

Taken from: *American Business Law Journal*, Volume 27/1, Spring 1989. Written by Ed Connery and Don Nelson. Copyright © 1989 by The American Business Law Journal, an official publication of the American Business Law Association.

## MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Our effort to evaluate the Issues just framed is based on the discipline of moral psychology. Moral psychology is a relatively new and, for business faculty, a relatively unfamiliar discipline. Psychology is moral psychology's mother discipline, so naturally moral psychology's focus is narrower. Moral psychology describes the rational (cognitive<sup>27</sup>) and emotional (affective<sup>28</sup>) processes, and the behaviors, of individuals confronting moral dilemmas. Moral psychology contrasts with *moral philosophy*, which seeks by means almost exclusively rational<sup>29</sup> to determine what is right and wrong. Moral philosophy is normative, describing what ought to be, while moral psychology is largely descriptive, depicting how people facing moral quandaries think, feel, and act. The broadest perspective on moral psychology is achieved by examining moral decision making.

### *An Overview of Moral Decision Making*

Most scholars acknowledge the following four elements in the moral decision making process<sup>30</sup>: 1) *moral sensitivity*—an awareness<sup>31</sup> of the moral content in a situation; 2) *moral judgment*—the selection of a standard of judgment, or framework of analysts, and its application to a situation to identify morally appropriate action; 3) *moral will*—the resolve to act in conformity with the moral judgments;<sup>32</sup> and 4) *moral action*—the implementation of the moral judgment.<sup>33</sup> To date, most research on moral decision making has focused on step 2, the moral judgment component. Problems of moral sensitivity, moral will, and moral action have been given little attention by moral psychology researchers.<sup>34</sup>

### *Kohlberg's and Loevinger's Theories of Moral Development*<sup>35</sup>

While there are a variety of fields within moral psychology, the dominant one is Lawrence Kohlberg's *cognitive developmental psychology*. This paradigm focuses on the way individuals utilize a standard of moral judgment and *reason* about justice. A second major field of moral psychology is Jane Loevinger's *ego development* theory. Grounded on the work of Freud, Adler, and Erickson, the ego development

school differs from Kohlberg's paradigm mainly in its emphasis on *affect*. Next to Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory; ego development is the most empirically based and widely accepted field in moral psychology.<sup>36</sup>

The principal features of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory and Loevinger's ego development theory are strikingly similar. Both are *developmental*. That is, they view individuals as evolving through a small number of *stages* of moral judgment. Within each of these stages, moral problems are evaluated in a uniform way. Kohlberg and Loevinger also both identify similar *causes* for growth, for movement through stages.

### *Lohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Psychology*

Although we use a few of the empirical findings from ego development research to supplement Kohlberg's theory, his paradigm<sup>37</sup> is the foundation for this article.<sup>38</sup> In describing Kohlberg's theory, we start with Piaget's<sup>39</sup> determination that children, beginning with infancy and progressing through adolescence, grow through moral stages. Kohlberg<sup>40</sup> extended Piaget's work to adults. Beginning with his dissertation<sup>41</sup> in 1958 and continuing with subsequent work that spans the last three decades, Kohlberg has advanced the *stage theory of moral development*. Each stage is characterized by a consistent social perspective.<sup>42</sup> People at different stages therefore differ in the way they evaluate, judge, or assess moral problems. And the stages are hierarchical building blocks, with each new stage built upon and incorporating previous stages.

