

Making Race and Nation, 2.0

Using Research in Moral Psychology to Analyze the Rhetoric of Race Politics in the United States

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Introduction

Political scientists and other social scholars are constantly searching for ways to explain and predict social phenomena from political participation to flash mobs. While many theories of collective action and psycho-social behaviors have been published, discussed, and analyzed, perhaps the most prolific of recent developments purports that certain aspects of one's identity tend to affect her participation in politics. This new area of research has been termed "identity politics," and is explained in more depth below. Two compelling subfields of this research are race as identity politics and morality or spiritual ideology as identity politics; both contribute to identity formation for every individual, and both can affect one's political opinions, decisions, and even level of participation and efficacy. Indeed, investigating these facets of identity can inform important research about politics and social behaviors and could even help to predict levels of participation in important political events such as elections and protests.

Even though race and morality remain two of the most heavily researched divisions of identity politics, there exists a significant gap between the literature of the two. Few scholars have ventured to combine these subfields in an exploratory manner that could inform discussions of both race-as-identity-politics and morality-as-identity-politics in the future. In fact, even the most prolific thinkers in fields like moral psychology and political science have left this intersection widely undiscussed. Jonathan Haidt is one of the few academics who has ventured to discuss these two areas in concert with each other. By synthesizing analyses of morality and politics, he transcended his own discipline and impacted other fields, including sociology, political science, and even strategic communications; and yet, the largest critique of his work remains that he left policy- and issue- specific contexts unexplored. I purport, however, that combining these burgeoning literatures is crucial to fully understanding race politics across temporal settings. Appeals to moral psychology characterize most of the rhetoric delivered by policymakers and elites in times of high racial contentiousness. Through rigorous qualitative data analysis of United States Presidents' race-related rhetoric and writings, I will illustrate the importance of synthesizing moral psychology and race as identity which will inform inquiry of race politics and the establishment of racial orders.

To accomplish this, I will use Jonathan Haidt's theory regarding moral psychology and its place in politics as the framework for my own argument. The basis of Haidt's argument lies in appeals to six moral modules, each of which is defined extensively in the following sections. The crux of Haidt's argument, however, is an analysis of appeals made to these moral modules by politicians; Haidt has found that conservative politicians tend to cite all six modules almost evenly, while liberal politicians rely heavily on three of the six. However, as mentioned above, Haidt is oft criticized for his disregard of highly salient political issues and, by extension, how these issues may skew the moral matrices of Republican and Democrats. For the purposes of this research, I focused on historical moments of intense unrest related to race in the United States and analyzed the rhetoric delivered by partisan politicians in this context.

In the following sections, I will briefly discuss the history of identity politics as an academic discipline, paying special attention to the schism that exists with regards to the

integration of morality and race, both as identity to be appealed to and as political ammunition to be used by political elites. Next, I will delve into an overview of leading scholars in the field of moral psychology; the purpose of doing so is both to establish foundational knowledge of current opinions and concepts in the discipline and to serve as an introduction to the framework that I used to conduct this research. I will also briefly discuss Anthony Marx, a leading contributor in the field of historical institutionalism. His book, *Making Race and Nation*, is a compelling synthesis of history and political science in the context of race politics. His theories and analysis provide a helpful first-generation attempt at such synthesis, upon which my research will build; while Marx bases his theories about the processes by which racial orders are established over time in a mostly objective, historical overview, my research is based in analyses and interpretation of appeals to morality. Later, I will discuss Jonathan Haidt's moral modules in depth and explain why this concept was the most accommodating example of moral psychology to apply to a political context. Finally, I will present the methods, results, and discussion of my research. The paper will culminate in conclusions that will venture to outline the policy, social, and academic implications of utilizing an integrated, comprehensive framework which synthesizes moral psychology and political science to discuss race and identity politics.

