

Defending National Treasures

French Art and Heritage under Vichy

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To Ryan and Grant

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were too preoccupied with the impending Allied invasion to pursue it vigorously. When negotiations turned to key works in the French cultural patrimony, there were limits even to Bonnard's willingness to accommodate German demands.

Postwar accounts of the recycling campaign have also minimized the role of French authorities in the destruction of statues, a tendency that coincided with the broader crafting of a Gaullist resistance myth.⁶⁹ By claiming that the statues had been destroyed by the Nazis and ardent collaborators, these accounts overlooked the origins of the campaign and the work of French officials who actually implemented it. That many of these departmental and midlevel civil servants remained in the administration after the Occupation helps explain why French actions—in this area as in many others—were not scrutinized more critically.

These accounts are also misleading because they focus on the loss of monuments to widely known republican or socialist leaders, which made up a small minority of the lost statues. Many of the recycled monuments commemorated regional or local figures who were neither known on the national level nor primarily celebrated for leftist political activities. Yet the fact that observers cited first and foremost the loss of republican symbols underscores the emotional attachment of the French to the departed bronze figures. The statues became symbols of suffering and loss under the Germans, all the more meaningful when only the empty pedestals remained. In the end, the decentralized decision-making process and a widespread desire to protect local artistic patrimony thwarted the plans of Pétain and Darlan to preserve only monuments to select national heroes—those who embodied their ideals of Catholicism, militarism, and monarchism.

The metals campaign was only one of many Nazi tactics to seize resources from France. The Vichy leadership negotiated away raw materials, foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and people—particularly workers and Jews. Then there were assets that the Nazis looted, without French consent, including works of art, libraries, musical instruments, and valuable furniture collections. Vichy leaders vociferously opposed Nazi art pillages, not in defense of the victims, who were primarily Jewish, but because they wanted to control the plunder themselves.

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Jewish Art Collections

By defeating France, the German army liberated the French government and people from the influence of the international Jewry. . . . The [German] protection of works of art owned by Jews should be considered a small indemnity for the heavy burdens and significant sacrifices of the Reich benefiting European populations in the battle against the Jewry.

—Gerhard Utikal, 3 November 1941

The Schloss collection was the last of the great Dutch art collections built in France during the nineteenth century. It would be deplorable if this entire collection went abroad, which surely will happen if the Louvre does not keep a portion of it. . . . With this acquisition, the Louvre's gallery of Dutch painting . . . would become the top Dutch gallery in the world, just after the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam and the Mauritshuis at The Hague. It thus would greatly enhance our museum's prestige.

—René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 18 August 1943

ON THE MORNING OF 3 NOVEMBER 1940, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring visited the Jeu de Paume museum, the Nazis' repository in Paris for freshly looted art. German officers awaited him, along with chilled champagne and an array of potted palm trees. The small museum was filled with antique furniture, precious sculpture, and paintings by Rembrandt, Vermeer, Renoir, and Gauguin—a wide range of highly valuable works of art. Dressed down in civilian clothes, Göring carefully surveyed the collection, his steps cushioned by rare oriental rugs. He continued studying the treasure the following day and handpicked twenty-seven paintings for his private collection, most of them previously owned by Edouard de Rothschild and Georges Wildenstein. He also selected dozens of furniture pieces

and decorative objects, including four tapestries and an eighteenth-century sofa with six matching chairs. Throughout the Occupation, Göring profited handsomely from his position of influence and made twenty-one such visits to the *Jeu de Paume* to procure looted art.¹

Like other Nazi leaders, the Reichsmarschall was an avid collector who enjoyed surrounding himself with fine works of art and relishing their aesthetic beauty. But he also sought to expand his collection as a symbol of his status and power in the Reich leadership. With each new batch of looted art, Göring and other top Reich officials selected prize pieces for themselves, allowing curators in the Nazis' employ to survey the remaining works and choose objects for German museums. In the Nazi vision of Europe, the Thousand-Year Reich would dominate the continent not only militarily but also culturally, thanks in large part to these spoils. French authorities, however, were not willing to relinquish the Jewish art collections without a fight. Officials from several agencies banded together to protest the German looting, not in defense of the collectors' private property but in defense of French sovereignty and cultural heritage.