### Content and Structure in Moral Judgment

The Kohlberg stages are based, not on the *content*, but rather on the *structure*, of moral judgments. Content, in the language of cognitive developmental psychology, refers to particular moral conclusions, or beliefs, such as "I should not steal;" "I am obligated to obey the law;" or "Human life is more important than property." In contrast, structure refers to the

underlying reason for the moral conclusion or belief. For example, one person might decide that she should not steal "because I might get caught," while another might reach the same conclusion because "stealing would injure others." Thus, these moral judgments would display the same content but different structures. Kohlberg described this distinction when he wrote:

Following Piaget, we distinguish between the content of moral judgment and its structure or form. By structure we mean general organizing principles or patterns of thought rather than specific moral beliefs or opinions .... Our focus is on the form of thinking rather than the content, because it is the form that exhibits developmental regularity and generalizability within and across individuals.<sup>43</sup>

This distinction between content and structure is one of the most powerful insights of moral psychology. Arguably, the distinction frees cognitive developmental psychology from indoctrination.<sup>44</sup> Since Kohlberg's stages are based on the reasons for specific beliefs, they are largely content-neutral. This contrasts with indoctrination, which advocates content—i.e. specific beliefs such as "Aryans are superior and thus ought to dominate inferior races," or "Communism is superior to democratic capitalism." The fact that persons operating at the same stages often display completely opposite beliefs<sup>45</sup> also supports the argument that cognitive developmental psychology is not a form of indoctrination.

#### The Structure of the Stages

Kohlberg found that people progress through six stages of moral development grounded on structures of increasingly complex thinking and increasingly sophisticated social perspectives. At stage one, for example, a person determines what is right based largely on avoiding punishment. In contrast, a stage five person has a perspective that incorporates such complex conceptions as "the common good" and "respect for individual rights." Figure 1<sup>46</sup> presents a brief summary of the perspectives of each stage. The Appendix to this article gives a more detailed description of the stages. Although all people progress sequentially through some stages, they do so at differing rates and end at different points. Within the population at large, only a small percentage develop to the highest stages.

Figure 1

Stage Title	Evaluation Standard
1.Obedience	"How do I avoid punishment?"
2.Instrumental Egoism	"What helps me now? An exchange is good if it helps me, even while it injures others."
3.Interpersonal Concordance	"Being kind will advance my long-term self-interest
4.Law and Duty to the Social Order	"Everyone is obligated by and protected by the law:"
5.Societal Consensus	"I am obligated by arrangements created by due process procedures."
6.Nonarbitrary Social Cooperation	"is this how rational, impartial people would organize cooperation.

#### The Greater Adequacy of the Higher Stages

Two lines of justification have been advanced to support the claim that higher stages are more adequate. One is rooted in the descriptive nature of the psychology. It asserts that because advanced stages are associated with older, more mature, better educated persons, they therefore are more adequate. For example, philosophers have been shown to operate at the highest stages.<sup>47</sup>

The second line of justification has tended to focus on the logical properties of the stages. In a logical sense, higher stages are more adequate because they are more internally consistent. For example, higher stages are, in Kohlberg's language, more *reversible*. This means thinking in higher stages allows one to articulate decision rules where rational persons can say: "The rule is so fair that it doesn't matter if I am party A or party B." To illustrate, stage one reasoning says: "Mom cuts the cake and whatever the size of my piece, it's O.K." Given the choice, any rational person would prefer being Mom over being the child. Stage six reasoning, however, would say: "One of us should cut the cake in half and the other should get the first choice. Which role do you want to play?" This decision rule is completely reversible. Its internal logic is more consistent, so it is more adequate.<sup>48</sup>

### *Stage and Moral Action*

A relationship between stage of moral development and moral action has been established. This research has typically involved tempting a group of experimental subjects, frequently students, to cheat. Then the stages of those who cheated were compared with the stages of those who did not. Those at higher stages were found to cheat at a lower rate.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, the rate of whistle blowing increases with stage,<sup>50</sup> while juvenile delinquency is inversely related to stage.<sup>51</sup>

But since moral judgment is only a part of the moral decision making process<sup>52</sup> the relationship between stage and moral action is only moderate, with correlations generally in the 0.3 range.<sup>53</sup> The relationship has been established on the group, but not the individual, level.<sup>54</sup>

### *Moral Growth*

Moral growth is the movement from one stage to the next higher stage. The underlying cause common to all moral growth experiences is thought to be cognitive *disequilibrium*.<sup>55</sup> Disequilibrium occurs when an individual becomes aware that his moral reasoning is inadequate.<sup>56</sup> That realization produces dissonance and stimulates a search for new ways of thinking about moral issues. This search can generate growth toward higher stages. Disequilibrium can be stimulated by a variety of experiences,<sup>57</sup> but *aging through adolescence* and *education* seem to be the most powerful.

