ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE PETTY CAPTAINS, THEY OBEY THEM BADLY: THE DIALECTICS OF PREHISPANIC WESTERN PUEBLO SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

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Southwestern archaeologists have debated the nature of late Prehispanic western pueblo social organization for nearly a century. Were the fourteenth-century pueblos egalitarian or hierarchical? This issue remains unsettled largely because of the oppositional thinking that has informed most contributions to the debate: that is, the tendency to frame questions about Prehispanic sociopolitical organization in dichotomous “either-or” terms. We critique this approach to the problem and examine one of the most prominent controversies about Prehispanic social organization: the Grasshopper-Pueblo–Chavez Pass controversy. We propose an alternative approach rooted in a dialectical epistemology, and a theory of social life that emphasizes the lived experience of people. What impresses us most about late Prehispanic western social organization is not that it was egalitarian or hierarchical, but that it was both. We discuss how this basic contradiction between communal life and hierarchy was a major internal motor driving change in these pueblos.

Arqueólogos del suroeste han debatido la naturaleza de los pueblos prehispánicos organización social por casi un siglo. ¿Estaban pueblos occidental del decimocuarto del siglo comun o jerárquico? Esta_emisión queda incierto grandemente a causa del pensamiento oposicional que ha informado la mayoría de contribuciones al debate: es la tendencia idear preguntas acerca de organización social prehispánico en términos dicotómicos. Nosotros critica esta proximidad al problema, y examina uno de las controversias más prominentes acerca de organización social prehispánico: el Grasshopper Pueblo–Chavez Pass controversia. Nos proponemos a una proximidad de la alternativa arraigado en un epistemología dialéctica, y una teoría de vida social que da énfasis al vivió experiencia de personas. Qué impresiones nosotros más acerca de tarde organización social pueblos occidental, prehispánico, no está que eran comun o jerárquico, pero que eran ambos. Discutimos cómo esta contradicción básica entre era un comandante impulso interior de motor cambia en estos pueblos.
late Prehispanic social organization in the Southwest in dichotomous either-or terms: i.e., was a given organizational entity simple or complex, egalitarian or stratified, acephalous or authoritarian (McGuire 1990; Plog 1995)? Questions about causality have been similarly framed. They ask whether change was environmentally or politically induced (e.g., Lightfoot 1984), with investigators’ preferences usually tied to their position on complexity. This kind of oppositional thinking originates in a processual view of social organization and causality. It has persisted through methodological refinements, and the collection of new data. It has also survived theoretical reevaluations of the concept of complexity and even widespread advocacy of continuous, as opposed to typological, approaches to variation (Sebastian 1991; Upham et al. 1989).

What impresses us most about modern and past pueblo societies is not that they are/were egalitarian or stratified, but that they embodied both consensual and hierarchical social relations (see also Plog 1995). Oppositional thinking does not accommodate the paradoxical reality of pueblo life or the empirical realities of the archaeological record. This means that a radical change in perspective is required, one that breaks with oppositional thought. For us, the best hope for new insights lies in framing different questions about the past, and adopting a different framework of inquiry. This alternative framework is grounded in a dialectical epistemology, and reflects an interest in the lived experience of past peoples, i.e., their actions within fields of social relations and cultural meanings, and their roles as conscious creators and negotiators of culture. We do not ask if the Southwest was egalitarian or stratified—thereby forcing Prehispanic cases into conventional categories—but rather we ask what was the dialectical relationship between egalitarianism and stratification? Or, put differently, how did consensual and hierarchical social relations structure pueblo society, and how did the tensions and contradictions in these relations propel cultural change?

Such questions can only be asked and answered in the context of specific historical experiences. After a brief comparison of the processual approach with a dialectical alternative, we will examine the Chavez Pass–Grasshopper debate to illustrate what our approach delivers in a concrete archaeological setting. We offer an alternative model open to the possibility that late Prehispanic western pueblo society may have varied in ways that conventional analytical categories cannot capture.

Oppositional Thinking and Processual Archaeology

Processual archaeology embraces a logical positivist epistemology and a systemic view of culture. Positivists emphasize the acquisition of general and “objective” knowledge and the ability to predict future events based on this knowledge. The processualist metaphysic is explicitly nomothetic rather than particularistic in orientation. It ultimately seeks to generate laws of human behavior good for all times and places. Processualists study pueblo prehistory to learn about that past, but also to fulfill more general goals such as making contributions to methodology and evolutionary anthropology (Cordell and Plog 1979:424; McGuire 1983).

The processualist emphasis on generality and predictability springs from a systemic and atomistic view of culture. Processualists imagine that culture consists of subsystems functionally integrated into a larger whole. This view emphasizes stability as the normal state of social systems. In most cases the system functions as a means of human adaptation to the physical environment. Given that cultural subsystems are functionally related and geared to produce stability, the cause for change must be found in independent variables that lie outside the system. Many processualists believe that changes in the technological subsystem determine change in other aspects of the cultural system. Therefore, processualists tend to find causality in the material relations of the economy and the environment. For example, Cordell and Plog’s (1979:410) reading of the whole of puebloan prehistory is predicated on the assumption that “human societies are continually involved in experimentation with different strategies for coping with the changing environment.”

Processual archaeology, and its attending val-
ues, performed a useful service for southwestern archaeology (Redman 1991). The new archaeology advocated explicit methods, directed us to variation as the proper focus of study, specified questions of social relevance, and undermined simple appeals to authority as the basis for inference justification. Cordell and Plog's (1979) seminal paper opened up the study of the pueblan past to diverse organizational strategies that may not be reflected in the ethnographic record. Processual archaeology's stress on material relations led to impressive gains in our understanding of Prehispanic pueblo environments and economies that we continue to build on.

Many archaeologists have concluded, however, that the philosophy of processual archaeology has made limited contributions to understanding cultural change. Numerous detailed critiques of processual archaeology exist in the literature, both from within (Cowgill 1993; Renfrew 1982:8) and without (Hodder 1982; McGuire 1992; Shanks and Tilley 1987; Trigger 1978). Two specific points drawn from these critiques inform our rethinking of late Prehispanic pueblo social organization: (1) processual archaeology has failed to attain its nomothetic ambitions and (2) processual archaeology's objectivist ideals preclude the expansion of archaeological inquiry into several important realms, such as social power and ideology. In other words, the processual paradigm has not delivered lawlike knowledge or general theories of culture change, and restricts our understanding of the full spectrum of human organizational possibilities.