Postwar memoirs and histories written by French museum officials, even in recent years, have focused on the German side of this story. In 2000, this perspective even appeared in the report of the *Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France*, created in 1997 by Prime Minister Alain Juppé. Headed by Jean Mattéoli, a former Resistance activist and political deportee, the commission is more commonly known as "la mission Mattéoli." The extensive, multivolume report was to serve as a kind of national *mea culpa*, recognizing the role of the French state in the seizure of a wide range of Jewish assets—bank accounts, real estate, businesses, furniture, musical instruments, and assets seized at the transit camps of Drancy, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande. It details the history of spoliation under the Vichy regime and offers recommendations for providing appropriate compensation to Jewish victims and their heirs.²

Historian Annette Wievorka, who served on the Mattéoli Commission, has emphasized in her scholarship the importance of distinguishing spoliation from pillages.³ Spoliation was a form of "legal theft" carried out by the Vichy regime, based on French legislation, in an effort to Aryanize the French economy. Pillages, in contrast, were carried out almost entirely by the Germans and were considered illegal by French authorities as a result of the Hague Conventions ban on the wartime looting of private property. The Mattéoli report echoes this distinction, asserting that the spoliation of

Jewish assets was an act of "Nazi inspiration, but essentially carried out by the Vichy regime," whereas art pillages were "a German affair."⁴ This framework allows the authors of the volume on art looting to focus almost exclusively on German actions: "In contrast to other areas studied by the [Mattéoli] Commission, an analysis of the art dossier underscores the preponderant role played by German agencies, mobilized under the circumstances to play a specific role in the ideology and intrigues of the National Socialist state."⁵

Yet the dichotomy of "French spoliation" and "German pillage" tends to oversimplify the very complicated reality of art seizures during the Occupation. In several key cases, French officials themselves were able to appropriate works from prestigious Jewish art collections in the southern unoccupied zone, including valuable works from the collections of Edouard, Henri, Maurice, and Robert de Rothschild and the heirs of Adolphe Schloss. For Jacques Jaujard, René Huyghe, and their colleagues in the museum administration, the private collections were part of the French *patrimoine national* that was being depleted each day as loaded trains carried thousands of paintings and other cultural objects to Germany. Since the Liberation, museum officials have correctly argued that an overriding French goal was to keep the works in France and out of Nazi hands. It is a heroic narrative that tells an important, courageous tale of conservation. Yet there is another side of the story that has remained untold: wartime archives also reveal that these curators and civil servants intended to place the works of art in the Louvre and other French museums—not temporarily, as a ruse to keep the works away from the Germans, but permanently. A significant body of archival evidence refutes postwar assertions that the museum administration merely was protecting the French cultural patrimony and acting in the interest of Jewish collectors. These documents also reveal continuities with postwar cultural policy, implemented by some of the same men who remained in the fine arts office, in which the Louvre and other museums began a complicated guardianship over more than two thousand objects from Jewish collections that had been recovered from Germany, were returned to France, but not claimed by victims or their heirs.

German Art Looting

Before Hitler fought in the trenches of World War I, experiencing a surge of pan-German patriotism, before he organized the National Socialist Party and became the Reich's Führer, he was a failed artist. As a young

man, he twice tried to enter the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna, and twice faced rejection from the cultural elite. Yet he fancied himself an art connoisseur and, once in power, ambitiously built a vast personal collection, setting into motion plans to create the most extensive and prestigious art museum in the world. A vast cultural complex featuring a Führermuseum would be created in his childhood hometown of Linz, Austria. Hitler recruited some of the top art historians, curators, and dealers in Germany to help him build the museum collection, which would pool masterpieces once housed across the European continent.⁶