People naturally grow in moral maturity as they age during youth. The inadequacy of the youthful moral judgment produces a natural disequilibrium as it interacts with the judgments of more mature parents, teachers, and social systems. But at some point the aging process seems to stop stimulating moral growth. Thus, persons over age twenty tend to remain at the same level of moral maturity,<sup>58</sup> unless they encounter disequilibrium from some other source.

The most likely source of such further disequilibrium is education. Research on the role of both age and education<sup>59</sup> indicates that these factors together account for about thirty-eight percent to forty-nine percent of moral development.<sup>60</sup> Other research finds that education is the more significant variable for adults.<sup>61</sup> Further, higher education

appears to be a requisite for growth to stages five and six.<sup>62</sup>

In normal education and aging, moral growth appears to be an incidental, unplanned by-product of these processes. Intervention techniques, in contrast, are attempts to *directly* promote disequilibrium and the moral growth that flows from it. The pioneering work on intervention techniques was done by Moshe Blatt.<sup>63</sup> He discussed ethical dilemmas with students, challenged their views, and encouraged them to compare their moral views with those of their peers. Tills process produced statistically significant upward movement in measured stage.<sup>64</sup> Blatt's work has been frequently replicated.<sup>65</sup>

Intervention techniques become more powerful as persons age.<sup>66</sup> Thus, intervention has an effect on junior high students, a greater effect on senior high students, and a still greater effect on college and adult subjects. The largest amount of upward movement in moral development is achieved in interventions where the students are twenty-four years or older.<sup>67</sup>

### *Measurement of Stage*

The ability to gauge the impact of intervention techniques depends upon high-quality processes for measuring stages. The most widely used measurement instrument is the Defining Issues Test (DIT)<sup>68</sup> developed by James Rest. The DIT is a paper and pencil questionnaire that can be easily administered to groups.<sup>69</sup> It consists of six separate fact patterns, each posing a moral dilemma. The factual pattern at the beginning of the Appendix is representative of all the fact patterns.

Each fact pattern presents the test-taker with a dilemma requiring an ethical choice between competing moral values. At the beginning of the Appendix, for example, test-takers are presented with a conflict between the values of preserving life and protecting property. The basic question below the dilemma—"Should Heinz steal the drug?"—compels an ethical choice between the conflicting values. But this decision is one of content, not structure. Accordingly, this response is not used in computing the test score.

Following the basic question are the twelve "structure statements," or rationales for the content decision. Each statement supports a decision from the perspective of a particular stage. For example, statement 3 expresses a stage two perspective and statement 12 articulates a stage five perspective.

Some statements are nonsense items that sound lofty but have no meaning. These are used to identify inaccurate tests caused by a test-taker's inattention and/or faking.

## APPENDIX

### HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money on it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? \_\_Should Steal \_\_Can't Decide \_\_Should not steal

### A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT<sup>146</sup>

#### Stage 1: Obedience

*General Characteristics:* At this stage, being moral is being obedient. An external authority provides rules and these rules are accepted. The child sees no justifications for the rules other than obedience and avoidance of punishment. The rules do not exhibit any plan, or purpose, or interconnectedness. They are simply there to be uncritically accepted.

The child extends the rule-giver's rules to other children and thereby begins to see the idea of generality of rules. The child's only right is to be free from punishment when obeying the rules.

*Prototypical Views:* Right conduct is obedience to fixed rules. Punishment follows violation of a rule and anyone punished has acted wrongly.

