is represented in the sample, with an average of 67.10 and a standard deviation of 27.52. Of the three subscales, the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale is the only subscale where the mean for the sample is higher than 50% of the possible subscale score indicating that it is the subscale...
with the highest endorsement rate in the sample. Table 3 illustrates the various models testing the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale hypotheses.

Two testable relationships between the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale and the contact thesis were predicted. First, it was anticipated that respondents who reported having higher percentages of lesbian and/or gay male friends would score higher on the subscale. This hypothesis is supported at the .05 level with percentage of lesbian and gay friends explaining slightly more than 3% of the variation on the subscale. Each reported increase in 10% lesbian/gay friends increases the score on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale by less than 1 point. While the relationship is statistically significant, it is substantively minor.

The second hypothesis related to the contact thesis was that no relationship between casual interaction and the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale was expected to emerge. The reasoning was that while casual exposure to lesbians and gay men might decrease hostile heterosexism as indicated in the literature, only more personal and extended exposure to lesbians and gay men would increase awareness of the discrimination that non-heterosexuals experience and, therefore, impact the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale score. Controlling for whether or not the respondent has lesbian or gay friends, respondents who believe that they have had no interaction with lesbians or gay men are not significantly different than respondents who have had only impersonal (casual) interaction with lesbians or gay men. One interesting side note to this hypothesis test is that the percentage lesbian/gay friends variable was recoded to be a dichotomous variable for this analysis where one indicates that the person has lesbian/gay friends and 0 means that the person does not. This, like the percentage lesbian/gay friends variable tested directly above, is statistically significant, but it is also substantively significant as having lesbian/gay friends increases one’s Paternalistic Heterosexism score by slightly almost 13 points.
on the subscale. This indicates that it is not the incremental progression to higher percentages of lesbian/gay friends (as was tested above), but rather a threshold effect whereby having any lesbian/gay friends has a strong effect on paternalistic heterosexism.

It was further predicted that higher levels of political conservatism would be related to lower scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. This prediction is supported at the .05 level. Political ideology explains slightly more than 3% of the variation in subscale scores and, on average, there is a decrease of 3 points for each category shift toward the conservative end of the continuum. This would indicate the existence of about a 17-point spread on subscale scores between those who are extremely liberal and those who are extremely conservative.

Positive stereotypic heterosexism. The full range of the subscale is represented in the sample, with an average of 28.68 and a standard deviation of 22.95. Of the four subscales, the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale has the highest percentage of respondents who did not endorse any of the statements at 18.4%. Table 4 illustrates the various models testing the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale hypotheses.

First, it was hypothesized that males would have higher scores on the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale than would females based on the gendered function of heterosexism documented in the literature. Thirty-six percent of the sample is male, compared with 64% female. Gender is a statistically significant predictor of positive Stereotypic Heterosexism at the .01 level of significance, with men scoring, on average, 8.42 points higher than do women.

Based on the same body of literature, it was predicted that self-discrepancy along dimensions of masculinity in terms of masculine/feminine interests would be linked to higher scores on the Positive Stereotypic subscale for men, but not for women. For men, only 7% of the sample self-identified as having feminine or very feminine interests while 11.5% of the women
in the sample self-identified as having masculine or very masculine interests. For the men, the predicted relationship was found to be significant at the .05 level. Males who self-reported more feminine interests scored almost 19.4 points higher on the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale than other males, possibly lending support to Basow and Johnson’s (2000) idea that men who feel their masculinity is threatened may react defensively and, in this case, endorse more stereotypical views of lesbians and gay men. The final hypothesis was that this relationship would not hold for women. This prediction was also supported. Women who self-identified as having masculine interests were not significantly different from women who self-identified as having feminine, very feminine or gender neutral interests.

**Relationships Between the Subscales**

The next question of concern was the relationship between the subscales. To analyze this, the correlations between the subscales were examined. Table 5 documents the correlations between the subscales.

What emerges from examination of the data are two significant correlations at the .05 level. The Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale is positively correlated with the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale, but only weakly so ($r=.1982$) at a .05 level of significance. This relationship is not surprising. Individuals most likely experience paternalistic heterosexism as neutral or positive and, as such, individuals who consider themselves as non-heterosexist might express attitudes in this cluster of sentiments. Similarly, positive stereotypic heterosexism is subjectively positive, and even individuals with many lesbian and gay friends might endorse these stereotypes.

Additionally, the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale is weakly correlated with the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale in a negative direction ($r=-.1710$). Central to the concept of
paternalistic heterosexism is the justification for not wanting one’s child to be lesbian or gay because they would *unfairly* experience various discriminatory behaviors toward them. On the other hand, apathetic heterosexists endorse ideas that lesbians and gay men are treated “as fairly” (emphasis added) as heterosexuals, so it is a denial of unfair treatment. This negative correlation reflects this divergence.

**Discussion**

The MHI (v.3) performed as expected on a number of tests of reliability and validity. Items developed to capture the distinct subdomains, including the additional subdomain of apathetic heterosexism, loaded as predicted. The emergent factor structure demonstrated theoretically sound relationships between the subdomains. However, one reasonable critique of the MHI (v.3) is its lack of differentiation between attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men.

Recent research in attitudes toward lesbians and gay men has demonstrated differences in attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men with greater hostility typically shown toward gay men than lesbians (Basow & Johnson, 2000; Kite, 1994). In addition, there have been some studies that have found differences in attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men *within* gender groupings. That is, men demonstrate greater hostility toward gay men than toward lesbians, whereas women do not express significantly different attitudes toward lesbians than gay men (Herek, 1994, 2000; Kite & Whitley, 1996). Additional development of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory should take into account these more recent developments in the understanding of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.