Hitler thus sought to expand both his personal art collection and the holdings of the future Linz museum. Other members of the Nazi leadership followed Hitler's lead and built sizable art collections of their own. They did so not merely for the aesthetic pleasure of owning beautiful works of art; a Nazi leader's art collection also symbolized his social status and political influence. As self-styled members of a new German aristocracy, Nazi henchmen such as Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, and party leader Martin Bormann used art collections to flaunt their success and to shape their identity within the political and cultural elite.⁷

As the Reich conquered vast expanses of territory across the European continent, bands of German pillagers scoured museums and private collections for cultural spoils. The pillaging campaign first began in Poland and followed the path of Hitler's war machine to the Baltics, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and eventually to the Soviet Union. The Nazis above all sought "Germanic" works, those either created by artists of German heritage (an elastic notion that included the seventeenth-century Dutch masters) or works that were previously owned by Germans. In a parallel to the "repatriation" of thousands of ethnic Germans from eastern Europe to the Reich territory, the pillages were to reverse a centuries-old scattering of Germanic art across the continent. In particular, top Nazi officials sought to reclaim works of art that had been stolen by Napoleon's armies.⁸ The seizure of cultural objects had been considered a natural extension of military operations through the early nineteenth century. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, to which Germany was a signatory, banned the plunder of private property by occupying military powers, but the Nazis felt no obligation to honor international law in their quest to reverse Napoleon's plunder.⁹

The directors of the Linz museum project, Hans Posse until December 1942, succeeded by Hermann Voss, seized works from German-occupied

territories and bought objects on the flourishing art market. Money was no object for Hitler. Between April 1943 and March 1944 alone, Voss was able to purchase 881 paintings. By the end of the war, the collection destined for Linz contained some five thousand paintings, ninety-five tapestries, and a wide array of furniture and other art objects. In comparison, the permanent collection of the Louvre in 1960 held a relatively scant fifteen hundred paintings.¹⁰

In their mission to recover "Germanic" art, Nazi leaders particularly coveted works by seventeenth-century Dutch and Flemish old masters—Rembrandt, Vermeer, Hals, Rubens, Ruisdael. They also sought traditional artistic genres such as domestic interiors, still-life paintings, and landscapes. They denounced as "degenerate" the cubist, expressionist, and surrealist movements. In March 1937, the Nazi cultural administration held an exhibition in Munich of *Entartete Kunst*, or "degenerate art," as a way to teach the public about the negative impact of modernism. Under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels, the cultural administration confiscated nearly sixteen thousand modernist works from the Nationalgalerie and other public museums, targeting pieces by artists such as Kokoschka, Kirchner, and Chagall. The works were either sold on the art market or destroyed. On 20 March 1939, nearly five thousand paintings, drawings, sculptures, and engravings were secretly burned in the courtyard of the Berlin fire department headquarters. As Lynn Nicholas points out, this dramatic cleansing of art collections is a disturbing portent of the Final Solution that would develop over the next few years.¹¹

Despite official denunciations of modernist art, Göring and other top leaders filled their own collections with postimpressionist works similar to those that had been confiscated from public museums. They knew which paintings would fetch a good price on the art market and used proceeds from sales to purchase works from earlier periods. Göring, for example, sold a Cézanne and two Van Gogh paintings that he had acquired from the Nationalgalerie purge to buy older paintings and tapestries.¹²

As the Reich expanded its control over the European continent, stockpiles of valuable art grew accordingly, emanating from both public and private collections. In France the looting began in the summer of 1940, soon after the armistice had been signed. Initially, Hitler sought to gain control over all art collections—public and private. In August 1940 he instructed Propaganda Minister Goebbels to launch an extensive survey of "all works of art and historically important objects," owned

by governments and private individuals alike, that were held in France and other occupied countries. Goebbels was to determine whether a "lawful change of ownership" would be feasible in the final peace treaties.¹³ As previously discussed, Goebbels commissioned a team of art historians headed by Otto Kummel, director of Berlin State Museums, to create a list of works that had been owned by Germans since the sixteenth century but currently were housed in other countries. Goebbels charged the group with researching art in three categories: works that were Napoleonic war spoils, pieces of German origin held abroad, and art that in some way reflected Germanic character.¹⁴ Goebbels and Göring together oversaw the research, which resulted in a three-volume, five hundred-page inventory, commonly known as the Kummel Reports. The fact that Goebbels and Göring headed this effort shows its crucial importance to Hitler and the Nazi elite.¹⁵