We feel that the limits of processualism lie in the inherent ambiguity and complexity of all societies. The advocates of processual archaeology underestimate these features, and oppositional thinking cannot capture them. For many critics, the New Archaeology's failure to arrive at general laws of cultural change suggests that there is more shaping society than the broad adaptive, systemic, and evolutionary "macro forces" championed by processual archaeology (Binford 1986:469). Specifically, "internal" ethnographic variables or "structuring principles" seem to make a difference (Wylie 1989). These variables include power, ideology, and gender, characteristics that make up the everyday lived experience of people (Gailey 1987; Kus 1989; Roseberry 1989; Silverblatt 1987; Wolf 1982). Change in structuring principles can occur on a temporal scale visible to the participants in a culture; that is, people are aware of them and act upon this knowledge (Paynter and McGuire 1991). Thus, human lived experience, and specific historical context, are indispensable in considering cultural process and change.

All of this suggests that study of ethnographic detail or "micro forces" is just as important as study of those systemic "macro forces" invisible to the participants in a society. By failing to address internal dynamics we miss the variation created by real trajectories of social change, as well as the lived experience that is to be found in the particulars of an empirical case. The task should not be to privilege one or another kind of inquiry as providing the truth about past societies (as is wont to happen on both sides of the "processual-postprocessual" debate), but to recognize that sensitivity to both kinds of organizational forces can lead to richer, more nuanced understandings of the past (Tringham 1991:99–103).

**Dialectics**

A dialectical approach to knowledge and society reveals the rich tapestry of the human past. The dialectic is both a worldview and a method of inquiry (Ollman 1976; Saitta 1989; Sayer 1987). As a way of thinking it differs radically from atomistic and systemic modes of thought (Gramsci 1971:435). Dialectics is underpinned by different ideals while at the same time retaining—albeit in a slightly different form—the generalizing and predictive aspirations of processual archaeology.

**Epistemology**

Like logical positivism, dialectics accepts that we can gain empirical knowledge of, and learn from, the world of experience. Dialectics differs, however, in recognizing that our specification of causality is fully dependent on particular sets of theoretical assumptions, conceptions of culture and society, and values. Knowledge is constructed about, rather than discovered in facts. Wylie puts it well: a "rich theoretical judgement" (1989:100) is required to make sense of empirical facts and gain an understanding of underlying relations and processes.
We do not endorse the radical subjectivism of the sort condemned by Watson (1991). A dialectical epistemology accepts that there are empirical and logical criteria for evaluating knowledge-claims (Saitta 1989; Wylie 1989). It also endorses generalization and prediction as admirable aspirations, albeit in particular senses. Specific cases can suggest what prior conditions, actions, and consequences we should examine to understand change in other broadly similar cases.

Our bottom line is that dialectics does not force a choice between objectivism and subjectivism, or science and humanism, or particulars and generalities. In other words it does not force a choice between an archaeology that is “either explanatory, empirical and capable of obtaining objective truth or intuitive and particularistic and a matter of personal interpretation” (Rowlands 1984:112). The debate over subjectivity and objectivity is a false one that serves only to obscure the dialectic between reality and consciousness, past and present, facts and values (Kohl 1985; Patterson 1989; Rowlands 1984).

Social Theory

A dialectical approach eschews ideal types in favor of social forms as constituted in history and out of the everyday lived experience of their participants. It views the social world not in terms of compartmentalized subsystems, but as a complex web of internal relations. Every real social form is a field of interconnected relations. A dialectical approach acknowledges that human individuals are embedded in these relations; indeed, relations have no existence independent of people. Individuals are recognized as conscious, intentional creators of culture rather than passive carriers of culture (Paynter 1989). People interact with social structures (e.g., arrangements for allocating resources, dividing labor, exercising authority, and so on), and they are differentially positioned with respect to these structures.

The dialectic embraces that which is paradoxical to oppositional thinking. In oppositional terms a society must be either egalitarian or stratified, or possibly in transition between the two. Dialectical thinking allows, however, that in some historical instances equality may necessitate the existence of certain forms of political stratification. That is, there are certain situations where forms of political hierarchy based on strongly regularized, even hereditary access to decision-making positions are crucial to maintaining communalism.

Such seeming paradoxes exist because social oppositions do not exist independently of each other, but rather form a unity whereby the existence of one necessarily entails the existence of the other. For example, the existence of a slave requires the existence of a master. The underlying relationship of slavery defines both the slave and the master. As should be obvious, the slave and the master experience this relationship differently, and because of the inherent inequality of it, find themselves in conflict. Social relations create parts in uneasy tension (if not outright conflict) so that the whole manifests tensions and conflict as much as harmony and integration. The tensions and conflicts that drive social change always have their origins in relationships between people in concrete environmental and historical settings. Instability is endemic to social forms (Paynter 1989).

Herein lies a notion of causality and change different from that in processual archaeology. We cannot identify some relationships as determinants and others as effects. We can, however, point to the role that one entity or subset of relations has in altering one or more of the other relations with which it is enmeshed (Ollman 1976:17). In doing so we are singling out an influence as being worth analyzing in a particular case, not saying that it was causal in the same way that causality is understood within processual archaeology.

Dialectics thus recognizes a complex social landscape that cannot be fully appreciated through oppositional thinking. Dialectics challenges us to define the operative forms or expressions of social differentiation (generational, gender, or class-based) in concrete instances; to take stock of individual and group interests vis-à-vis patterns of inclusion and exclusion; and to clarify the instabilities and conflicts (over material conditions and cultural meanings) that they can produce. Change in social forms in turn springs from the myriad possibilities for conflict inherent in the nature of social relations. Every social form has within it the seeds of its own transformation. These seeds will not totally
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destroy the old form, but rather will change it into something that is both new and old. In this mix of new and old are other potential tensions that will, in the end, transform the new social form. Thus, history is a critical element in a dialectical account of change. Incorporating history means that explanation is “contingent,” sensitive to the complex interweaving of environmental conditions, human interests and choices, interregional contacts, regional spheres of interaction, and particular local dynamics. In the next section, we use these theoretical concepts to develop a more specific model of a pueblo social landscape.

The Pueblos as Complex Communal Societies

The key opposition in understanding pueblo social organization hinges on a distinction between the pueblos as egalitarian societies and as stratified societies. The traditional position argues for egalitarian pueblos lacking in formal hierarchies beyond age and sex, and organized by cross-cutting ties (sodalities) immanent in social structure (Eggan 1950; Reid 1985; Vivian 1990; Whittlesey 1978). The recent “revisionist” position sees the pueblo as hierarchical polities that may manifest significant inequalities of wealth and power (Brandt 1994; Smith 1983; Upham 1982; Whiteley 1988; Wilcox 1981).