*Responses to the Heinz<sup>147</sup> Story:* "When you take a drug like that, it's stealing. Stealing has always been

against the law. That's the way it is, the law is the law."

#### Stage 2: Instrumental Egoism and Simple Exchange

*General Characteristics:* At this stage being moral is acting in one's self-interest. To do this, one must account for the self-interest of others. Two people may want to cooperate if each gets something out of the cooperation. And it's what they get out of the cooperation that makes it fair. Transactions are one-time deals, favor for favor, renegotiated with each new exchange opportunity.

Unlike Stage 1, where morality is blind, at Stage 2 morality serves the purpose of broad self-interest. At this stage, the child begins to sense ideas of equality and reciprocity.

*Prototypical Views:* An act is moral if it advances the actor's self-interest. One should obey the law only if it is prudent to do so. Cooperation is based on simple exchange.

*Responses to the Heinz Story:* "Heinz is running more risk than it's worth unless he's so crazy about her he can't live without her. Neither of them will enjoy life if she's an invalid."

#### Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance

*General Characteristics:* At this stage morality is viewed in terms of creating and nurturing long-term relationships of mutual support. Parties form alliances based on friendships and other personal relationships. Implicit in these relationships is the idea that one understands the other's goals and is obligated, because of the relationship, to support them. Allies anticipate each other's needs, desires, and expectations. The interests of the allies are balanced against each other, but the concerns of third parties are not accounted for in moral decision making. At this stage persons begin to appreciate long-term cooperative equilibrium.

*Prototypical Views:* An act is good if it is prosocial. Being moral implies a concern for the approval of others.

*Responses to the Heinz Story:* "If you were so heartless as to let your own wife die, you would feel terrible and everybody would really think you were inhuman. It would be terrible to think of what you allowed to happen to your own wife and what they must have thought when she realized you weren't going to save her:"

#### **Stage 4: Law and Duty to the Social Order**

*General Characteristics:* This stage judges morality as upholding law and order. Law is seen as a mechanism for coordinating the roles and expectations of others, whether allies or not, in order to avoid chaos. The law is supreme and the source of all other values. But it is vulnerable. Deviations from the legal order threaten the whole system and raise the prospect of actual social chaos. So compliance with the law is paramount. Individuals relate to one another based upon social or legal roles. Thus, one must respect authority.

*Prototypical Views:* Right is defined by rules that are binding on all and fix shared expectations as a basis for the social order. Values are derived from the social order and the maintenance of law. Respect for legitimate authority is part of one's obligation to society.

*Responses to the Heinz Story:* "It is a natural thing for Heinz to want to save his wife, but it's still always wrong to steal. You have to follow the rules regardless of how you feel or regardless of the special circumstances. Even if his wife is dying, it's still his duty as a citizen to obey the law. No one else is allowed to steal, so why should he be? If everyone starts breaking the law when they get in a jam, there'd be no civilization, just crime and violence."

#### **Stage 5: Social Consensus**

*General Characteristics:* At this stage, morality is seen in terms of processes for rules, laws, or systems of law that win the allegiance of everyone by giving each person a stake in the system. It is an attempt to articulate rational rules that respect both the majority and the minority. Its assumption is that people can agree about laws if the process reflects the general

will and provides certain minimal safeguards for everyone.

*Prototypical Views:* Moral obligation derives from voluntary commitments of society's members to cooperate. Procedures should exist for selecting laws that maximize welfare as discerned by the majority will. Basic rights are preconditions to social obligation.

*Responses to the Heinz Story:* "Heinz has to respect the general will of his society as it is set down in the law. The law represents the basic terms on which people have agreed to live with each other."

#### **Stage 6: Nonarbitrary Social Cooperation**

*General Characteristics:* At this stage, morality is based on commitment to rational, abstract, self-selected universal principles for governing social cooperation. These principles are derived by trying to imagine what impartial, rational, equal persons would identify as the appropriate standards under which social life should proceed.