The Germans were not the first to create such an artistic wish list. The Allies had drawn up a similar inventory after World War I to recover works from Germany as part of the reparations agreements. Article 247 of the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to return to Belgium twelve panels from the Ghent altarpiece, a fifteenth-century Flemish masterpiece by Hubert and Jan Van Eyck, also known as the *Mystic Lamb* altarpiece. The Kaiser Wilhelm Museum in Berlin had bought the panels legally in the nineteenth century, but in 1919 Germany dutifully returned them to Ghent, where they were housed at the Church of Saint Bavo.¹⁶ As we will see in Chapter 10, the altarpiece became the subject of an intense diplomatic struggle in 1942. In a quest to restore their cultural patrimony, German agents seized the *Mystic Lamb* from a French art depot in the southern town of Pau, where the Belgian museum administration had sent it for safekeeping.

Thus, the issue of artistic "repatriation" was not new, but the Nazis pursued it with unprecedented zeal. The art looting in France took place in two phases. The first began in the summer of 1940 and targeted the assets of prominent Jewish collectors and dealers, including Alphonse Kann, David David-Weill, Georges Bernheim, Jacques Seligmann, Georges Wildenstein, Paul Rosenberg, and members of the Rothschild family. Particularly vulnerable were the collections left by those who had fled abroad before the invasion. A Vichy law of 23 July 1940 stripped emigrants of French citizenship, leaving their assets in a precarious legal situation and at increased risk of spoliation and looting.

The second phase of German plunder was launched in 1942 and extended to less wealthy Jews whose properties were ransacked, often after their arrest and deportation but, in some cases, while the owners still occupied their homes. This operation, known as Möbel-aktion or M-Aktion, aimed to distribute furniture, clothing, décor, and other household items to ethnic Germans settling in the occupied territories of eastern Europe—the Lebensraum that undergirded Hitler's entire quest for European domination. Some works of art belonging to smaller collectors were looted during M-Aktion operations. Annette Wiewiorka tells the story of her mother's family, who had fled to Grenoble just before the roundups of July 1942. The family members returned to their home after the Liberation, only to find that the looters had taken everything, even private papers and photographs. In the end, the recipients of the furniture and other domestic goods were not settlers in the eastern territories occupied by the Reich but victims of Allied bombings within Germany.¹⁷

As in other areas of the Reich administration, Hitler deliberately fostered competition among a few agency leaders as a way of solidifying loyalty to him and preventing any one official from gaining too much power over looting operations. As historian Jonathan Petropoulos explains, "At no point during the war did one minister or agency have sole jurisdiction over the plunder."¹⁸ While Goebbels's team carried out its research on coveted items, Hitler instructed Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to "secure" all artistic treasures in France—particularly from Jewish collections—through the German embassy in Paris. Ambassador Otto Abeck entrusted this task to field police agent Eberhard Freiherr von Künsberg. Künsberg had already led similar operations in The Hague and Brussels, accompanied by a team of art experts who selected works of art worthy of German collections. The actual pillages were carried out by field police group 627 led by Commissioner Gernu, who was placed under Künsberg's authority to "protect" archives and works of art. Accompanied by a team of art experts, Gernu's unit initially was instructed to search for "all works of art in France owned by the state, cities, and individuals" and to "safeguard" them in Hitler's name. Eventually, Hitler instructed the foreign office to limit the campaign to Jewish-owned collections, sparing the fine arts museums. Yet according to Albert Speer, "This restraint was not so unselfish as it seemed, for [Hitler] occasionally remarked that in a peace treaty the best pieces from the Louvre would have to be delivered to Germany as part of war reparations."¹⁹ Even though the Germans did

not seize works from fine arts museums, they confiscated several thousand objects from the Musée de l'armée (army museum), some of which France had acquired from Germany through the Treaty of Versailles.²⁰