The revisionists argue that these inequalities derive from differential control of esoteric knowledge and ceremonial objects. This differential access to wealth and power is further understood to follow clan lines. The revisionist literature notes the differential participation of particular clan leaders (from core lineage segments) in a variety of regulative processes, including the allocation of land and permits relating to the use of land and water, the scheduling of ceremonial activity, the appointment of ceremonial and secular officials, the utilization of communal surpluses, and general planning for the future (Reyman 1987; Upham 1982; Whiteley 1988). Primary producers support elites via work parties that prepare, plant, and harvest elite land maintenance their houses, and periodically prepare their food. Upham (1982) and Brandt (1994) see this support of elites as reflecting institutionalized inequality if not coercive, exploitative relations. Finally, revisionist scholarship underscores how positions of leadership are hereditarily transmitted within clans. In short, for these revisionist authors access to ritual knowledge and power translates into control over the very economic foundations of society.

As Brandt (1994) points out, however, the pueblo ethnographic literature “is neither deep nor thick.” Information was collected over a period of more than 100 years, from different intellectual perspectives and with different interests in mind. Thus, at present one can find empirical support in pueblo ethnography for either model of pueblo social organization.

Our review of this literature—and our suspicion that empirical patterns in pueblo prehistory defy explanation with either model—suggests the need for alternative formulations. We seek to open a third space for theory development, and from this space we propose that the Prehispanic pueblos, while not egalitarian, were not stratified either; in fact, they were simultaneously both. We capture this situation with a model of the pueblos as complex communal societies.

A communal society exists when constituent social groups hold the means of production—the land, game, plants, fish, tools, technical knowledge, and other resources needed to sustain life—in common, and where surplus appropriation is collective in form; i.e., where the extractors of surplus labor are simultaneously the producers (Amariglio 1984; Diamond 1974; Handsman 1991; Leacock 1972; Lee 1990; Saitta and Keene 1990). It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because production is communal, wealth and power differentials between interest groups—the indicators of “complexity” in revisionist literature—do not exist. The communal ownership of property and the collective appropriation of social labor do not necessarily imply that each communal group will have the same or equal amounts of property, that people within these groups will have equal access to resources, or that some groups will not be in a position to make demands on the labor of other groups (Bender 1989: 84–87; Brumfiel 1989:128–132; Handsman 1991:342). Inequalities can exist within and between social groupings (Brumfiel 1989:128–132). Reproduction and ideology can become the means by which some members within a group dominate others, or by which one social
group gains dominance over another. Cultural knowledge can be unevenly distributed and have important political and economic effects depending on environmental and historical circumstances.

Communalism can take a variety of forms that cannot be captured by the simplistic opposition of egalitarian vs. stratified society. It is possible to have hierarchy and even institutionalized social ranking without the erosion of collective appropriation or differential effects on the biological well-being of members of the society. That is, we can imagine situations or contexts where political hierarchy exists without the sort of wealth and power monopolies that generate class divisions. Indeed, political hierarchy in some circumstances may even be crucial to the maintenance of egalitarian collectives, depending on how those hierarchies articulate with other aspects of communal social life.

Saitta (1994) develops this idea for “tribal” groupings generally, and the pueblos specifically. He sees historic pueblo hierarchies as responsive to, rather than exploitative of, the commune. Pueblo leaders were “subsumed” to the commune and did not form a distinct class exploiting the labor of kinfolk and neighbors. The pueblo elite’s subsumption to the commune implies a paradoxical position within the communal social order. Subsumed elites are limited by kin and civil obligations, and they struggle with each other over access to communally extracted and allocated surpluses. While a “communal ethos” or “ideology of community” (Handsman 1991:343) in this case tempers the use of power and softens its impact on the daily life of people, power relationships and social struggles among elites and between subsumed elites and primary producers provide an internal dynamic of daily life and social change.

In short, we are mistaken to assume that communal hierarchies and inequalities will always have the same form, or exist in the same spaces where we find them in our own lives. Prehistoric societies may have been quite variable with respect to the nature and sources of social conflict, and we miss an opportunity to explore this variation when we make conventional assumptions about hierarchy and its structural position in society. Identifying the sources of social power and its relationship to wealth and labor flows is a real challenge to building a theory of communal forms. Evidence for the pueblos as complex communal societies may be found in the same gamut of ethnographic and ethnohistoric sources used to sustain egalitarian and stratified models of pueblian social life.

Whiteley (1988), in his reexamination of classic puebloan ethnographies, challenges the assumptions of clan corporateness and equality in economic, jural, and ritual affairs that underwrites the egalitarian model. He shows that clans have differential access to ceremonies and duties in the social order. Further, he demonstrates that inequality existed within clans and between family/lineage segments, and that some family/lineage segments had differential access to land and ceremonial knowledge. Whiteley’s reexamination suggests that the economic, social, and ceremonial relations structuring Puebloan society (specifically, those determining landholding and inheritance patterns, and participation in ritual) were far more variable and flexible than either pole of the existing opposition allows. These relations were also more open to modification and negotiation by agents than either an egalitarian or a stratified model permits.

Ownership of pueblo land is clearly a complex and ambiguous relation that is subject to negotiation. Whiteley underscores a point made by Titiev (1944) that no producers are left landless at Hopi regardless of how land distribution is regulated (Whiteley 1988). This suggests the existence of a fundamentally communal mechanism for guaranteeing producer access to, and control over, the means of production. However, Jorgenson (1980:239) notes that in some cases dominant clans could confiscate farmland. These observations suggest that the defining condition of pueblo communalism was not equivalent access, but rather guaranteed access to resources. This guarantee embodied ambiguities and contradictions that could, in extreme conditions, render it null and void.

Jerrold Levy (1992) explicitly confronts these contradictions in his analysis of the 1906 split at Orayvi. He demonstrates a contradiction in Hopi society between an ideology of cooperation and integration, and a stratified system of land control. He describes two ranks for clans in Hopi
society, the *pavansinom* clans, who control the major ceremonies and the best agricultural land, and the *sukavungsinom*, who control neither ceremonies nor good agricultural land. The superior economic position of the *pavansinom* clans did not, however, translate into obvious economic benefit for these clans. Levy argues that this was because the Hopi society was organized to manipulate scarcity and not abundance.

Among the turn-of-the-century Hopi the manipulation of scarcity created a social contradiction. Although cooperation was necessary for the economy and society to work, resources could not be distributed evenly because in times of extreme scarcity starvation and destruction of the social order would result from such egalitarian distributions. The resolution of this contradiction led to a social organization that was neither egalitarian nor stratified (Levy 1992). Powerful clans controlled both the best agricultural lands and the ceremonial cycle of the villages, while poor clans held inferior lands and had only minor roles in the ceremonial cycle. In good times, social relations and ideology stressed egalitarianism, cooperation, and peaceful relations among all members of the community—relations that urged all to work for the common good. When insufficient rains fell or the frost came too early, the economically powerful and ceremonially more important clans had food and stayed in the village, while lack of food forced poorer clans out to hunt and gather, or to depend upon the charity of the Navajo or other pueblos.