*Prototypical Views:* Moral judgments are ultimately justified by principles of ideal cooperation. Individuals each have an equal claim to benefit from the governing principles of cooperation.

*Responses to the Heinz Story:* "Where the choice must be made between disobeying a law and saving a human life, the higher principle of preserving life makes it morally right—not just understandable—to steal the drug. If Heinz does not do everything he can to save his wife, then he is putting some value higher than the value of life. By not acting in accordance with your sense of the value of human life, you would condemn yourself—you would know that you have betrayed your own moral integrity."

---

<sup>27</sup> Cognition is the process by which knowledge is acquired. It may be based on perception, intuition, or reason. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 269 (1970). In moral psychology, the emphasis is on *reasoning*, particularly reasoning about right and wrong.

<sup>28</sup> As used here, *affect* refers to "[a] feeling or emotion as distinguished from cognition, thought or action." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 21 (1970).

<sup>29</sup> Of course, some forms of moral philosophy, such as natural philosophy, rely on feeling as the guide to what is right and wrong. For example, as Edward Westermarck once wrote, "in my opinion the predicates of all moral judgments, all moral concepts, are ultimately based on emotions..." E. WESTERMARCK. ETHICAL RELATIVITY 60 (1932).

<sup>30</sup> The process described here is based on Rest's "Four-Component Model" of moral action. He makes the point that the components leading up to action do not necessarily occur in a particular order. J. REST-1988, *supra* notes 2, at 8-27.

<sup>31</sup> The best illustration is provided by Barley and Batson. They report an experiment where students at Princeton Theological Seminary were asked to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan. Some were placed under time pressure and told to go to another building to give the talk. On the way they encountered a person dressed shabbily, slumped over, coughing, and groaning. Some seminarians merely stepped over this person without offering aid as a Good Samaritan would. Barley & Batson, *From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior*. 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 100 (1973).

<sup>32</sup> Rest provides the following illustration of a lack of moral will. Children can describe how candy bars *ought* to be distributed as a reward for making bracelets (a moral judgment). But when given the candy bars to allocate among the group, their actual distribution behavior deviates from their verbalization of what they ought to do (a lack of moral will). J. REST-1988, *supra* note 2, at 15. The deaths of Jesus and Socrates are the most obvious examples of the display of moral will. See 26 Mark

<sup>33</sup> Sometimes this involves a series of concrete actions designed to achieve an objective. Other times it may be simply articulating a stance. Perhaps simply saying "No."

<sup>34</sup> Initial work on moral sensitivity has been pioneered by Muriel Bebeau of the School of Dentistry at the University of Minnesota. She has developed a measure of moral sensitivity for the practice of dentistry. See Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, *Measuring Dental Students' Ethical Sensitivity*. 49 J. DENTAL EDUC. 225 (1986). No similar test exists for either business or law students.

<sup>35</sup> While Loewinger's theory is broader than Kohlberg's in the sense that it addresses more issues than just moral judgment alone. It is clear that moral judgment is one component of her theory.

<sup>36</sup> See J. LOEVINGER, EGO DEVELOPMENT (1976). For an evaluation of management from the ego development perspective, see W. TORBERT, MANAGING THE CORPORATE DREAM (1987).

<sup>37</sup> Other major paradigms exist, but are not addressed here. Social learning theory is an example. It holds that moral behavior is learned from others by processes such as modeling. See A. BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977). Behaviorism is another major model related to social learning theory. But it views personal conduct as amoral, as the product of the external environment. Here, operant conditioning—the interplay of positive and negative reinforcers—is viewed as determining individual conduct. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).

<sup>38</sup> Kohlberg's cognitive developmental psychology was chosen as the principal framework for this article because, among the competing paradigms, it is by far the most mature. By maturity we mean that the field has a theoretical construct widely accepted by scholars, has reliable measurement instruments, and has sufficient empirical findings to allow researchers to make useful comparisons. See, e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, *A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment*. SRCD MONOGRAPH 48 (1983). Some of the research in this area has involved as many as 6,000 subjects. J. REST—1988, *supra* note 2, at 29.