Gerum's junta also targeted evacuated archives housed temporarily at various locations in the Loire Valley. On 11 August 1940, the unit raided archive depots in Tours and Langeais and walked away with original copies of the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain. By early December, German field police also seized documents housed in the small towns of Saint Patrice, Saint Etienne de Chigny, Luyne, and Fontevraud-l'Abbaye. Dossiers of particular interest to the Nazis were shipped to Berlin, including documents on French interwar policy toward the Rhineland, the Ruhr Valley, and territories that were now dominated by the Reich, including Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Alsace-Lorraine.²¹

The German looters easily tracked down the most important Jewish art collections in the occupied zone, whether they were located in private homes or with evacuated works in the national museum depots. A German ordinance of 15 July 1940 required collectors, dealers, and temporary guardians in the occupied zone to declare all cultural objects in their possession worth at least one hundred thousand francs. As a result, the museum office was forced to declare cases of privately owned objects that had been evacuated to art depots in the occupied zone along with the public museum collections. The Germans thus quite effortlessly obtained lists of valuable objects and their locations.²²

In some cases, Jewish collectors had agreed to carry out simulated donations to integrate their pieces into French national collections and thus, in theory, protect them from the German confiscation of private property. Following the declaration of war in 1939, Jauyard had drawn up false contracts, sometimes predating them to appear that the donation had occurred prior to the war. He used special stamps and old paper to make the donations look authentic. According to Louvre curator Germain Bazin, "It was understood that the works would be returned to [the Jewish owners] after the hostilities." There was an inherent risk in this transfer of property, Bazin adds, since one could not predict the future "nuance of the political government in place and what its attitude would be in this matter."²³

Rose Valland, a French attaché of the Direction des musées who monitored operations at the Jeu de Paume, explains in her memoirs that the Germans were not deterred by the simulated donations. Hitler de-

creed on 17 September 1940 that any donation of property to the French state after the declaration of war, 3 September 1939, was null and void. Thus, French officials needed to prove that the dates on the contracts were accurate. As Valland explains, this procedure would have required in-depth discussions with German authorities, "which never occurred. The legal battle thus seemed definitively lost despite all French efforts."²⁴ On 8 August 1940, a German police officer accompanied by two French civilian officers, who identified themselves as part of the Paris police force, demanded access to the extensive Wildenstein collection housed at the Moire chateau. Despite an interdiction barring access to the depot, the officers seized thirty-eight paintings from the collection. On 15 August 1940, Gerum and several German embassy officials inspected national museum depots in Chambord, Amboise, and Brissac. As the depot director held lists of three thousand cases but not the cases' contents, the group returned to Paris and demanded from French officials inventories of the evacuated works. Künsberg's art experts received the derailed lists on 27 August 1940 and quickly began selecting objects from Jewish collections that would be worthy of German museums, subject to Hitler's approval. Later, on 14 May 1941, the Germans seized additional works from the Wildenstein collection at the Sourches chateau in the Sarthe department, where Bazin served as depot director.²⁵

In the summer of 1940, Gerum's unit also plundered numerous objects from the French foreign office, including a bust of Frederick the Great, a statue of Napoleon at Leoben, Austria (where the Habsburgs had hosted negotiations regarding French expansion into Holland and west of the Rhine), two quills formerly used by Bismarck, a history of relations between Jesuits and the papacy, and a two-volume history of the 1409 Council of Pisa, in which church authorities unsuccessfully sought to resolve the papacy's Great Schism. Gerum's unit carefully wrapped the objects and shipped them to the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin along with numerous maps and intelligence documents.²⁶