The revisionist claim that elites coerced labor from others in the society seems problematic. Titiev (1944:65) noted that individuals in work parties organized for a leader’s benefit at Hopi contributed their labor voluntarily, without prodding or fear of reprisals. He also remarked on a general lack of mechanisms to compel labor performance in other activities such as cleaning springs or sponsoring dances (Titiev 1944:63). Ellis (1981:414, 423) expands on this point by noting the frequent participation of caciques in such activities. In light of these observations, it seems reasonable to hypothesize puebloan elites as subsumed to the communal order. That is, the personal consumption of labor by political leaders represents communally allocated shares of surplus labor (given as compensation for the performance of those regulative processes described by revisionists), the size and timed distribution of which is controlled by the commune. Exemption of individuals from certain labors and their realization of material support through labor performed elsewhere in a wider social division of labor does not necessarily imply a relationship of domination or exploitation.

Still other information indicates the existence of a complex subsumed communal hierarchy organized along the lines imagined here. Parsons (1933:77) reports an informant’s observation that there was not one but “many bosses” at Zuni, a comment that suggests a complex set of checks on power wielding. Whiteley (1988) buttresses this inference with his observation that, at least at Hopi, society (sodality) chiefs had a considerably more important role in political life than traditional pueblo ethnographies allow. He argues that society chiefs were not subservient assistants to village chiefs, but rather were independent participants within a group of decision makers—village chiefs were only “first among equals.” Bolton (1908) makes a further point about the communal limits on political power in his reporting of Oñate’s observation on the pueblos: “In their government they are free, for although they have petty captains, they obey them badly and in very few things” (see also Titiev 1944:65). Goldman (1937) noted that individuals did not seek the ceremonial offices carrying greatest responsibility (and that consequently should bestow greatest opportunity for economic control), but rather that they were filled only with great difficulty because they involved the holder in unwelcome and heavy obligations (see also Ellis 1981:426).

We should note that Brandt (1994) sees this reluctance to hold office as a product of an ideology fostered by elites so as to limit interest in leadership and thereby preserve differential access to resources. We doubt Brandt’s conclusion. It ascribes to primary producers an ignorance of inequality and oppression that seems hard to square with observations made by other ethnographers about the reality of pueblo political and economic life.

While we have only cited shreds of evidence here, these observations suggest the plausibility
of alternative models of pueblan social structure and dynamics, models that cannot be neatly described as egalitarian or stratified. A model of pueblan society as communal in the sense advocated here allows for the great variability in patterns of authority, property relations, and forms of labor mobilization and circulation noted by ethnographers from Kroeber (1917) through Whiteley (1988), and that we take as an implicit message of Jorgenson (1980). We believe, based on Fried’s (1975) comments on tribalization in contact situations and the well-documented patterns of twentieth-century change in pueblan society (Whiteley 1988), that this variability was even greater before the Spanish Entrada. We suspect that early Spanish and later United States regimes stabilized what had been much more dynamic political and economic patterns.

Thus, the longstanding debate about the nature of pueblan social organization results from a false opposition. The pueblos are neither egalitarian nor stratified, but rather they are both (Plog 1995). While our model acknowledges political power differentials and even deep social hierarchies, this power is far from the coercive kind that stratification theory invokes. We believe that the revisionist literature overstates the effects of hierarchy and holds to a particularly narrow view of power in pueblan society.

A dialectical perspective on the pueblos “de-centers” this political aspect, showing it to be complexly shaped by the other, nonpolitical relations of the commune. We suggest that each household/individual in pueblan society was/is faced with a set of distinct and potentially conflicting kin and non-kin (civil) interests and allegiances that are conditioned by their differential participation in the communal labor process and communal political and socioceremonial processes. This strikes us as an alternative and potentially profitable way to begin exploring and specifying the tensions and tendencies toward factionalism in pueblo groups that ethnographers and archaeologists have noted (Eggan 1950; Kintigh 1985).

The archaeological and ethnohistoric evidence for specialized political, economic, and ritual activity in pueblan society provides the substantive foundation for proceeding in this direction (Ellis 1981; Ferguson 1981; Ford 1972; Snow 1981). Such specialization raises the possibility of conceivably intense conflict and struggle occurring both within, and across, kin groupings. Individuals filling subsumed communal leadership positions and charged with regulating the many aspects of communal social life stand to be especially conflicted by these struggles. That is, they stand to be torn by different kin and sodality obligations. To proceed under this model we need to determine the extent to which the subsumed leadership structure of pueblan society is internally differentiated; how communal economic, political, and religious functionaries receive support; to what extent subsumed leaders participate in the performance of everyday labor; how subsumed leaders are squeezed by competing demands for communal surplus production; and where structural points of tension and conflict lie in this ensemble of interacting processes. We do not expect these dynamics to be the same for all polities across the pueblan Southwest; rather, they will vary in time and space so that any analysis must be historically contextualized.

It is clear that traditional ethnographies can provide only limited creative guidance for building such models. The ethnographic literature is problematic because it represents only a brief moment in the long history of pueblan peoples. This moment comes after 300 years of interaction between pueblan society and Europeans. While expanding the search for ethnographic parallels would help—for example, adopting the less provincial ethnographic perspective suggested by Cordell and Gumerman (1989)—that strategy is compromised by the same fact. At best, the ethnographic literature can be useful as a source of clues to meaningful relationships existing between different aspects of social life. Imaginative work drawing on the “subject side” of the interpretive equation—i.e., the archaeological record—is also required. Reflexive use of both ethnographic and archaeological sources can allow development of “hunches” about the possibilities for variation in the past and the contradictory forces conditioning Prehispanic development (Sacks 1979:106–107).

The Grasshopper Pueblo–Chavez Pass Debate

Perhaps the hottest recent debate in southwestern archaeology has been the decade-long contro-
versy about the nature of Prehispanic social organization at Grasshopper Pueblo and Chavez Pass. Like most notable scholarly debates, it embodies theoretical, substantive, institutional, and personal quarrels. It gained prominence in the field because of the eminence of the individuals and institutions involved, and because it highlights the fundamental opposition in scholarly views about pueblo social organization. The debate exemplifies a fissure that divides most of the archaeologists in the Southwest. On one side of the divide stand those archaeologists who see a Prehispanic Southwest populated by egalitarian communities. On the other side are scholars who envision a landscape dotted with hierarchically organized polities.

Grasshopper Pueblo and Chavez Pass

Grasshopper Pueblo and Chavez Pass are two late Prehispanic pueblos located in the mountainous zone of central Arizona. Pueblo people established both communities at the end of the thirteenth century, and occupied each until the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries. They built their pueblos in broadly similar environments at locations about 100 km apart.