<sup>39</sup> See J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965). The first edition of this work appeared in 1932.

<sup>40</sup> See generally L. KOHLBERG—1984, *supra* note 2.

<sup>41</sup> L. Kohlberg, The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years Ten to Sixteen (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958).

<sup>42</sup> B. BOYCE & L. JENSEN, *supra* note 2, at 103.

<sup>43</sup> A. COLBY & L. KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT 2 (1987) (emphasis added).

<sup>44</sup> In contrast with some theories of moral psychology, cognitive developmental psychology asserts that it does not indoctrinate. Kohlberg argued:

The sequence provides us with a concept of moral development that can be stimulated by education without indoctrination and yet that helps to move student judgment toward more adequate principles.

The way to stimulate stage growth is to pose real or hypothetical dilemmas to students in such a way as to arouse disagreement and uncertainty as to what is right. The teacher's primary role is to present such dilemmas and to ask Socratic questions that arouse student reasoning and focus student listening on one another's reasons.

L. KOHLBERG—1981, *supra* note 2, at 27.

<sup>45</sup> For example, those at stage five in Kohlberg's scheme, see *infra* Figure 1, may have different views on subjects such as abortion and euthanasia.

<sup>46</sup> Figure 1 is adapted from J. REST-1979, *supra* note 2, at 24-35.

<sup>47</sup> This rationale is, of course, a natural philosophy justification. As such it can be attacked with the charge of the "naturalistic fallacy." Is does not imply *ought*. Just because something is, just because philosophers reason at higher stages, does not mean they *should* do so. See generally D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739); C.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1903). See also Kohlberg, *The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Higher Stage of Moral Judgment*. 70 J. PHIL., 630 (1973).

---

<sup>48</sup> This justification opens Kohlberg's paradigm to the charge that it is biased toward contractarian philosophies. While that debate is beyond the scope of this article. It will influence the direction of future research in both moral philosophy and moral psychology. For a strong contractarian statement by Kohlberg, see Kohlberg, *supra* note 47, at 641-46. For an argument against the strong philosophical connection, see Goodpaster, *Kohlbergian Theory: A Philosophical Counterinvitation*, 92 ETHICS 491 (1982).

<sup>49</sup> See Lemming, *Cheating Behavior, Situational Influence, and Moral Development*, 71 J. EDUC. RES. 214 (1978); Malinowski & Smith, *Moral Reasoning and Moral Conduct*, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY (1988) (in press).

<sup>50</sup> Brabeck, *Ethical Characteristics of Whistle Blowers*, 18 J. RES. IN PERSONALITY 41 (1984).

<sup>51</sup> McColgan, Rest, & Pruitt, *Moral Judgment, and Anti-Social Behavior in Early Adolescence*, 4 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 189 (1983); Nitzberg, *The Relationship of Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Functioning in Juvenile Delinquent Subgroups* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Nova University, 1980).

<sup>52</sup> Simplistic attempts, whether formal or informal, to connect moral values, i.e. the content of moral judgments, and moral action have generally failed. Thus, Pittel and Mendelsohn observe:

While the delineation of the links between values and behavior is clearly a desirable objective, many investigators, in their eagerness to focus on behavior, have paid insufficient attention to the conceptualization of moral values .... Simplistic models of this relationship have led to a failure of prediction ....

Pittel & Mendelsohn, *Measurement of Moral Values: A Review and Critique*, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL., 22, 22 (1966). This may account for the widespread suspicion that ethics education is ineffectual. See, e.g., Magnet, *supra* note 7.

<sup>53</sup> Blassi, *Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action*, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 1 (1980).