The looters then focused their energies on Jewish homes known to hold important works of art, particularly vacant residences whose owners had fled abroad or been arrested. On 27 August 1940, the group seized fourteen paintings from the home of Georges Mandel, a Jewish parliament member who had joined other opponents to the armistice agreements on the *Massilia* and was eventually assassinated by the French militia in 1944. Two weeks later, group 627 pillaged the home of Maurice de Rothschild,

seizing more than one hundred pieces of furniture and several cases filled with works of art. By the end of August 1940, Künsberg's group had seized about fifteen hundred works and stored them in a building adjacent to the German embassy on the rue de Lille.²⁷

The plunder prompted vigorous protests from at least one German official—Franz Graf von Wolff Meternich, head of the Kunstschutz in the German army. Meternich reported the embassy's pillages to the MBF, arguing that the seizure of Jewish-owned works of art violated article forty-six of the 1907 Hague Convention, which forbade the confiscation of private property by an occupying authority. As a result, General Walther von Brauchitsch issued an order forbidding the transfer of all objects in the French museum depots.²⁸

Despite Meternich's efforts, the looting intensified. Abez and his minions soon faced competition from the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), led by Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg. On 5 July 1940, Hitler had instructed Rosenberg to seize archives and libraries from declared enemies of National Socialism. His charge was greatly expanded on 17 September 1940, when Hitler further authorized him to seize all "ownerless" works of art, including those under the protection of the French museum administration.²⁹

Rosenberg's ERR quickly eclipsed the German embassy as the pre-dominant looting agency in France. In November 1941 the administrative head of the ERR, Gerhard Utikal, issued a report outlining the agency's ideological justifications for German seizure of Jewish assets. According to Utikal, the ERR did not intentionally confiscate works owned by the French state or by non-Jews, and in any case of confusion, it promptly returned the seized pieces. The Reich, in his words, was perfectly justified in confiscating Jewish-owned assets, as "the war against the great German Reich was provoked by the global Jewry and Freemasonry, which in alliance with like-minded politicians, drove various European states and peoples into the war against Germany." By invading France, "the German army liberated the French state and people from the influence of the international Jewry." Using the Rothschild family as an example, he argued that the German origins of Jewish wealth had been "irrefutably demonstrated by history," and thus the confiscation of Jewish assets was merely a relatively insignificant "reprisal measure" against the Jews.³⁰ Similarly, Rosenberg argued that the Rothschild dynasty had robbed treasures from all parts of the world, and the ERR was merely placing the objects in safety.³¹

According to Utikal, the German seizure of Jewish assets reflected an established legal principle that in wartime, individuals have the right to use principles or reprisal measures that the enemy has already used against them. Judaic law, he argued, treats non-Jews like cattle and disregards property rights of Gentiles. Thus, in defending Jews' rights, one may not invoke the Hague Convention, which forbade the confiscation of privately owned assets: "The Jew and his property are outside the law because for millennia, he has held that all non-Jews lack all rights." Moreover, Utikal claimed, the French ought to be grateful that the Germans had not seized all Jewish assets in France, such as bank accounts and real estate. "Thanks to the German army, the French people once again are masters of important Jewish properties," including a number of historic buildings. These assets, previously "stripped from the French nation by stock market deals and deceptions," were once again available to France.³²

Even as late as August 1944, when only the most fervent Nazis continued to believe in a Reich victory, Rosenberg laid out a plan for a new European Order. "The four great civilizations," Germany, France, England, and Italy, would "back to back, adjust their interests to each other and not against each other."³³ He envisioned promoting five cultural spheres in Europe: the central Lebensraum in Germany and Austria, northern (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark), western (France, Spain, Portugal), southern (Italy, the Balkans, North African coastal areas), and eastern (to the Urals and Caucasus) spheres. Rosenberg continued to argue that "plutocratic" and "Bolshevik" Jews were "political agitators for the destruction of European culture" and believed it imperative that "all nations little by little identify with the German solution in order to prevent forever Jewish-Bolshevik development."³⁴