Identity Politics

The relationship between political behaviors—actions by which citizens can directly contribute to political processes in their country—and identity, termed “identity politics,” is a relatively recent, heavily explored, and policy-relevant topic. Historically, the effects that one's cultural or gender identity can have on her political beliefs have been extensively discussed, including how one's status as an immigrant or a member of a minority race can deter her from voting (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Lipsitz 2006). More recently, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status have been proven to affect levels of political efficacy and participation (Stewart-Winter 2016; Beltran 2010). A correlation also exists between religious beliefs and political behavior; it has been found that the former can have drastic effects on the latter. Scholars around the world have studied this association and have found that it is most prevalent and important to consider in highly religious parts of the world, such as Latin America, Southern Europe, and Africa (Wilson 2008). Perhaps the most pertinent and compelling subfield of identity politics, however, is race politics; the literature about this area is extensive and scholars spanning a variety of disciplines have contributed research to the field.

Race has long been considered the most relevant aspect of one's identity to her social, political, and ideological behaviors; there is a reason that that is the first and, in some cases, the only demographic discussed in the context of political activity like elections and protests. For this reason, it is important to consider how race is characterized, discussed, and used by political elites. This paper does so in a systematic and analytical way.

Historical Institutionalism: Marx's Making Race and Nation

You may recognize the title of this paper as being an extension of historian Anthony Marx's *Making Race and Nation*. My research aims to learn from Marx and apply his frameworks, theories, and examples to a new discipline. Marx is a classical historical institutionalist and, as

such, analyzes the establishment of racial orders across time and between different nations via the overarching trajectories of a nation. He considers the colonial and empirical histories, the religious and social institutions that were (and were not) present at any point in time, and the overall treatment of race as identity, race as hierarchy, and race as class throughout history. Ultimately, I aim to do the same—analyze race and its place in the political, social, and economic spheres—through an integrated political science and moral psychology framework. In doing so, I hope to highlight the importance of synthesizing disciplines outside of politics to better inform issues and theories within the political realm.

Theory

For the purposes of this paper, Jonathan Haidt’s theory will suffice as a foundation. He is one of only a few scholars who has ventured to integrate political science and moral and social psychology. While he did so on the level of the individual, rank-and-file voter, I intend to apply his arguments to the politicians who serve as representatives thereof. Below, I delve into an overview of Haidt’s argument and discuss how I plan to use it in the context of race politics.

Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Psychology

I will be using Jonathan Haidt’s conceptual frameworks of moral psychology to inform my research of United States Presidents’ appeals to morality in the context of race politics. Haidt’s best-known contributions to the field of moral psychology and, I propose, to other social science fields as well, are his moral modules or foundations and the subsequent arguments made about their use in politics. Haidt contends that these modules are inherently understood by all human beings. His integration of leading assumptions about human nature supports neuroscientist Gary Marcus’s “rough draft” theory of the brain, which holds that the human mind, upon creation, possesses very basic predispositions (of which the moral modules are an example). Aside from this foundational knowledge, the human mind begins as a rough draft and is then reshaped and edited over time as we experience and learn new things. In this way, Haidt rejects earlier concepts of the *tabula rasa*, or “blank slate,” human mind supported by a myriad of leading scholars such as John Locke. In all, Haidt’s moral foundations are a compelling framework through which we can analyze appeals to morality, much as Haidt did himself in his book, *The Righteous Mind*; these modules are crucial to understanding and applying leading theories in moral psychology and can evaluate political strategy and appeals over time and across parties. Below, I will describe each of Haidt’s six moral modules: care/harm, authority/subversion, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, and sanctity/degradation.

Care/Harm

This moral module is the most basic and easily identifiable of the six: appeals thereto consist of calls to protect vulnerable populations or nods to the expectations and responsibilities of benevolent figures to protect their charges from any threats. In his book, Haidt discusses motherly intuition as the true and original form of this moral foundation, arguing that mammal mothers who, “invest a lot more in each [offspring],” have been conditioned to notice signs of discontent among their children and, therefore, are acutely attuned to the triggers of and reactions

to the Care/Harm module. Politically, this module can be observed in policies meant to save endangered animals, disaster relief efforts, and even innovative medical policies of late (e.g., the Affordable Care Act). Each of these political actions and regulations aims to protect some type of vulnerable population; whether it be baby seals, as Haidt cites in his discussion of the Care/Harm module; innocent people who have lost their homes in a terrible storm; or poorer individuals who cannot access healthcare, each of these groups inspires feelings of sympathy and a desire to help—this is the sentiment upon which the Care/Harm module is.