<sup>54</sup> *Id.* Thus stage cannot be used to predict individual behavior. The research shows that persons who display higher stages are, as a group, less likely to engage in wrong conduct. The research cited in *supra* note 53 conflicts with the view of behaviorist, who have traditionally asserted that there is no connection between moral behavior and knowledge, values, or reasoning. See, e.g., Grindler, *Relations Between Behavioral and Cognitive Dimension of Conscience in Middle Childhood*, 35 CHILD DEV. 881 (1963). See generally 1 H. HARTSHORNE & M. MAY, *STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER* (1928).

<sup>55</sup> Boyce and Jensen observe:

[S]ome researchers have held that when various disagreeing opinions or perspectives are presented on an issue, a person will tend to reduce disagreements between his own opinions and those of others. This disequilibrium, or conflict, is often resolved by the person's changing his own opinions and even his method of reasoning .... A person, through repeated exposures to different levels of moral reasoning and opinion should feel mental discomfort and move toward more advanced thinking.

B. BOYCE & L. JENSEN, *supra* note 2, at 161.

<sup>56</sup> Blatt & Kohlberg, *The Effect of Classroom Moral Discussion Upon Children's Moral Judgment*, 4 J. MORAL EDUC., 129 (1975); Kohlberg & Turiel, *Moral Development and Moral Education*, in PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 410 (G. Lesser, ed. 1971). Tapp & Kohlberg, *Developing Sense of Law and Legal Justice*. 27-2 J. Soc. ISSUES 05 (1971).

<sup>57</sup> R. GALBRAITH & T. JONES, *MORAL REASONING: A TEACHING HANDBOOK FOR KOHLBERG TO THE CLASSROOM* (1976); Cooper, *Cognitive, Development, and Teaching Business Ethics* 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 313 (1986).

<sup>58</sup> J—1979, *supra* note 2, at 143.

<sup>59</sup> For a visual representation of the relationships between age and education in moral development, see Figure 8, at i&teat surrounding notes 73.74.

<sup>60</sup> J. REST-1979, *supra* note 2. at 10912.

<sup>61</sup> Set, e.g., R. Codes. *Moral Judgments In Adults* (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Minnesota. 19761: J. Dortzbach, *Moral Judgment and Perceived Locus of Control: A Cross-Sectional Developmental Study of Adults, Aged 26-74* (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Oregon, 19821

<sup>62</sup> Sea Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman. *A Longitudinal Study of Aforal Develop. melt*, 48 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1 11983).

<sup>63</sup> M. Blatt, *The Effects of Classroom Discussion Programs on Children's Level of Moral Judgment* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 19891.

<sup>64</sup> *Id.*

<sup>65</sup> E.g, Page & Hods, *Inducing Changes in Moral Reasoning*, 1982 J. PSYCHOLOGY 112 (19821.

<sup>66</sup> Rest writes: Table 8.7 indicates that treatment effects were most powerful for the adult group (.811 and least for the junior highs (.221.... Also, an educational program with adults might be more powerful because they draw on more previous experience and hence may find greater personal meaning in an educational intervention.

J. REST, *supra* note 2, at 82. Rest also speculates that experimental and measurement factors Wahl, account for the Greater Rain.

<sup>67</sup> *Id.*

<sup>68</sup> J. REST-1979, *supra* note 2.

<sup>69</sup> For readers who wish to explore alternative instruments, see THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT (A. Colby & L. Kohlberg eds. 1987); J. GIBBS & K. WIDAMAN, *SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: MEASURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION* (1982); *EVALUATING MORAL DEVELOPMENT* (L. Kuhnmerker, M. Mentrowski & V. Erikson eds, 1980); J. REST-1979, *supra* note 2. The following manual is required to score the DIT: J. Rest, *Revised Manual for the Defining Issues Test* (unpublished manuscript, 1979). It is available from the Center for the Study of Ethical Development, University of Minnesota.

<sup>146</sup> This summary is adapted/excerpted from, J. REST-1979, *supra* note 2, at 24-35.

---

<sup>147</sup> This story is presented at *supra* at the beginning of the Appendix.