Grasshopper pueblo includes approximately 500 rooms divided into 13 room blocks. These room blocks include three enclosed plazas, one of which the inhabitants converted into a great kiva. The pueblo grew through a process of aggregation as populations abandoned smaller communities in the area and moved into Grasshopper Pueblo. Reid and Whittlesey (1990:195) argue that a major motivating factor for this aggregation was defense. Researchers initially attributed the abandonment of the pueblo to the failure of the burgeoning community to develop the requisite social complexity for managing changes in societal scale (Graves et al. 1982). While not agreeing with this interpretation, Reid (1989:89) links abandonment of the community to declining rainfall at the end of the fourteenth century.

Researchers at Grasshopper Pueblo have consistently interpreted the social organization of the site as egalitarian. They have categorically rejected the idea that a social hierarchy with an established elite was present at any time in the pueblo's history. Reid has invariably argued that social complexity at Grasshopper did not exceed that which Eggan (1950) and Jorgenson (1980) describe in their egalitarian interpretations of western pueblo social organization. Reid (1989:88) states, "The implication is that Grasshopper social organization is an example of a Prehispanic sequential hierarchy with community decision-making vested in sodalities."

The Chavez Pass ruin, which archaeologists also refer to by its Hopi name, Nuvakwewtaqa, is a large pueblo of around 1,000 rooms. The ruin includes several enclosed plazas, a great kiva, and a possible ball court. Extensive agricultural features cover the countryside surrounding the pueblo. These features include terraces, linear grid systems, agricultural check dams, and field houses. Researchers at the Arizona State University (ASU) located many smaller settlements in the general region of Nuvakwewtaqa. They interpreted these as evidence of a Prehispanic site hierarchy with an administrative center, Nuvakwewtaqa, encircled by smaller hamlets (Upham 1982). They made production estimates for the agricultural features, and population estimates for the settlements. Based on these estimates they concluded that the catchment area of the pueblo could not have supported the population that was present (Upham and Plog 1986). In their interpretation the pueblo was home to a managerial elite. This elite controlled access to a variety of strategic resources, and managed a large sedentary population that exceeded the carrying capacity of the area. This elite also interacted with the elites of other similarly organized polities that filled the late Prehispanic landscape of the Southwest.

A Critical Evaluation of the Debate

The Grasshopper Pueblo–Chavez Pass debate has shed some light on southwestern prehistory, produced quite a bit of heat, and lots of smoke. Despite considerable data collection, methodological critique, and theoretical disputation, however, we seem no closer today to resolving the egalitarian versus stratified debate than we were over a decade ago. Both sides have identified three substantive issues as key in the debate: agricultural intensification, mortuary behavior, and regional exchange. Each side has engaged these
issues with different methods and theoretical assumptions.

The first thing to recognize in the debate is that real differences do exist between the two pueblos. Grasshopper Pueblo is only about half the size of Nuvakwewtaqa. The two sites participated in different trade spheres, as indicated by polychrome pottery. Jeddito Yellow wares predominate at Nuvakwewtaqa, and White Mountain redwares and Salado redwares at Grasshopper. Researchers have not found extensive agricultural features like those at Nuvakwewtaqa around Grasshopper. Upham and Plog (1986:229) claim that the catchment area of Grasshopper would have been able to support the population of the community, while the catchment area at Nuvakwewtaqa would not have been adequate for the local population. We would agree, however, with the principals in the debate that these differences are not great enough to account for the very different interpretations of social organization for the two communities.

Upham (1982) based his initial arguments for hierarchy at Nuvakwewtaqa on an inference of dramatic intensification of agriculture in the area. He interpreted the appearance, growth, and spread of agricultural features as evidence of this intensification. Researchers at Grasshopper Pueblo also inferred increases in agricultural productivity around Grasshopper, but stopped short of calling it intensification.

The hottest exchanges in the debate have concerned the interpretation of mortuary behavior at the two pueblos. The distribution of grave goods at the two sites is very similar, but the distributions have been interpreted very differently.

The mortuary sample from Nuvakwewtaqa is not very large or complete. Archaeologists excavated over 100 individuals, but pothunters had intensively looted the cemetery so that the researchers viewed their conclusions from the sample as provisional. They found a differential distribution of grave goods in the burials and inferred three tiers of graves with goods, and a fourth tier without goods.

At Grasshopper there is little or no evidence of pothunting and the sample of burials is bigger and more complete: over 400 individuals. These burials exhibit a differential distribution of goods very similar to the distribution at Nuvakwewtaqa. Whittlesey (1978), however, interprets this distribution as evidence of differential membership in sodalities or societies. Based on an assumption that individuals were buried in their sodality ceremonial costumes, Whittlesey identified six sodalities and labeled them according to the distinctive attributes of the costumes: (1) a female ring society, (2) a coed shell bracelet society, (3) a male conus tinkler society, (4) a male bone hairpin society, and (5) a male arrow society. One male burial, number 140, stood out both because of the quantity of grave goods, more than 190, and their variety. This burial had emblems of the arrow, bone hairpin, and shell bracelet societies. Whittlesey (1978) interpreted this individual as a community leader and head of the arrow society.

One of the most striking things about both the Grasshopper and Nuvakwewtaqa collections is the large quantity of trade items, especially polychrome pottery, at each site. At Nuvakwewtaqa only four of the 80 pottery types found were locally produced. Other trade items included obsidian, turquoise, and copper bells. These items occur at Nuvakwewtaqa, but not in the surrounding smaller sites. The ASU researchers hypothesized that these goods were used in a “banking” strategy controlled by a managerial elite. They also used these goods to infer the existence of specialized production at the pueblo. Grasshopper exhibits the same kinds of objects, with the addition of macaws. Here researchers interpreted exchange as a buffering mechanism against hard times. They suggested that such exchange occurred in a down-the-line fashion with Grasshopper households linked to other settlements via trading partnerships.

The disparity in these interpretations, and the critiques by each side of the other, reflects substantive, methodological, and theoretical differences. Neither the Grasshopper Pueblo field school, nor the Chavez Pass project, have adequately published the data necessary to evaluate their positions. These disparities also obscure the shared assumptions underlying each position, further impeding resolution of the debate.

The Chavez Pass substantive critique of the Grasshopper position has tended to focus on errors in statistical analyses and the use of ethno-
repeatedly questioned the representativeness of the Grasshopper burial sample, and pointed to specific mistakes in statistical analyses (Cordell et al. 1987; Plog 1985). They have also questioned the use of ethnographic analogy in the interpretation of social organization at Grasshopper. Upham and Plog (1986:237) note that the historic pueblos had undergone severe contact-induced changes, and that pueblo ethnography is biased by an "Apollonian" view of pueblo culture conceivably inconsistent with the reality of pre-contact situations.

Proponents of the Grasshopper critique are very empirical. They note that the quantity and quality of the Grasshopper data are superior to Chavez Pass and, therefore, the Grasshopper interpretations are more likely to be correct. They question the interpretative conclusions at Chavez Pass because they believe that the archaeologists there did not adequately control archaeological formation processes. They question the inference of a hierarchical settlement pattern at Chavez Pass and argue instead that the smaller communities were earlier.