Further, as Haidt mentions, there are both a set of standardized triggers for each module *and also* triggers that are culturally-specific or religiously-specific or even gender- or age-related. Over time, the triggers have expanded. For instance, thousands of years ago, when we lived in hunter-gatherer communities and procreated only for the sake of the human species, the only triggers that may have existed for the Care/Harm module were noticing signs of danger (either to one's self or to her offspring). As time has gone on, however, more and more images have come to elicit similar reactions: puppies, starving children on the other side of the globe, and dead trees, to name a few. Figures 1 and 2 below are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of rhetoric and imagery that appeal to the Care/Harm foundation.



Figure 1, from Haidt



Figure 2, from Haidt

Authority/Subversion

The Authority/Subversion module appeals to one's attempts (or failures) to fit into a hierarchy. It can be broadly interpreted, as these hierarchies can manifest in a myriad of ways and can range from family structure to the established pecking order at work to obeying the flight attendant's instructions on an airplane. Social, political, ideological, and relational hierarchies are constantly operating in our daily lives, but there is a cultural schism as to how we react to them: Americans hate being inferior to anyone. Religious authority is one of the most prevalent demonstrations of this module in day-to-day life; the threat of one's god, or a higher power with complete authority over all followers, is the binding agent of most religious practices. As Haidt himself notes, however, it is difficult at first to view this discrepancy as one of morality; is Jimmy *really* a person of questionable moral character for telling his teacher to shove off? Haidt counters this by

arguing that there is a distinct and crucial difference between *authority*, which occurs when one is trusted to maintain peace and stability in society, and *power*, which is a role characterized entirely by control over others. Both can be exploited to suppress the weak, Haidt argues, but in this way, an authority figure becomes a moral pillar, whereas a powerful man becomes indicative of force and restriction.

The triggers associated with the Authority/Subversion module, originally, were simple displays of dominance, force, regulation, or supervision and their corresponding subordinating displays of deference, obedience, and passiveness. When human beings lived in smaller, less complex societies, examples included one hunter killing the largest prey or one gatherer collecting the largest bounty of berries. Today, signs of authority or subversion can include serving in a leadership position in an established hierarchy, wearing a uniform of some kind, or simply being a parent. Reactions differ, too: rather than beating our chests and hollering about our own subordination, there are numerous paths we can take to articulate our feelings about the authority figure in our lives. Figures 3 and 4 below are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of rhetoric and imagery that appeal to the Authority/Subversion foundation.




Figure 3, from Haidt




Figure 4, from Haidt

Fairness/Cheating

The Fairness/Cheating module has arguably the most prolific history within the social sciences; studies about the Prisoner's Dilemma, reciprocal altruism, biodiversity, genetics and evolution, and cooperation all allude to this foundation. Opportunities to adhere to the expectations dictated by the Fairness/Cheating module arise several times a day. Paying your waitress a tip comparable to the quality of her service qualifies as such an opportunity. Lending your friend in your math class a pen with the expectation that he will loan you his calculator next time you forget yours does as well, as does holding the door open for a stranger in exchange for a kind smile and a "thank you". As human beings, we anticipate that we will be treated fairly in most aspects of daily life; this module is subconsciously engrained into most of our daily interactions. Countless clichés have been derived from these expectations: "the early bird gets the worm" and the entire concept of karma are heavily based in our reactions to the Fairness/Cheating module.

Haidt notes that the triggers for this particular module are extensive and constantly shifting. They are linked to notions of “reciprocity and cheating” (Haidt 2013, 158) and, in fact, are so fluid that Haidt was compelled to draw a crucial distinction between the conservative ideals of the Fairness/Cheating module and liberal ideas thereof. Republicans, on the one hand, maintain that “fairness”-as-an-ideal is commensurate to proportionality, or the idea that the outcomes of a venture ought to be completely equal to the effort put in. This type of fairness holds that one ought to receive what she earned; it is the difference between getting what you deserve and getting the same as everyone else gets, which is the liberal version of fairness discussed in more depth below. Democrats, on the other hand, believe that “fairness” is equivalent to total equality. They will often make appeals to social justice or attempts to avoid discrimination and prejudice.