In solidifying his own position and fending off administrative rivals, Rosenberg solicited the protection of Göring, who stood to benefit greatly from an alliance with Rosenberg. According to their agreement, Göring would ensure adequate funding and transportation for the ERR, and in return he would have privileged access to the spoils for his personal collection. For Rosenberg, Göring's stewardship would solidify his agency's control over most of the looting operations.³⁵

In November 1940 Göring assured Rosenberg that he would "support energetically" the work of his colleagues and "give them access to transportation and personnel that was not available until now. The Luftwaffe has received orders to support fully this effort." To clear up any possible

misunderstandings about his own claims to the spoils, the Reichsmarschall explained that Hitler had approved the expansion of Göring's personal collection at his Carinhall retreat, which he would eventually bequeath to the Reich. In Göring's effort to complete his already sizable collection, which he modestly described as "perhaps the most important private collection in Germany if not all of Europe," he hoped to buy "a small number of works from seized Jewish collections," using a special fund approved by Hitler. He felt that this personal gain was entirely justified, as "unquestionably a large number of works were removed from hiding places because of my efforts."³⁶

From the fall of 1940 through the following summer, the alliance between Göring and Rosenberg proved extremely fruitful to both men. The ERR oversaw objects seized by its own men, including works collected within the M-Aktion operation, plus the objects that had been seized by the German embassy. Added to this growing cache was art found in safes and bank vaults by the *Devisenschutz Kommando*, or foreign currency protection commando. Rosenberg's agency broadened its reach to Jewish collectors who had not emigrated, were not affected by the law of 23 July 1940, and remained French citizens. One case in point is the collection of a Mlle L. Wassermann, who resided in the seventeenth arrondissement of Paris. In November 1940, German officials inventoried some seventy-five paintings stored in a Bank of France vault to which the family no longer had access. Four months later, on 12 March 1941, Germans seized the paintings but, in a curious twist of events, returned them the next day. A Lieutenant Mewer of the *Devisenschutz Kommando* questioned Mlle Wassermann: Was she French? Was her father French? Why did he buy the paintings, and were they purchased in Paris? According to Wassermann, the line of questioning "aimed to confuse us with non-French people." It is possible that the looters initially thought the vault assets belonged to a collector who had been stripped of citizenship but realized the error and returned the collection while investigating further. In the end, Wassermann's citizenship status made no difference. In the following week, all of the paintings were plundered and sent to the Jeu de Paume along with thousands of other looted objects. In a protest to the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs, Wassermann pleaded for assistance. She hoped to bolster her case by mentioning that she was a decorated World War I veteran, having served in an ambulance on the battlefield, and was an active member of the *Union nationale des combattants*. Exasperated that French citizens could be victims of outright German theft, she emphasized that she did

not want money but the return of "French artistic patrimony." The commissariat responded simply that Xavier Vallat, commissioner for Jewish affairs, had discussed the case with the French ambassador to occupying authorities, Fernand de Brinon, but could not "take effective action."³⁷

Nazi looting intensified in 1941. By the middle of the year, the Germans had confiscated about three-fourths of all objects that would be seized during the Occupation. Particularly hard hit were several members of the Rothschild family, who lost 3,978 objects. These works included world-renowned masterpieces, such as Vermeer's *Astronomer*, which Göring reserved for Hitler, and Boucher's *Portrait of Madame Pompadour*.³⁸ Although Wolff Metternich of the *Kunstschutz* was unable to halt the activity of the ERR, which operated under Göring's direct authority, he went so far as to notify the French Direction des musées of upcoming raids. On 8 April 1941, for example, Metternich informed French officials that the ERR would search the Souches chateau three days later for the David-Weill collection, one of the largest given to the Direction des musées for safekeeping. Prior to the war, David-Weill was one of the most important benefactors to the national museum administration and president of its advisory council. The German officials indeed arrived at Souches to seize his collection on 11 April, as expected by the depot director, Germain Bazin. Despite the advance warning from Wolff Metternich, Bazin was unable to prevent the Germans from taking 130 cases from the David-Weill collection.³⁹ Bazin writes very little of this important event in his memoirs. He notes simply, "I had the painful duty at Souches of giving the Rosenberg service the collection of our president of the Museum Council, David David-Weill."⁴⁰ Between 1940 and 1944, the Nazis seized a total of fourteen private collections from the evacuation depots: six from Chambord, six from Brissac, and two from Souches.⁴¹