The Chavez Pass researchers tend to view material culture as a direct reflection of culture and social organization. Thus, when confronted with a positively skewed distribution of grave goods, they conclude that a hierarchical social organization existed. They critique the Grasshopper researchers for failing to accept such direct interpretation. For example, Plog (1985:162) comments on Whittlesey’s (1978) analysis of Grasshopper burials: “A given table will show, for example, that only 13% of the burials between 20 and 30 years of age contain high status grave goods. In a hierarchical system would one expect otherwise?”

University of Arizona archaeologists tend to reject the idea that artifact distributions will be a direct reflection of social organization. They are careful in interpreting skewed distributions because such distributions could be the product of intervening formation processes, rather than direct reflections of Prehispanic social reality (Reid and Whittlesey 1990). Accordingly, they interpret the differential distribution of whole vessels on room floors at Grasshopper to indicate variation in patterns of room abandonment as opposed to differences in wealth or status. The skewed distribution of goods in burials that Plog notes becomes evidence for membership in sodalities.

The interpretations of Chavez Pass are based on an explicitly developed evolutionary social theory, but the social theory of the Grasshopper research is largely implicit. This makes examination of the Grasshopper social theory difficult, but clear differences from the Chavez Pass position are apparent. Cordell et al. (1987) criticize the University of Arizona archaeologists for making the object of study behavior, rather than culture. They then point to substantive errors that they believe result from this focus. Reid et al. (1989:803) reply that Cordell et al.’s approach does not allow “the archaeologist to understand how various sources of systemic variability (e.g., functional, occupational, and cultural variability) as well as formation processes influenced the production of archaeological variability.”

**Developing an Alternative View**

The standoff in the Grasshopper–Chavez Pass debate is not resolvable through the collection of new data, or through new interpretations of existing data. The standoff results from the oppositional thinking that informs the debate. This thinking derives from a shared functionalist view of culture, a shared notion of power, and a common use of analogy in the analyses.

The social theory that shapes both positions is pervasively functionalist. In the case of Grasshopper it is a structural-functionalist view derived from Eggan’s (1950) and Jorgenson’s (1980) analyses of western pueblo society. Structural-functionalism answers the question of why societies do not fly apart by showing how social parts function to maintain the social whole. Functionalism underpins the Chavez Pass researcher’s invocation of a managerial elite. This functionalism is derived largely from information theory. It assumes that once a certain number of nodes or levels of organization exist, some centralized control must also develop to maintain the smooth functioning of the system.

Neither variety of functionalism provides an internal motor for cultural change. Because in each theory the different parts of society function to maintain the whole, change must originate out-
side the system. In both cases this change is usually some combination of environmental shifts and population growth. Humans are not active in these schemes: they simply react to external stresses, and their reactions are severely limited. Missing is a sense that environments are not "given" but rather are culturally constituted. That is, cultures define environments and even environmental stress because they filter experience through meaning frameworks of their own construction. Also missing in the functionalist view is a sense that environmental stress can affect participants in a culture differently depending on their positions in the wider political economy.

This last point suggests that power is at the heart of understanding western pueblo social organization. Power, however, is not explicitly examined by the participants in the debate. All of the participants appear to regard power as simply a quantity that may or may not be present in society. In the oppositional terms of the debate, egalitarian societies lack significant power relations, while such relations are the hallmark of a stratified society. Power is considered in terms of its presence or absence rather than in terms of its nature, sources, and articulations. In the conventional view, power is ultimately an ability to thwart another, a form of negative action. Power becomes something set apart from society as a whole, a thing held by some people and not by others. Archaeologists can then divide social groups into elites that have power, and commoners who do not. This is "power over."

We can also think of power as "power to," the capacity of individuals to intervene in events so as to alter them. "Power to" permeates all social life. It is not a quantity but instead is an intrinsic aspect of social life. Power over necessarily comes from and involves power to. Power does not operate outside of society. It has no existence as an abstract quantity. People derive power from the network of social, material, and ideological relationships of which they are a part. Power, therefore, exists only in the social relations between people and/or groups of people. This relational view of power recognizes that power exists in many forms, and that it is not reducible to a single source, structure, or hierarchy (Crumley and Marquardt 1987:613–615; Paynter and McGuire 1991). It is not a quantity that an elite can hoard, dole out, or control, and it exists in the absence of an elite.

People have the power to act upon, and in, the material world. People do not, however, act directly on the material world, but instead through their ideas about that world. Human action presupposes a web of social relations and meanings that structure behavior. These social relations and meanings must therefore be given equal weight in our explanations as the material conditions that people act on and in.

One of the issues in the Grasshopper–Chavez Pass debate has been the use of pueblo ethnography as an analogy for interpreting Prehispanic western pueblo social organization. The Chavez Pass researchers reject the use of the egalitarian "Apollonian" view of Pueblo society created by some anthropologists, while the Grasshopper group avidly embraces it. In fact, both positions ultimately rest on Pueblo ethnography, and they differ in the reading of that ethnography. Neither grasps the ambiguities and contradictions between equality and hierarchy permeating pueblo ethnography that are highlighted here.

A Dialectical View of Western Pueblo Social Organization

The late Prehispanic period (Pueblo IV) is an opportune time to examine this dynamic. It is in this period that Mogollon and Anasazi developments coalesced to form western pueblo culture. The population aggregations present across western New Mexico and eastern Arizona in the late thirteenth century were not the first in prehistory. But, as Adams (1991:190) argues, the foundation for historic and modern pueblo culture lies in these late Prehispanic developments.

On a substantive level we accept most of the reconstructions of behavior offered by both the Grasshopper and Chavez Pass researchers. We build our analysis on the contradictions and ambiguities in these reconstructions. We have some qualms about doing this. Reanalyses of the data on which these reconstructions are based would most likely point to other possible inferences. Acceptance of these inferences might alter the specifics of our interpretation, but not necessarily our general perspective and most fundamental point.
We agree with the Chavez Pass archaeologists that there is evidence for hierarchy at Nuvakwewtaqa, but there are also data suggesting that this hierarchy existed in the context of a communal ethos. We concur with the critics of the settlement pattern analysis who claim that the smaller sites in the area are earlier. We accept the Chavez Pass researcher's arguments for agricultural intensification, specialization, and hierarchy in burials. We would ask, however, that if this were the hierarchical society posited by the ASU researchers, then why are there only slight differences in domestic architecture, and why are imported polychrome pots found in large quantities in all contexts?