**STUDY TWO**
As MHI (v.3) does not differentiate attitudes toward lesbians from attitudes toward gay men with the exception of items capturing positive stereotypes, a second study was undertaken to incorporate this feature. Study two also further investigates the factor structure and psychometric properties of the MHI (v.4) with a larger sample of undergraduate students. A total of forty questions were developed from the twenty questions included in MHI (v.3) by differentiating the gender of the target of the question and an additional four questions were added that were slight modifications of the questions to make the questions more applicable to the gender differences.

Procedure

This study was administered through a web-based survey to undergraduate students at six different institutions of higher education. Access to the survey was limited through the use of passwords and unique identifiers to reduce the likelihood that the samples were contaminated by respondents other than those legitimately in the samples.

Sample

Participants. Participants in the study were undergraduates taking introductory social science courses at one of six U.S. colleges and universities. As one option to complete a course component on social science research, students were given the option to participate in the study. The different sites represent different types of secondary educational institutions.

Five of the research sites were private universities, consisting of two Catholic-affiliated schools, one Mennonite-affiliated college, one Baptist-affiliated university, and one university not affiliated with a religious denomination. The sixth school was a medium-sized public university in the Midwest. By tapping into six very different undergraduate pools of students, it was anticipated that the study would have greater variability in terms of age, life experiences, sociopolitical orientation, religious affiliation and religiosity, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic
status and marital status than is typically captured in studies using undergraduate convenience samples. While this strategy increases variability, it does not alleviate generalizability concerns about studies that utilize a non-representative sample of undergraduate students.

Sample descriptives. The final sample consists of 651 undergraduates taking introductory social science courses. Of the 651 respondents, 70.05% were females. Caucasians made up the majority of the sample (81.1%), followed by Hispanics (6.7%), African Americans (5.4%), Asian/Asian Americans (3.85%), biracial (2.31%), and less than 1% each of individuals who identified as Native Americans, or other race. The majority of respondents were first or second year students (79.70%).

Ages ranged from 18 to 56, with a mean of 20.4 years and a standard deviation of 4.5 years. Almost 66% of the students identified as middle class, 19% as working class, 12% as upper class and 3% as lower class. Income was reported in categories, with 8.6% reporting family incomes of less than $25,000, 23.4% with incomes between $25,000 and $54,000, 17.2% between $55,000 and $74,000, 26.4% between $75,000 and $104,000, and the remaining 24.4% report family incomes of $105,000 or greater.

With regard to religion, 38.1% of the sample reported religious affiliations as Catholic, 34.1% with churches in denominations classified as conservative Protestant, 14.4% reported no religious affiliation, 11.6% as mainline or liberal Protestant, and the remaining 1.7% as other non-Christian religious affiliation. Almost 35% of the respondents consider themselves liberal, 24% moderate, and the remaining 41% conservative.

The research protocol was structured in such a way as to decrease the likelihood of missed items or failure to complete survey. Range of missing data on items went from 0 missing
values on the first four items of the survey to 11 missing values (1.69%), on the income question. The vast majority of items had between 3 missing cases (0.46%) and 7 missing cases (1.08%).

Hypotheses

**Apathetic heterosexism.** As was the case in study one, it is again hypothesized that a conservative political ideology would be associated with greater endorsement of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale items. Likewise, it is anticipated that seculars would display significantly lower apathetic heterosexism than would conservative Protestants.

As an additional test of convergent validity for version four of the MHI, it is hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of hostile sexism will also show higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. The literature demonstrates that individuals who are hostiley prejudiced against one social group also tend to be hostiley prejudiced against other social groups (Bierly, 1985; Ficarrotto, 1990; Heineman, 2003). Even though apathetic heterosexism differs conceptually from hostile heterosexism, it seems reasonable to predict that a similar relationship should exist between apathetic heterosexism and hostile sexism. This predicted relationship is based on the role that conservative religious organizations have played in disseminating the rhetoric associated with apathetic heterosexism, the relationship documented in the literature between religiosity and hostile heterosexism, and the relationship documented between conservative religious traditions and hostile heterosexism.

**Paternalistic heterosexism.** In addition to predicting apathetic heterosexism, conservative political ideology should also predict paternalistic heterosexism, although not as strongly and in the opposite direction given its concern about the *unfairness* of the discrimination that lesbians and gay men might face in life.
The predicted relationship between paternalistic heterosexism and hostile sexism is somewhat more difficult to anticipate. The most straightforward prediction would be that as hostile sexism increases paternalistic heterosexism decreases; individuals who are hostilely sexist are unlikely to express concern over the unfairness of discrimination towards lesbians and gay men.

**Positive stereotypic heterosexism.** As in the first study, it is anticipated that males will endorse positive stereotypes more strongly than will females due to the gendered functioning of heterosexism. It is also predicted that a significant positive relationship between positive stereotypic heterosexism and hostile sexism will emerge. Individuals who endorse prejudicial attitudes about one group—regardless of the valence of the attitudes—should also endorse prejudicial attitudes about other groups.

Unlike the other forms of heterosexism, positive stereotypes of gay men have not played a significant role in the political rhetoric opposing legal advances for lesbians and gay men.\(^{13}\) As such, it is anticipated that political orientation will not be predictive of endorsement of positive stereotypes. The hypotheses for study two are summarized in Table 6.