This distinction can be observed in most political debates today: affirmative action, welfare and general healthcare, and minimum wage deliberations are all based on this contrast. Figures 5 and 6 below are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of both the liberal (left) and conservative (right) conceptualizations of the Fairness/Cheating module.




Figure 5, from Haidt



Figure 6, from Haidt

Liberty/Oppression

This module mirrors the liberal version of the Fairness/Cheating module mentioned above in many ways. This module holds that freedom is important, even necessary to effective and just governance. Therefore, liberty and oppression are used to describe the expectations and violations associated with ideals of equality, freedom, and opportunity. Haidt proposes, further, that a notable characteristic of this module is its relatively recent development; as lower-ranked citizens banded together to overthrow the oppression of those who occupied the higher-ranks, equality and universal freedoms emerged as the new normal. As Haidt argues, it is similar to Karl Marx’s proletariat rising up to overcome the oppressive bourgeoisie.

Haidt purports that this module manifests itself differently among conservative and liberal individuals similarly to the Fairness/Cheating module. For instance, liberals would argue

that a lack of oppression and a true presence of liberty ought to equate to *egalitarianism*: everyone is free, everyone has equal access to resources, and so on. Conservatives, on the other hand, believe that liberty is the absence of infringements on rights or lifestyles. Their preference for small government and limited government regulation serve as good examples. Triggers of this module are still similar to those of the Fairness/Cheating module, but the moral matrix of liberals will elicit starkly different reactions to those triggers than the conservative moral matrix will. Figures 7 and 8 are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of the liberal (left) and conservative (right) ideas of the Liberty/Oppression module.



Figure 7, from Haidt



Figure 8, from Haidt

Loyalty/Betrayal

This module operates off the expectation that one ought to remain loyal to his authority figures, whether they be country, boss, or parent. It is innate, in that it is crucial to our ability to form teams and cohesive groups, which is then subsequently essential to effective governance and human survival, as many prominent contract theorists have argued in the past. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Haidt cites President George W. Bush as having appealed to this particular module quite frequently; loyalty to one's nation in a time of national crisis is important to maintain. Further, it is quite easy to condemn those who are *not* loyal. Thus, this module can often create complex power structures, and opinions regarding the extent to which one violates this module can vary widely. For example, in the weeks following September 11th, 2001, many American citizens denounce those who appeared disloyal to the United States; indeed, this is one of the primary arguments used to justify the war in Iraq. However, at the same time, Islamic Extremists *are* loyal to their own authority figures. It can be difficult to delineate between what is betrayal and what is a matter of people possessing different loyalties.

Triggers of this module originated as simple threats to a cohesive group or even to the established structure of that group. If the son of a primitive familial unit is expected to collect wood for their fire each night and betrays the group, the entire group will suffer. Therefore, it becomes necessary to recognize and identify signs of upcoming betrayal. Today, however, triggers can include anything from national security threats, as mentioned above, to rooting

against one's school or sports team. Figures 9 and 10 are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of the Loyalty/Betrayal module in action.



Figure 9, from Haidt



Figure 10, from Haidt

Sanctity/Degradation

Finally, the Sanctity/Degradation module is the most abstract and difficult to define of the moral modules. Essentially, appeals made to this module are appeals made to one's "that's gross" sensor: anything from a dirty homeless man to a small child picking his nose to a pair of rainboots covered in mud can elicit emotions associated with this module. As Haidt argues, this module is the least pragmatic of all of the modules, because on an innate, strictly practical level, it makes no sense for human beings to have a moral reaction to dirt and grime. However, there is a biological and evolutionary reason for reactions like disgust and, therefore, this module is innate and practical (though abstract). It has simply grown and expanded to include a variety of things aside from the horrid taste of poisonous plants—today, this module can even include "disgusting" theories, ideologies, and social institutions.