Our reading of the Grasshopper inferences is similar. We are willing to accept the idea that sodalities crosscut kinship units to integrate the pueblo. However, the problem of integration is more complex than the Grasshopper analyses recognize. Clearly differences were created by social integration at Grasshopper. Whittlesey (1978) concludes that fewer than half of the males were members of one of these sodalities, and over two-thirds of the females had no emblems of membership. Reid and Whittlesey (1990) also suggest that the arrow society was the most important and powerful in the community. As mentioned earlier, one individual, from burial 140, stands out from all others as the conceivable head of this society. Integration in this case, as in all societies, therefore involved individuals and social groups positioned in different relations of power and with different opportunities and interests. As Trigger (1990) points out, societies maintain such integration only with great effort in the face of internal relations that would catapult the interests of some social groups over the interests of others. At any time such a community might appear functionally integrated, but such integration is fleeting in the dynamic interplay of competing interests within the pueblo.

The Dynamics of Late Prehispanic Pueblo Social Life

We suggest that the tension between equality and hierarchy conditioned an internal dynamic that governed the aggregation and fissioning of communities in late pueblo prehistory. The late Prehispanic period witnessed a widespread instability of settlement as populations aggregated, communities dissolved, and whole regions were abandoned. The tension between equality and hierarchy entered into a complex dialectical process that involved material conditions, social organization, and ideology. People did not experience these later three circumstances separately so that their motivations for action were as much social and ideological as environmental.

Processual archaeologists have extensively studied the material conditions of this process. We would argue, as Crown and Judge (1991) do for Chaco Canyon and Levy (1992) does for historic Hopi, that western pueblo social relations were for the manipulation of scarcity. This observation, however, leads us to expectations about social change that are different, even contrary, to those common in current processual interpretations of late prehistory.

The environment of the plateaus and mountains is marginal for corn agriculture given the technology of the Prehispanic western pueblos (Cordell 1984). Throughout the region, a combination of relatively few frost-free days and the limited availability of moisture restricts the growing season to only a few more days than the minimum required for the tropical plant triumvirate of corn, beans, and squash. Agricultural potential and success is highly variable from year to year, and from location to location within a given year. The timing of frosts and the availability of moisture combine in complex and sometimes unpredictable ways to produce this unevenness. This variability plays itself out against a moving baseline of long-term increases and decreases in temperature and precipitation.

The manipulation of scarcity in this environment can involve a social contradiction, as Levy (1992) describes for turn-of-the-century Hopi. Communalism—the collective appropriation of labor and redistribution of products—evens out the spatial variation in production during a given year, and it can even out variation between years. Communalism provides stability in unstable circumstances. Bad years come once in a while, however, and if they come sequentially for two or more years, then there is simply not enough to go around. In these years hierarchy becomes the means to expel some portion of the population,
while a subsumed elite remain in the community and maintain the social and ideological continuity necessary for the survival of the pueblo. When times are good again, the sojourners may be welcomed back into the communal whole.

Neither the environment nor the technological level of society in any way determines that these contradictions, or this social form, will exist. There are other ways for human populations to survive in this environment. The ethnographic and archaeological record of the Southwest gives us many examples of these other ways, even when domestic livestock are removed from the picture.

One such successful adaptation is to spread the population thinly over the landscape. Such populations may mix agriculture with hunting and gathering, with such diversity compensating for the uncertainty of the environment. Various combinations of exchange, exogamy, and fictive kinship may link small groups. When times are really hard each small group is on its own. This dispersed adaptation was predominant in certain periods of prehistory, such as Pueblo I, and was an available option in all others. In all periods of southwestern prehistory there were areas, often immense areas, suitable for agriculture that lacked appreciable (that is, archaeologically visible) populations. In the historic period, low-ranked Hopi groups would go out and live with the Navajo when agricultural production was inadequate; when they alienated themselves from other Hopi; or when epidemic disease hit (Parsons 1936). When times got better these groups might return to the Hopi, or stay among the Navajo. (The Navajo have a Hopi clan comprised of the descendants of these people; see Young and Morgan 1980.) In the absence of the Navajo, dispersed groups could have taken up hunting and gathering with low intensity agriculture either on their own or with an existing low intensity population (Upham 1988).

Another successful adaptation is to aggregate into larger communities. As structural functionalist scholars of western pueblo society recognize (Eggan 1950; Jorgenson 1980), the bonds of pueblo society are very difficult to maintain. Clans and lineages are small enough that the vagaries of reproduction do not guarantee that each group will have the right number of offspring in the necessary sex ratio to reproduce itself each generation. This internal dynamic constantly reworks the social fabric. Aggregation allows linked clans to reside together and facilitates the transfer of individuals between groups to maintain important clans and lineages. Aggregation also leads to safety in numbers when conflicts erupt between different villages.

Social relations also involve power and the contradictions of equality and hierarchy. Higher ranked clans have the best farmland, but they may lack sufficient labor to work all of that land and to reproduce the clan (Levy 1992). Therefore, they may have to draw on lower ranked clans for labor. Matrilineal inheritance means that the corporate land base will not be diluted by marriage down in clan rankings, but such marriages do establish reciprocal relations of sharing and labor with lower ranked husbands. Matrilineal inheritance, however, also meant that these husbands could be discarded without weakening the clan membership. Sodalities and societies also crosscut kin groups to further reinforce communal relations. But, the leaders of these groups were usually from high-ranked clans, and these leaders controlled the esoteric knowledge necessary for the sodalities and societies to survive. Thus, sodalities and societies linked everyone in the pueblo, but only a small leadership group was essential to maintaining the organization in hard times.

Two different functionalist perspectives have been used to interpret western pueblo religion. In a structural functionalist model, religious organizations such as the katsina cult functioned to bind together the diverse social groups of the community (Adams 1991). In an adaptive functionalist, or cultural ecological, model, such organizations provide stability by redistributing agricultural products among social groups. In contrast Plog and Solometo (1993) have highlighted the connections between the katsina religion and warfare. They suggest that the communal aspects of the religion were products of population declines that resulted from European conquest of the Southwest. We would accept that religious practices functioned in social and adaptive ways, but we would argue that religion was a locus of struggle where the contradictions between hierarchy and communalism in pueblo society were real-
ized. Religion carried meaning and embodied power relations.

Western pueblo religion is ascetic and esoteric. Religious activities maintain and enhance the people’s harmony with the world. Without such activities this harmony would be broken, and the world destroyed or transformed. Thus, western pueblo people have a special role because it is only through their acts that the cycle of nature will be maintained. Their identity as a people is a product of this role. These acts require adherence to strict rules of conduct, and the making of offerings or sacrifices to the supernatural. Individuals who break these rules can be severely disciplined or even killed. The ceremonial calendar includes many rituals, each of which must be performed to make the religion whole. Some of these rituals must be private, while others must involve the entire community. The rituals are to benefit all people, plant, animal, and spirit life, yet the knowledge of individual rituals is the property of specific clans and is carried by special individuals in those clans. The religion can work only through the communalism of the whole, yet its parts are restricted to a few.