**Factor Analysis**

**Factor structure.** An exploratory iterative factor analysis with oblique rotation was used to examine the factor structure of the 44-item scale. Eigenvalues were examined for values greater than 1.00, indicating the presence of four factors. Likewise, the scree plot was examined and also indicated four factors. Finally, the items loading on each of the potential factors were examined, also indicating four theoretically distinct clusters of items rather than the three that had been theorized.\(^{14}\) The analysis was re-run restricting the number of factors to four and the resulting factor loadings were examined.
As data were collected from six different universities, additional tests of the factorial structure using exploratory factor analyses were run individually for each of the schools. Should a similar structure emerge from the sample at each of the individual schools, this provides greater support for the underlying factorial structure. Using the “eigenvalues greater than one” criteria for factor retention, the factor structure at five of the six schools indicated the retention of four factors. The factor structure at the sixth school—a private women’s Catholic university—indicated three factors with eigenvalues greater than one, with the fourth factor having an eigenvalue very close to 1.00 at a value of .9810, essentially a four factor model as well.

Rather than the three factors originally anticipated (apathetic, paternalistic, and positive stereotypic), four factors emerged across the sample as a whole and individually for each of the schools. Items loaded as expected on both the paternalistic and positive stereotypic subdomains, however, the items developed to capture the apathetic heterosexism subdomain split into two distinct factors. Examination of the items indicated that the two clusters represented (a) a group of four items that denied the existence of discrimination against lesbians and gay persons, and (b) a second group of six items indicated belief that lesbians and gay men were too militant in their demands, were overly focused on their sexuality, or received too much attention.

This differentiation of themes in what had originally been termed apathetic heterosexism necessitated a teasing apart of the original definition of apathetic heterosexism into two definitions that better captured the nature of the two emergent clusters of items. The label amnestic heterosexism was used for the cluster of items that denies the existence of discrimination, and the cluster of items that perceived lesbians/gay men as too militant or receiving too much attention cluster was called aversive heterosexism.
For aversive heterosexism, the following definition was developed: *Attitudes, myths, and beliefs that dismiss, belittle, or disregard the impact of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community.*

Aversive heterosexism has a similar negative valence to hostile heterosexism, but rather than using rhetoric that relies on the traditional negative stereotypes of lesbians and gay men (mentally ill, perverse, pedophile, etc.), and concerns about morality, the aversive heterosexist is much more likely to couch their anti-gay arguments in less inflammatory language. They will argue that the lesbian and gay movement is wanting too much, too fast, an attitude similar to many in the 1960s who opposed the integration of African Americans in the U.S. South as being forced and not evolving “naturally.” Additionally, they may claim that too much attention is given to issues of lesbian and gay sexuality.

Amnestic heterosexism is defined as *attitudes, myths and beliefs that deny the impact of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community.*

Amnestic heterosexism on the other hand is a move to a less hostilely valenced cluster of attitudes. The amnestic heterosexist suggests that discrimination is a thing of the past, and that lesbians and gay men are treated fairly in contemporary society. The amnestic heterosexist may be making these claims out of ignorance, out of refusal to acknowledge factual information, or even out of life experience where they see many successful lesbians and gay men.

Given the clustering of scale items for these two subdomains and the tone of the items, it is anticipated that aversive heterosexism would have a moderate to strong relationship with
hostile heterosexism, while amnestic heterosexism would have only a weak to moderate relationship.

Of the 44 items tested, 21 items were dropped either due to factor loadings of less than .50 or due to ambiguous loadings onto two or more subdomains. This resulted in a 23-item scale covering the four subdomains: paternalistic heterosexism, positive stereotypic heterosexism, aversive heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism.

Examining the variance explained by each factor prior to rotation for the complete sample, factor 1 accounted for 48.7% of the variance in the measured variables, factor 2 accounted for 30.2%, factor 3 accounted for 15.1%, and the final factor for 8.8%. These correspond to the four subdomains of paternalistic, positive stereotypic, aversive, and amnestic heterosexism, respectively. The range for the percentage of variance explained by individual schools was between 32.55% and 51.12% for paternalistic heterosexism, 23.00% and 30.22% for positive stereotypic heterosexism, 11.95% and 17.16% for aversive heterosexism, and 6.73% to 10.81% for amnestic heterosexism. See Table 7 for the items of the MHI (v.4) and their factor loadings for the entire sample.

**Descriptive statistics and reliability.** In order to standardize the various subdomains which have different numbers of items, the sum of the subscale was divided by the number of items on the subscale to obtain an average score (from 1 to 7, with 7 being the highest endorsement of the items in the subdomain). The range for the 7-item Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale scores ranged from 0 to 7, and has a mean of 3.7 with a standard deviation of 2.25. The Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale consists of six items with a range from 1.17 to 7 in the sample. It has a mean of 4.9 and a standard deviation of 1.27. The six-item Aversive Heterosexism subscale has scores in the sample ranging from 1 to 7, a mean of
4.1 and a standard deviation of 1.45. The last subscale, the four-item Amnestic Heterosexism subscale has a range from 1 to 6.5 in the sample, has the lowest mean at 2.5, and the smallest standard deviation at 1.10.

The Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency estimates of .94, .87, .91, and .79 were found for the Paternalistic Heterosexism, Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism, Aversive Heterosexism, and Amnestic Heterosexism subscales, respectively. All the subscales demonstrate adequate internal consistency. As it is anticipated that the various subdomains of the scale will have different relationships with other constructs, and therefore it is not recommended that the scale be used as a whole, the reliability of the overall scale at .80, while adequate, is not particularly meaningful.

**Hypotheses Testing**

Since the data in Study 2 represents respondents from six different universities and it is reasonable to expect that respondents from the same universities are more likely to have similar attitudes (especially given that four of the six universities are religiously-affiliated) than they are to someone from a different university, Huber-White robust standard errors are utilized in the regression models used to test the study’s hypotheses.