Triggers for this module can include trash, blood, dead animals, dirt, grime, bugs, bad smells, and fascism. Anything is fair game so long as it has the potential to elicit reactions similar to disgust. Figures 11 and 12 are some of the illustrations that Haidt provides in his book as contemporary examples of appeals to the Sanctity/Degradation module.




Figure 11, from Haidt



Figure 12, from Haidt

Haidt's Overarching Argument

Haidt's politically relevant argument relates to how different partisan voters react to appeals to these moral modules. He argues that conservative voters are actually more responsive to appeals to morality in general, as they tend to react to appeals to all six modules with relatively equal frequency. Liberal voters, on the other hand, will react strongly to only a subset of the modules—specifically, they tend to place the most weight in the Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression modules far more than they do on the other three modules. Haidt illustrates this argument through two explanatory figures, which I reproduce below as Figures 13 and 14. These visualizations succinctly and effectively portray the thrust of Haidt's argument. The thickness of each vertical line represents the importance of or reaction to each moral module, with a thicker line indicating that that module is more integral to that type of voter's moral matrix. Thus, the liberal moral matrix (represented by Figure 13) varies from one module to the next; Care/Harm, Liberty/Oppression, and Fairness/Cheating are obviously the most crucial and the other three are less so. The conservative moral matrix (represented in Figure 14), by contrast, depicts an almost equal distribution of importance between each of the six modules. This, Haidt argues, is the crucial distinction between liberal and conservative morality and their applications to politics.




Figure 13, from Haidt

Figure 14, from Haidt

Methods

To analyze political appeals made to Haidt's moral modules by American presidents, I opted to read and code a standardized set of documents from a carefully chosen group of United States Presidents; to ensure that my research covered every variable necessary to consider, my selection process was broad but also complex. Using the context of race politics or racial order shifts as my selection criteria, I selected presidents who were in office when a significant racially charged event occurred. Because my research was dependent on the comparison between Republican political strategies and Democratic political strategies, I made sure to select at least one president from each party who served during or directly surrounding each event. This selection process and results are outlined in Table 1. Further, the standardization of documents was important but difficult to ensure. I chose to include State of the Union Addresses and Inaugural Addresses as universal documents intended for public consumption; these documents were readily available from each of the administrations analyzed, and are typically important agenda-setting tools. I then chose to include Executive Orders as an example of more technical, less accessible policy-

relevant documents. All three types of texts are officially released by the executive branch, which was important to the integrity of the research and had been released at least once by most of the administrations of interest. There are two important exceptions to this latter condition: in the case of Andrew Johnson, he did not write or deliver an Inaugural Address, since he took office informally following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln; and Donald Trump, obviously, has given only one State of the Union address, as opposed to all other administrations, who have delivered at least three. While this is important to note, it bears little influence over the results of this research, as the results are reported as a standardized percentage rather than a raw number of moral appeals, which would be dependent on the number and length of documents analyzed for each individual president.

Once I had selected and acquired each of the documents of interest, I began coding them in NVivo, a qualitative analytical software. I coded each document based on Haidt’s six moral modules, using his definitions of each as a set of guidelines for my coding process. Perhaps obviously, there was significant overlap between modules: a quote from one document may “count” as an appeal to multiple modules, and a select few may even serve as evidence of all six modules. Further, while very few documents did not present a single appeal to moral psychology by Haidt’s definition, most contained appeals to most of the modules, and many contained a large number.