A number of inequities are embedded in this communal ceremonial cycle. Not all rituals, or even parts of rituals, are of equal importance or centrality. There is a ranking of clans historically based on the sequence of clan arrival in their communities. Older clans control more important rituals and knowledge, and some clans make only minor contributions to the cycle. The Hopi distinguish between highly ranked pavansinom clans and lower ranked sukavungsinom clans (Levy 1992:30–32). At Zuni, a poor person is tewuko?liya, without religion (Tedlock 1979:501). Even within clans, ritual information is not uniformly shared because only clan leaders have full access to the most esoteric knowledge of rituals. These clan rankings establish a hereditary ranking of social groups based on the control of ceremonial knowledge in western pueblo society.

What archaeologists refer to as aggregation and agricultural intensification are more than just adaptive strategies, they are also the essence of self in western pueblo life. To be Hopi or Zuni is to stand in good relation to the supernatural. To do this the individual must farm, participate in communal rituals, make ritual offerings and sacrifices, have a good heart, and cooperate with his and her fellows. To do so is to be special, to have the responsibility and honor of ensuring the harmony of nature. The coming together and breaking apart of late Prehispanic populations was, therefore, not just a functional response to changes in the environment, but meaningful human action undertaken by social groups with different and sometimes contradictory interests in an environmental context.

Our reading of late Prehispanic western pueblo social organization suggests a process of social change much different from that stipulated by processualist models. The evolutionary assumptions of processualist models suggest that pueblo society was either egalitarian, or locked in an evolutionary trajectory of intensification and deepening social hierarchy. Archaeologists have tended to assume that population growth, aggregation, environmental changes favoring corn farming, and the intensification of agriculture would lead to increased complexity and social stratification in society. Recognizing the paradoxical relationship between equality and hierarchy and its roots in the material, social, and ideological conditions of life suggests that the ebb and flow of aggregation and dispersal in the archaeological record does not relate to environmental change in a simple additive way.

We would argue for a much more dynamic, variable, and historically contingent process of cultural change. In the initial stages of aggregation founding clans would benefit materially, socially, and ideologically by attracting others. They would maintain their primary status, but give new arrivals good land and an important position in the ritual calendar. Material, social, and ritual thresholds exist in this process. The good land will be taken up, the list of ranked clans will grow large, and the sacred dates of the calendar will become crowded. As these thresholds are approached, established clans have less to gain from newcomers, and newcomers would be given less and less to join the community, or not allowed to join at all. The lived experience of
the community would start out communal and become reconfigured as the thresholds approach, possibly resulting in greater political hierarchy. This political hierarchy would be an ambiguous one, however, enmeshed in a paradoxical relationship with the other social relations of the commune.

In this process, increasing population, environmental change, aggregation, and agricultural intensification affect the interplay of communality and hierarchy in different ways. Initially, population growth and aggregation would favor communalism until thresholds were approximated; then they would favor hierarchy as more and more people divided up the material, social, and ritual resources of the community. At this point any decline in population, such as the massive declines of the historic period, would strengthen communalism. Contrary to processual assumptions, any factor that increased production (e.g., environmental change, agricultural intensification) would support communalism, while drought or agricultural failure would expose the full force of hierarchy. With plenty there is more to share and strengthen the position of high-ranked clans through communal ideals, and with want high-ranked clans justify the expulsion of others for the survival of the whole.

Any such change would be socially negotiated. Social groups’ fortunes and position in ranked hierarchies could rise and fall through the vagaries of reproduction, the manipulation of histories, and jostling for ceremonial position. Clans would have the options of fissioning to form new communities, or possibly joining other communities at different stages of the development cycle, albeit at some social and ritual cost. Finally, there would always be the option of spreading out and living a different life. Such a life, however, would entail a different relationship to the supernatural and require a new definition of self.

All of this would be played out on the dynamic environmental stage of the region. Long-term trends would differentially affect communities depending on their position in the developmental cycle, and would expand or contract the size of the stage. They would not, however, determine the process.

The coming of the Spanish after 1540 would have altered but not qualitatively changed this dynamic. The massive population decline that resulted from disease and warfare would have favored communality in social relations and disrupted clan rankings. The expansion of horse-mounted nomads—the Comanche, Ute, Navajo, and Apache—would have made community shifts and colonization of new areas more difficult. This and the European threat of violence would have displaced some populations and encouraged aggregation in large villages. Finally, the development of closed corporate communities would have been a response to European attempts to control pueblo life directly.

In the end our interpretation of late Prehispanic pueblo social organization may not be more correct than either the Grasshopper or Chavez Pass interpretations. What is important about our scenario is that it moves us away from oppositions to asking questions about social variation and dynamics. We hope that it will be more productive for archaeologists to ask how the tension between equality and hierarchy played itself out over time, rather than to argue about which conceptual box western pueblo social organization best fits into. Archaeologists need to examine specific instances of change with a framework that acknowledges a complex interaction of material, social, and ideological processes. The results of these efforts will not be predictive models of prehistory or grand schemes of human evolution but instead be a history of pueblo lived experience over the ages.

**Conclusion**

We have outlined an alternative approach to understanding variation in Southwest prehistory, one situated within a critique of prevailing positivist and evolutionist ways of thinking. A dialectical approach radically changes traditional assumptions about the organization of society. We have used this approach to make sense of late Prehispanic pueblo society. It should be clear that we understand the communal formations of this time period to be moments in the historical development of pueblo society, not exemplars of conventional evolutionary stages.

We recognize that this exercise is incomplete. The aim here has been to frame issues, problems,
and directions for further work. The task as we see it is to use archaeological and ethnographic materials together to imagine alternative organizational possibilities for late Prehispanic pueblo societies. The task also involves inquiring into the diversity of social relations and experiences that structure pueblo society, and how material culture is used within those relations and experiences. Archaeologists may never resolve the debate over pueblo social organization, but with a dialectical approach we can at least move away from the traditional oppositions that preclude other, and perhaps richer, understandings of pueblan history.

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Notes

1. This position would seem to depend on acceptance of population estimates for the Chavez Pass area that assume the smaller sites were coeval with Nuvakwewtaqa. We doubt that this is the case and suspect that some of the smaller sites are in fact earlier, and that others are field houses. If we are correct, then the catchment area around Nuvakwewtaqa probably was adequate to support the population of the pueblo.
2. The two adaptations just discussed—dispersal and aggregation—parallel the opposition that Stuart and Gauthier (1981) make between efficiency and power. Indeed, we found their discussion immensely helpful in specifying the material conditions that make these adaptations possible. We do not, however, see these as opposites because the aggregated adaptation can only survive over periods of tens of years by forcing a portion of the population into a dispersed adaptation. We also give more weight to internal processes, and social and ideological circumstances in our interpretation than do Stuart and Gauthier.

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