**Apathetic heterosexism.** Since the theorized apathetic heterosexism subdomain emerged as the two distinct subdomains of aversive heterosexism and amnestic heterosexism instead of one subdomain, the hypotheses predicted for apathetic heterosexism will be utilized in testing the two new subdomains. Evidence of difference in direction of relationship or in terms of strength will be further evidence of the distinctness of the two subdomains as well.

It was predicted that an increasingly conservative political orientation would be predictive of higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. Testing this hypothesis with the Aversive
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Heterosexism subscale, this hypothesis is supported. For each shift toward a more conservative political orientation, the endorsement of aversive heterosexism increases by almost a third of a point (.29) on the 7-point scale. On average, then, the difference between someone who classifies themselves as “strongly liberal” and someone who classifies themselves as “strongly conservative” will be 1.72 points which is almost 25% of the scale’s 7-point range. Examining religious differences, it was found—as predicted—that seculars have significantly lower scores on the Aversive Heterosexism subscale than do conservative Protestants. However, it had not been anticipated that both liberal Protestants and Catholics would also significantly differentiate themselves from conservative Protestants on this subscale. This may be partially explained by the shift from apathetic heterosexism to aversive heterosexism. Aversive heterosexism is the most extreme component of apathetic heterosexism, while amnestic heterosexism is the less extreme component. Therefore, it seems reasonable that examination of the items as a combined domain in the previous study may have obscured the effects of the individual components.

The third hypothesis related to apathetic heterosexism was a predicted positive relationship between it and hostile sexism. This hypothesis was supported with aversive heterosexism. Each one-point shift in hostile sexism is associated with at .54 point increase in the Aversive Heterosexism subscale. Clearly, hostile sexism has an overlap with aversive heterosexism. Table 8 displays all the hypotheses tests for aversive heterosexism.

Examining the same three hypotheses for amnestic heterosexism, similar results emerge. More conservative politics predicts greater endorsement of the Amnestic Heterosexism subscale items, seculars are significantly lower on the subscale than are conservative Protestants, and there is a significant, positive relationship between hostile sexism and amnestic heterosexism. While all three hypotheses are supported, they are weaker effects than were found with aversive
heterosexism. Likewise an examination of the $R^2$ values demonstrates that these factors have less explanatory value with amnestic heterosexism than they do with aversive heterosexism. In addition, liberal Protestants do not differ from conservative Protestants in their endorsement of amnestic heterosexism, although Catholics (along with seculars as already mentioned) are significantly lower than conservative Protestants. Results can be found displayed in Table 9.

**Paternalistic heterosexism.** Two hypotheses were made regarding the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. First it was predicted that increases in political conservatism would be associated with lower levels of paternalistic heterosexism as paternalistic heterosexism is concerned with *unfair* discrimination against lesbians and gay men. However, this did not turn out to be the case. Rather political conservatism was not predictive of higher levels of paternalistic heterosexism. (See Table 10, Model 1). This is in contrast to the findings in the first study where the opposite pattern was found.

A number of possible explanations for the difference exist. The first is that the differences have emerged because Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale in MHI (v.3) did not differentiate attitudes toward gay men and attitudes toward lesbians, while MHI (v.4), which was used in this study does. Rerunning the analyses separating paternalistically heterosexist attitudes about lesbians from those about gay man, however, finds the same pattern maintained in predicting attitudes regardless of whether it was only for lesbians or only for gay men: increased political conservatism is associated with higher levels of paternalistic heterosexism. (See Table 10, Models 2 and 3).

The second possibility is that differences may exist based on the gender of the respondents, rather than on the gender of the target. However, analyses (not shown) indicated this, too, was not the case. A third permutation of the this argument is that both the gender of the
respondent and the gender of the target may work together. These four models were examined (not shown), and like above, the pattern initially identified holds.

A final possible explanation for the differences between the two studies regarding this empirical relationship is that the manner in which respondents who are okay with having a gay or lesbian child were handled in the survey administration changed. In MHI (v.3) a skip pattern was utilized so that those who expressed no preference in terms of the child’s sexual orientation did not answer the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale items. Those respondents were assigned a score of 0 on paternalistic heterosexism. However, in MHI (v.4) all respondents answered all the questions of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale, but were also given the opportunity to indicate that they were “Okay with a Gay Kid.” Only those who indicated that they were okay with having a gay child on every paternalistic heterosexism question received a zero as their score. (Approximately 16% of the sample indicated that they were Okay having a gay or lesbian child on every paternalistic heterosexism question.)

To determine if this change in survey structure might be responsible for the difference between the studies’ findings, the analyses were rerun once again, but this time those who had a score of zero were eliminated from the analyses. This time the originally predicted pattern emerged and was significant at the .001 level. (See Table 10, Model 4.) Those with a more conservative political ideology scored endorsed significantly lower levels of paternalistic heterosexism than those who were less conservative. The influence of the manner in which respondents who are okay with having a lesbian/gay child are handled within the instrument’s structure raises some interesting questions for future examination.

The second hypothesis regarding the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale predicted that higher levels of hostile sexism would be associated with higher levels of paternalistic
heterosexism. This hypothesis was supported with the full sample. (See Table 10, Model 1). The finding maintained significance at the .01 level (see Table 10, Model 4) when examined with the restricted sample dropping the respondents who were okay having a lesbian/gay child.