President	Party	Race-Related Event	Years in office
Andrew Jackson	Republican	The Trail of Tears, Native American Relations	1829-1837
Martin van Buren	Democrat	The Trail of Tears, Native American Relations	1837-1841
Abraham Lincoln	Democrat	The Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation	1861-1865
Andrew Johnson	Republican	The Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation	1865-1869
Ulysses S. Grant	Republican	The Civil War, Jim Crow	1869-1877
Franklin D. Roosevelt	Democrat	World War II, Japanese Internment	1933-1945
Harry S. Truman	Democrat	World War II, Japanese Internment	1945-1953
Dwight D. Eisenhower	Republican	Aftermath of World War II, aftermath of Japanese Internment, Civil Rights Movement	1953-1961
John F. Kennedy	Democrat	Civil Rights Movement	1961-1963
Lyndon B. Johnson	Democrat	Civil Rights Movement	1963-1969
Richard Nixon	Republican	Civil Rights Movement	1969-1974
Bill Clinton	Democrat	Muslim-American Relations, Mexican-American Relations	1993-2001
George W. Bush	Republican	Muslim-American Relations (9/11), Mexican-American Relations	2001-2009
Barack Obama	Democrat	Muslim-American Relations, Mexican-American Relations, the Refugee Crisis	2009-2017
Donald Trump	Republican	Muslim-American Relations (“Travel Ban”), Mexican-American Relations (the “Wall”)	2017-

Table 1.

Results

This research was performed to test the reliability of Haidt's party-based differences in appeals to his moral modules, specifically in the underdiscussed context of race politics and ethnic-based unrest. Haidt argues that conservative voters will react to all six of the moral modules almost equally while their liberal counterparts will react to only a select subset of them, namely the Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression modules. (Figures 13 and 14 at the end of the Theory section articulate this argument visually.) While his contentions are compelling, and there is no denying his conclusion based on the evidence that he presents, this pattern does not emerge in the rhetoric of political elites as they discuss racial conflict and social discontent.

Overall, I find little support for Haidt's contentions in the context of elite-level discourse during periods of racial upheaval. In contrast to Haidt's argument that liberal politicians rely primarily on the Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression modules, while conservative politicians rely on all moral modules equally, I find that conservative politicians appeal to the Care/Harm module significantly more than liberal politicians did, on average. To the extent that liberal politicians do appeal to the Fairness/Cheating and Liberty/Oppression modules more frequently than their conservative counterparts, these differences were substantively small. Figures 15 through 20 illustrate these findings graphically.

Additionally, my findings indicate that, during periods of heightened racial tensions in the United States, liberal politicians appeal to the Sanctity/Degradation module significantly *more* than conservatives do. Neither liberal nor conservatives reference the Loyalty/Betrayal module frequently, and to the extent that they do so, they reference it roughly equally. (In nearly 25% of all documents coded, this foundation is not referenced at all, compared to an average of only 8% of documents in which the five other modules are never referenced.) However, consistent with Haidt's predictions, I find evidence that conservatives have appealed to the Authority/Subversion module more frequently than liberals. These findings are outlined in Figure 16. Figure 16 illustrates the raw number of appeals made to the Authority/Subversion module for each individual president.

Further, I contrast my findings with Haidt's implicit predictions using simulated data in Figures 21 through 26. Specifically, whereas two of the bars in these figures reflect findings from my actual data, the other two bars in the figures represent simulated data intended to represent Haidt's broader argument. The overarching patterns are in fact opposite of what Haidt's argument implies. For instance, Haidt contends that conservatives appeal to each module almost equally, while liberals rely more heavily on only a subset of moral modules; and yet, the data collected in this study display the opposite. Liberal politicians actually appeal to the modules more evenly than do conservative politicians.

This is especially interesting when we consider which modules are utilized more often by which parties. The Sanctity/Degradation module is often associated with religion, spirituality, and values. For this reason, it makes sense intuitively (and based upon party platforms, ideologies, and histories) that conservatives would cite this foundation more frequently than liberals. Yet, at least insofar as periods of heightened racial tension are concerned, liberals

appealed to the Sanctity/Degradation foundation more than any other module, *and* more than their conservative peers did. Further, the Care/Harm module commonly refers to government's duty to assume a paternal role and protect its citizens. Haidt argue that liberals frequently appeal to this module in the context of increased surveillance and regulation to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the public. However, my data indicates that conservatives appeal to the Care/Harm module more often than any other module *and* more often than liberals. The data, therefore, do not support Haidt's argument.

The other three modules—Authority/Subversion, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression—*do* follow Haidt's pattern insofar as the first is employed by conservatives more than liberals; the second, while used more by liberals in contrast to usage of some of the other modules, is used almost equally between Republicans and Democrats; and the last is wielded more by liberals than by conservatives. However, the extent to which these findings mirror Haidt's data visualizations varies. According to Haidt's data presented in Figures 13 and 14 and the subsequent simulated data presented in Figures 21 through 26, the Care/ Harm module is cited by liberal politicians almost three times as often as it is by conservative politicians. The Liberty/Oppression module, further, is used about twice as often. The Fairness/Cheating module is used almost evenly by liberals and conservatives, but appears more central to the liberal moral matrix than it is to the conservative moral matrix. And, at least in the context of race politics, the evidence indicates that conservative politicians actually appealed to the Care/Harm module more than their liberal counterparts. While liberals appeal to the Fairness/Cheating and Liberty/Oppression modules more than conservatives, the difference is not as significant as Haidt's argument and analysis imply.




Figure 15. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Authority/Subversion module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 16. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Care/Harm module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 17. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Fairness/Cheating module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 18. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Liberty/Oppression module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 19. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Loyalty/Betrayal module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 20. This graph represents the raw number of appeals made to the Sanctity/Degradation module by each individual president. Red dots represent Republican presidents, while blue dots represent Democratic presidents.




Figure 21. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Authority/Subversion module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.




Figure 22. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Care/Harm module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.




Figure 23. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Fairness/Cheating module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.




Figure 24. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Liberty/Oppression module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.




Figure 25. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Loyalty/Betrayal module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.




Figure 26. This graph represents the percentage of total appeals made that were appeals made to the Sanctity/Degradation module, separated by political ideology. It also presents simulated data meant to represent Haidt's argument.

Discussion

There are several important implications of my findings, as well as limitations. Most importantly, my findings raise three key questions for social scientists interested in Haidt's argument concerning moral psychology and partisan US politics: (1) Can we make meaningful inferences from individual-level survey data (i.e., individual citizens' reported preferences) about the strategic appeals that politicians make? (2) Under what conditions are politicians more (or less) likely to *make* appeals in line with citizens' general moral preferences? Put differently, is there something about race politics, politicized ethnicity, or identity politics at large, that transforms the landscape of moral politics in the US? and (3) Do we have reason to believe that the broader trends in moral psychology and public opinion that Haidt is interested in might have varied systematically over time, for instance, as US political parties realigned, or as certain issues gained or lost traction in public discourse? These are important questions for future research to investigate further.

Limitations and Future Research

Along these lines, the present results must be interpreted with caution given the relatively small numbers of documents that I have coded for each president, and the fact that I have only focused on periods of heightened racial turmoil. In the future, I hope to code more documents for each president and to code more presidential administrations so that I can better examine the potential difference during periods of particularly salient racial turmoil in national discourse. Additionally, the dataset is currently limited in that it only looks at the rhetoric of elected presidents, but not their competitors who lost elections. Future research could also consider investigating variation in the moral appeals made by winning versus losing candidates. Lastly, my dataset operates at the presidential level, but it is possible that state-level or congressional politicians engage in slightly different moral politics than candidates for the highest office in the country. This could be another avenue for further reading, theorizing, and research.

In the near future, I hope to launch a second round of research endeavors exploring the questions posed and hypotheses proposed in this paper. For instance, I aim to compile a set of qualitative coding guidelines in order to instruct other researchers to complete the same rigorous coding process that I did and provide more confidence in my results. As the politics and social forces are ever-changing in the United States, continued research is both necessary and practical to ensure timeliness and sensitivity to the ongoing struggle for political prowess and social equality.

Contributions of the Research

It is normatively important and empirically interesting for voters and political scientists to better understand how politicians use moral appeals to engage in the social (re)construction of race and national identities. Overall, my preliminary findings presented in this paper support the idea that context and specific policy issues play a greater role in affecting the way moral psychology plays out in the US politics than Haidt acknowledged. Given the central role that race politics plays in

American national life (c.f., Marx 2007), and given Haidt's lack of attention to issues of identity politics, in particular (Sperber lectures 2016), this paper has identified an important area for reconsideration of Haidt's claims and provided evidence to justify further research in this area.

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