**Positive stereotypic heterosexism.** Three hypotheses were proffered regarding positive stereotypic heterosexism. The prediction that those with higher levels of hostile sexism would have higher levels of endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men was supported (Table 11, Model 1). The prediction that political orientation would not be related to endorsement of positive stereotypes however was not supported. Those with more conservative ideology were less likely to endorse common positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men. This finding held even when examining the endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men separately from the endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians (Table 11, Models 2 and 3.) The third hypothesis, that males would score higher on Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism, was not supported either. In fact, the opposite pattern emerged. Males endorsed positive stereotypes significantly less than did females.

To better understand this finding, the analyses were rerun dividing the endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men from those of lesbians as the gender of the target of the attitude may very well influence this relationship. As expected, this closer examination of the relationship indicates that male and female respondents differed on their endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men, with males being less likely to endorse positive stereotypes of gay men than are women. (See Table 11, Model 2). The opposite pattern emerged with regard to positive stereotypes of lesbians. Men were significantly more likely to endorse positive stereotypes about lesbians than are women (Table 11, Model 3).

**Discussion**
The differentiation of attitudes toward lesbians from those toward gay men has improved the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory’s ability to discern important differences in levels of heterosexism depending on the target of the attitude, and, at times, the gender of the respondent combined with the gender of the target of the attitude. In addition, a factor structure analysis with a larger sample identified two separate factors that had previously been combined into the subdomain of apathetic heterosexism. While not all hypotheses were supported, the majority were. Those that weren’t appear to be related to either structural changes in the survey instrument itself or to the differentiation of attitudes by gender of the target.

Further validation of the instrument, as well as inquiry into the emergent relationships around both paternalistic and positive stereotypic heterosexism is needed in order to better understand how these subdomains of modern prejudice function.

Study Limitations

The most obvious limitation of the proposed project is its reliance on an undergraduate, convenience sample which has been one of the major criticisms of much of the social psychological research base (Higbee & Wells, 1972; Myers, 1983; Schultz, 1969; Wintre, North & Sugar, 2001). The critique inquires, “...given the unrepresentativeness of the sample, how can the findings of this type of study be generalized to the real world of everyday people?” (Sears, 1986; Smart, 1966). And, because attending college is not even a universal phenomenon for young adults between the ages of 18 and 22, some have even argued that limiting generalization even just to this age group is also inappropriate (Munroe & Adams, 1977; Schultz, 1969; Wintre et al., 2001)

A second and related criticism regards the developmental phase in which college-aged students fall. They are neither adolescents nor are they typical adults, but are in a transitional
phase to adulthood (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Lerner, 1998; Wintre et al., 2001). Sears (1986) points out that undergraduates’ sense of self and identity are in flux, and Murphy and Gilligan (1980) suggest that the seclusion that comes with an academic atmosphere may actually negate the development of reasoning that results from real world adult experiences of moral conflict and choice. There is also evidence that intelligence (Norman & Daley, 1959; Wechsler, 1958), social behavior (Wintre, Yaffe & Crowley, 1995; Youniss & Smollar, 1985), and learning ability (Adams, 1991; Wimer, 1960) change as one ages.

All studies depart from the ideal research design in some ways with various trade-offs having to be negotiated by the researcher. The important question is, then, in what ways might this study’s departure from the ideal influence its findings and the ability to infer from the results? The above concerns seem to suggest that the generalizability of the study’s findings will be strongly restricted; however, other empirical evidence suggests that the concern may not be as troublesome as would initially seem. An examination of studies that have compared findings of undergraduate students and adults on the topics of heterosexism might shed some light upon the issue of generalizability for this particular project.

**Empirical considerations.** McFarland and Adelson (1996) used twenty different predictors of a composite measure of prejudice (against women, lesbians/gay men, and African Americans) with both a student sample and an adult sample. They found that only four of the twenty correlates significantly predicted prejudice and that the four predicted prejudice in both samples. In addition, an examination of their standardized coefficients reveals that they are very similar in strength across the samples. Table 12 lists the variables and their coefficients.

Whitley and Lee (2000) in their meta-analysis of the relationships between authoritarianism, political conservatism, and heterosexism found similar patterns. Both right
wing authoritarianism and political conservatism were associated more strongly with attitudes
toward homosexuality in adult samples than in the college student samples.

While anti-gay/anti-lesbian prejudice--although decreasing--has been found to be
widespread in both samples of college students (e.g., Herek, 1984; Kite, 1994) and national
survey samples (e.g. Herek and Capitanio, 1996), a number of studies have indicated that
younger people have lower rates of hostile heterosexism (Balanko, 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, &
Sears, 1999; Simon, 1995; Simoni, 1996; Waldo & Kemp, 1997), greater support for lesbian/gay
rights (Yang, 1999), and greater support for same-sex marriage (Gallup, 2004; L.A. Times,
2004). Additionally, much of the work on the changing nature of heterosexism has specifically
argued that the dynamics of modern prejudice are most clearly found within the academic setting
where cultural socialization of anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes clashes with the values of
egalitarianism (Norris, 1991). In addition, it is logical to expect (and empirical evidence suggests
(Balanko, 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, & Sears, 1999; Simon, 1995; Simoni, 1996; Waldo & Kemp,
1997)) that because the young adult generation has less negative and more positive attitudes
toward homosexuality than older adults, we will find greater endorsement of positively-valenced
prejudicial attitudes among members of this age group.

These findings do not imply that the findings of this project are necessarily generalizable
to the U.S. population--that will be evident only if future replications of the project are
undertaken with different samples and find similar results. In general, however, these empirical
findings suggest three things about the generalizability of the study. First, the idea that young
adults have substantially less stability in sociopolitical attitudes than other age groups is weakly
supported, at best. Second, in attempting to capture modern prejudice related to sexual
orientation, a young adult cohort may actually be a better sample than older adults given the
generational differences that have been documented related to the specific types of anti-gay/anti-lesbian attitudes. Finally, if anything the empirical results suggest that relationships between a number of attitudinal constructs used in this project and attitudes regarding homosexuality are likely to be stronger in the U.S. adult population than among college undergraduates in the U.S. Therefore, findings with college undergraduates are likely to be a conservative estimate of the relationships found in the adult population.

CONCLUSION

The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4) builds on previous literature regarding attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and expands the conceptualization of heterosexism to include four additional subdomains in addition to the one normally captured by existing instruments. One of these additional subdomains, aversive heterosexism, has been the subject of one other attitude scale, the Modern Homonegativity Scale (Morrison & Morrison, 2002), while the other three, paternalistic heterosexism, positive stereotypic heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism have not been captured by scales in the existing literature.

This project extends the work of numerous scholars working in the arena of modern racism and sexism into the realm of heterosexism and models two of the initial subscales on the work of Glick and Fiske (1996) and their Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. It also answers the call of a number of researchers (Morrison & Morrison, 2002; O’Donohue & Caselles, 1993; Szczerba, 1997; Wright, Adam & Bernat, 1999) to capture a wider range of attitudes about lesbians and gay men than is captured by existing instruments.

The current scale is the first to attempt to capture positive stereotypes and to examine their relationship to other subdomains of prejudicial attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. It is unique in this manner, even among scales capturing modern racism and modern sexism. While
much work has been done on negative stereotypes--their function, their content, and their relationship to other social psychological concepts--little has been done on positive stereotypes and their role in the maintenance of stratification. From differing perspectives, Jackman (1994) and Glick and Fiske (2001) have laid a foundation on which this work can be undertaken. However, much work needs to be done to fully understand the similarities and differences in positive and negative stereotypes. The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4) offers an instrument that can be utilized in this endeavor when examining attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.

This paper outlines the scale development process for the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory. The current version of the scale functions well in terms of reliability, construct validity, concurrent validity and divergent validity. It predicts group membership and its overall structure is supported by theoretical arguments that exist in the literature. Additional investigation of the scale will need to examine its properties when used in community settings rather than solely with undergraduates, and its ability to predict discriminatory behavior has yet to be explored.

While the scale has been designed to capture heterosexuals’ attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men, it seems logical that lesbians and gay men themselves may share as wide of a range of attitudes about their own social group as do heterosexuals. After all, lesbians and gay men grew up with the same socialization toward homosexuality as do heterosexuals. The scale’s applicability to lesbians and gay men has not been tested although it may be appropriate for use with this population given a few minor modifications.

Like attitudes regarding race and gender, the structure, content and function of attitudes toward sexual orientation are multidimensional and complex. The traditional perspective that
prejudice is comprised solely of hostile attitudes is clearly called into question by studies on
stereotype content and by theoretical developments in the understanding of intergroup relations
and modern forms of prejudice. The current studies extend this body of scholarship and offer
further empirical evidence of this framework as applied to attitudes towards lesbians and gay
men.

The existing literature on attitudes regarding homosexuality captures primarily only one
specific subdomain, albeit probably the most common constellation of attitudes up until the last
couple of decades. The force of social change has, however, remolded the manifestation of these
attitudes into new forms that exist side-by-side with the traditional expression of hostile
heterosexism. The narrow focus on hostile heterosexism is no longer broad enough to capture the
intricacy of attitudes that maintain stratification based on sexual orientation and continued
reliance on it will make the current understanding of attitudes towards homosexuality
incomplete.

Finally, the conceptualization of positive stereotypes as a factor in maintaining
stratification has implications beyond the current application to heterosexism. Their role has
been hinted at in work done by Katz and Hass (1988) on the elicitation of polarized responses as
a function of ambivalence and in the gender differentiation subcomponent of benevolent sexism
(Glick & Fiske, 1996). In addition the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu,
2002) incorporates the dimension of warmth which, for some social groups, can be closely
related to positive stereotypes. Jackman (1994)--while not concerned specifically with positive
stereotypes--has examined some aspects of the role that positive feelings can play in maintaining
stratification based on class, gender and race. Her work, however, has not been sufficiently
incorporated into the social psychological literature on prejudice and discrimination.
The recent call to examine stereotype content (Eckes, 2002; Stangor & Schaller, 1996; Zebrowitz, 1996) is a timely one, and one that should not overlook the examination of positively valenced attitudes toward various social groups and the role that these attitudes may play in fostering and maintaining stratification. Even so, as many of these scholars argue, the content of stereotypes matter and were it not for cultural consensus about the content, stereotypes would not be particularly problematic.
NOTES

1. These new forms of prejudice may not actually be “new” at all, but may have existed concurrently with more traditional hostile prejudicial attitudes as well. If this is the case, it is perhaps more appropriate to view these clusters of attitudes as new in the sense that they represent a cluster of attitudes that is gaining greater consensus in the population as a way to justify and legitimize stratification, potentially even replacing the hostile cluster of attitudes as the primary way in which social stratification is justified.

2. Perhaps, the mostly widely used scale to measure attitudes about lesbians and gay men in the last twenty years is Herek’s (1988) ATLG and ATLG-S (short) scale (for recent examples, see Ellis, Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2002; Span & Vidal, 2003; Van de Meerendonk, Eisinga, & Felling., 2003; White & Kurpius, 2002) The scale and its shorter version have undergone extensive testing for factor structure, item analysis, construct validity and reliability (Herek, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1988).

3. For a comprehensive review of strategies and scales used to capture attitudes toward lesbians and gay men through 1993, see Schwanberg (1993) and O’Donohue and Caselles (1993).

4. All of the concerns identified by Morrison and Morrison (2002) fall under the rubric of what the author originally conceptualized as apathetic heterosexism: the belief that lesbians and gay men are making unnecessary demands for change; the belief that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a relic of the past; and the belief that lesbians and gay men exaggerate the impact of sexual orientation.

5. Using the term hostile heterosexism parallels Glick and Fiske’s (1996) use of the term hostile sexism which they define to mean “antipathy toward women who are viewed as usurping men’s power” (p. 109).
6. A subdomain corresponding to heterosexual intimacy was not theorized for the attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. Given that the nature of the relationship between the in-group (males) and out-groups (females) regarding gender is significantly more interdependent than that of heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals, it is suggested that the heterosexual intimacy component may be a unique feature to prejudice based on gender. See Jackman (1994) for a thorough discussion of the role of interdependence between groups in shaping the dynamics of oppression between groups.

7. The remaining two questions for the gender differentiation subcomponent are “Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility” and “Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.”

8. Positive stereotypes may play an important social identity role. They may function as identity consolidators--clearly defining in-groups and out-groups--in much the same manner as negative stereotypes. An individual with a non-prejudiced self-concept does not have negative stereotypes at their disposal (unless they want to risk cognitive and emotional dissonance) and therefore may endorse positive stereotypes as a way to meet their social psychological identity needs. Identities do not exist in a vacuum, but rather in a stratified social context, where they are tied to issues of power, privilege and status.

From a structural perspective, positive stereotypes also identify “approved of” social roles for marginalized groups and can serve as explicit and implicit justifications for limitations placed on career options, social roles and even geographic relationships. The positive stereotype of women as nurturing can be used, for example, as a justification to limit women to careers of education, childcare and nursing. This stereotype is dissonant with the image of women as trained soldiers marching into battle or cutthroat executives managing a hostile takeover. Even
the man who considers himself non-sexist may still experience emotional reluctance to employ a qualified woman for “dirty work.”

9. Development of questions to tap into the paternalistic heterosexism subdomain faced a number of difficulties. First, because it was believed that paternalistic heterosexism might vary as a function of social distance, a decision had to be made whether to risk little variability by asking questions regarding a close relationship and triggering a more general protective instinct (one’s child), or to risk little variability by asking questions regarding a distant relationship and triggering a live and let live attitude (an acquaintance). The decision was made to err on the side of a close relationship. If little or no variability emerged, we would experiment in later versions of the scale.

10. Descriptive statistics, reliability coefficients, and correlational information are available from author upon request.

11. Apathetic was chosen for its connotation of indifference, unresponsiveness, and little concern.

12. One would also anticipate that like seculars, persons of the Jewish faith would also score significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative Protestants. However, the sample consists of no persons of the Jewish faith, leaving this hypothesis untestable.

13. While the stereotype that gay men are wealthy has been utilized in some anti-gay political rhetoric, it has typically been used in a manner that resonates more with the denial of discrimination, rather than as a positive stereotype. For example, it is often discussed as evidence that gay men are not discriminated against and, therefore, need no legal protection against discrimination.
14. As a further check on the structure of the scale, multidimensional scaling was conducted using Euclidean distances. The initial analysis was restricted to two dimensions and resulted in a Mardia fit measure 1 = .5401 and Mardia fit measure 2 = .8990, indicating a less than optimal fit for the data. Consecutive analyses were run allowing three, four, five and six dimensions to emerge. Each additional dimension improved the fit measures, however, factor analysis with five and greater factors resulted in factors that were ambiguous. As such four factors were retained. The four dimension model emerging from the multidimensional scaling analysis resulted in a Mardia fit measure 1 = .6889 and a Mardia fit measure 2 = .9662, a significant improvement over the 2-dimensional model.

15. Amnestic is the adjective form of the word amnesia and was chosen for its incorporation of both the idea of forgetfulness and the state of being oblivious.

16. The format of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale questions allow for someone to indicate that they are “okay with having a gay kid.” If they indicate that response on all 7 items then they are assigned a score of zero for the subscale.

17. Glick and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory does contain a component that they term “gender differentiation” which it has been argued here actually does tap into positive stereotypes of women.
AUTHOR NOTE

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REFERENCES


Balanko, S. (1998, June). Anti-gay violence at the University of Saskatchewan. Poster session presented at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Montreal, PQ.


### Table 1

**Summary of Hypotheses for Study One**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdomain</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apathetic Heterosexism</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1: Higher degrees of political conservatism will be associated with significantly increased levels of apathetic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Secularists will report significantly lower levels of apathetic heterosexism than conservative Protestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Catholics and mainline/liberal Protestants will not report significantly different levels of apathetic heterosexism than conservative Protestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1: Individuals with lesbian/gay friends will report significantly higher levels of paternalistic heterosexism than will individuals with no lesbian/gay friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Individuals with only casual interaction with lesbians/gay men will not differ significantly on reported paternalistic heterosexism than individual with no interaction with lesbians/gay men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Higher degrees of political conservatism will be associated with significantly decreased levels of paternalistic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1: Males will report significantly higher levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism than will females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Males who report more feminine interests will report significantly higher levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism than will males who do not report feminine interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Females with masculine interests will not significantly differ on reports of positive stereotypic heterosexism than females who do not report masculine interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

*Regression Analyses for Apathetic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>2.95***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.908)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.255)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline/Liberal Protestant</td>
<td>-3.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.426)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Christian</td>
<td>-14.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.642)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-7.60*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.760)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>20.17***</td>
<td>34.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.851)</td>
<td>(1.994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup>Conservative Protestants used as reference group.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
Table 3

*Regression Analyses for Paternalistic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Friends who are</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbian or Gay</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Interaction with Lesbians or</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay Men</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.191)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Lesbian or Gay Male</td>
<td>12.58**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.153)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.91*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.336)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>63.56***</td>
<td>59.93***</td>
<td>78.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.755)</td>
<td>(3.481)</td>
<td>(5.599)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.*

*aCasual (impersonal) interaction used as reference category.*

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).*
Table 4

*Regression Analyses for Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8.42**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-report of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminine Interests</td>
<td>19.36*</td>
<td>(9.096)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(males only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-report of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests (females</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.681)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>25.75***</td>
<td>32.61***</td>
<td>25.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.774)</td>
<td>(2.580)</td>
<td>(1.835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).*
Table 5

*Correlations between Subscales of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Apathetic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apathetic Heterosexism</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
<td>-.1710*</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</td>
<td>.0603</td>
<td>.1982*</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
### Table 6

**Summary of Hypotheses for Study Two**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdomain</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apathetic Heterosexism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Higher degrees of political conservatism will be associated with significantly increased levels of apathetic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Secularists will report significantly lower levels of apathetic heterosexism than conservative Protestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals with higher levels of hostile sexism will report significantly higher levels of apathetic heterosexism than individuals with lower levels of hostile sexism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Higher degrees of political conservatism will be associated with significantly decreased levels of paternalistic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Individuals with higher levels of hostile sexism will report significantly lower levels of paternalistic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Males will report significantly higher levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism than will females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Individuals with higher levels of hostile sexism will report significantly lower levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
<td>Higher degrees of political conservatism will not be associated with significantly different levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because she would unfairly be stopped from adopting children.</td>
<td>-.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be a homosexual because she would face unfair discrimination.</td>
<td>-.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because religious institutions unfairly reject lesbians.</td>
<td>-.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 (continued)

*Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because most churches would unfairly reject him.</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because it would be unfairly harder for him to adopt or have children.</td>
<td>-.83</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my SON NOT be a homosexual because he would unfairly be denied the right to marry the man he loved.</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because he would be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfairly discriminated against.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down everyone’s throat</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbianism is given too much attention in today’s society.</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbians make far too much noise about their sexuality.</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 (continued)
Table 7 (continued)

*Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Lesbians have become too radical in their demands.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Things would be better if lesbians quit trying to force their lifestyle on everyone else.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. There is too much attention given to gay men on television and in the media.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Discrimination against lesbians is virtually non-existent in today’s society.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Most people treat lesbians as fairly as they treat everyone else.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 (continued)

*Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. Gay men are treated as fairly as everyone else in today's society.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Gay men no longer face discrimination in the U.S.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at physically defending themselves.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Lesbians excel at outdoor activities more than heterosexual women.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at auto maintenance and repair.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 (continued)

*Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Gay men are more compassionate than heterosexual men.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Gay men take better care of their bodies than heterosexual men.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Lesbians are more independent than heterosexual women.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8
Regression Analyses for Aversive Heterosexism (MHI, v.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>.286***</td>
<td>(.0307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.539***</td>
<td>(.1013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline/Liberal Protestant</td>
<td>-.328*</td>
<td>(.1668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Christian</td>
<td>-.393</td>
<td>(.3190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-.637***</td>
<td>(.1322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td>.540***</td>
<td>(.0406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.081***</td>
<td>(.1696)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²                      .451
N                        629

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
Table 9
*Regression Analyses for Amnestic Heterosexism (MHI, v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.0281</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.237*</td>
<td>.0950</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline/Liberal Protestant</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.1477</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Christian</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.2884</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-.271*</td>
<td>.1245</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td>.254***</td>
<td>.0378</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.215***</td>
<td>.1653</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>629</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
Table 10

*Regression Analyses of Paternalistic Heterosexism Subscale (MHI, v.4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 4&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.204***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>(.0554)</td>
<td>(.0564)</td>
<td>(.0589)</td>
<td>(.0511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>.426***</td>
<td>.456***</td>
<td>.385***</td>
<td>.196**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism</td>
<td>(.0771)</td>
<td>(.0798)</td>
<td>(.0818)</td>
<td>(.0705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.809***</td>
<td>1.808***</td>
<td>1.809***</td>
<td>4.495***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3652)</td>
<td>(.3732)</td>
<td>(.3780)</td>
<td>(.3702)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup>Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward gay men.  
<sup>b</sup>Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward lesbians.  
<sup>c</sup>Predicting paternalistic heterosexism, dropping respondents who report being okay with having a gay child.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).*
Table 11

Regression Analyses of Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism (MHI, v.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.436***</td>
<td>.293*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1070)</td>
<td>(.1285)</td>
<td>(.1146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>.441***</td>
<td>.432***</td>
<td>.445***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism</td>
<td>(.0454)</td>
<td>(.0561)</td>
<td>(.0475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>-.103***</td>
<td>-.127***</td>
<td>-.092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>(.0297)</td>
<td>(.0372)</td>
<td>(.0311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.769***</td>
<td>2.343***</td>
<td>1.482***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1808)</td>
<td>(.2294)</td>
<td>(.1808)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup>Predicting positive stereotypic heterosexism toward gay men.

<sup>b</sup>Predicting positive stereotypic heterosexism toward lesbians.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
Table 12

Regression of Composite Prejudice Measure on Four Predictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlate</th>
<th>Standardized coefficient (β)</th>
<th>Multiple correlation R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult sample (N=283)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Student sample (N=438)     |                              |                        |
| Social dominance orientation | .29                          | .48                    |
| Authoritarianism            | .42                          | .64                    |
| Universalism                | -.21                         | .69                    |
| Gender                      | -.10                         | .74                    |