The ERR also confiscated Polish and Czechoslovakian national libraries housed in Paris and valuable private libraries of prominent Jewish intellectuals, including historian Marc Bloch and André Maurois, a French writer who had amassed a collection of some ten thousand volumes. The Germans intended to house the books in a new Berlin library dedicated to understanding the Jewish psyche. As Rosenberg solidified his control over the growing stockpile of pillaged objects, he demanded that the German embassy relinquish the pieces that it had seized. Abertz acquiesced, keeping only pieces that Ribbentrop was authorized to hold. The embassy sent about twenty works of art to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin and

kept twenty-six "degenerate" paintings, to be used in exchanges for older works. Though the full scope of the embassy's looting remains unknown, by 30 October 1940 it had transferred some 450 cases of objects from its headquarters to the Louvre, where the ERR first deposited the growing stash of confiscated objects.⁴² In early November 1940, Jaujard allowed the ERR to transfer the works to the Jeu de Paume. The museum normally held exhibitions of foreign contemporary art but was empty at the time. In an agreement between the Kunstschutz and the French museum administration, Metternich assured Jaujard that a double inventory would be created of the works brought to the Jeu de Paume, with one copy given to French authorities, the other copy to the Germans.⁴³

As more and more pieces filled the museum, however, it became clear that the Germans had no intention of allowing French authorities to document the flow of objects. Directing this flurry of activity was the Paris head of the ERR, Kurt von Behr, whom Rose Valland described as a "cynical activist" with an "implacable personality."⁴⁴ Von Behr oversaw the art shipments in and out of the Jeu de Paume, which became a triage center where pillaged works were inventoried and sent to storage locations in Germany.

Although the Germans did not provide the inventories that Jaujard had demanded, they did allow him to appoint Valland as a French national museum attaché. She remained on-site at the Jeu de Paume as German art experts and historians fastidiously sorted and documented the looted works of art. An unassuming individual, she attracted little attention as the Germans studied the treasure filling the museum. Valland was born in 1898 to working-class parents and grew up in Saint-Etienne-de-Saint-Geoirs, a small village in the Rhône-Alpes region of southeastern France. She was a good student with ambitions that took her beyond her small hometown. Through scholarship programs, she was able to study at the prestigious Ecoles des beaux-arts in Lyon and Paris, and at the Ecole du Louvre in Paris, where she earned a master's degree in art history. These were exceptional accomplishments at the time, particularly for a woman and even more so for one outside the French social elite. In 1932 she became an *attachée bénévole* at the Jeu de Paume, meaning that she worked as a volunteer but was able to gain valuable experience by helping plan a wide range of foreign art exhibitions.⁴⁵

After the German invasion the Jeu de Paume curator, in Jaujard's words, had "retired from the museum" and Jaujard asked Valland to keep track of the ERR's activities, *coûte que coûte*, or "cost what it may." She was

paid for her work only beginning in 1941, but she immediately became an invaluable source of information, tracking the daily activities of the ERR. To the Germans, Valland merely supervised the maintenance staff, ensuring adequate light and heat in the museum and hanging works of art. Showing remarkable courage, she also secretly worked on her own inventory of the looted works after the Germans had left the museum for the night.⁴⁶

Valland knew that she was risking her life by carrying out this kind of espionage. One day while trying to note an address surreptitiously, she was startled by Bruno Lohse, a German art historian recruited by Göring to serve in the Paris ERR. Lohse reminded her that everyone working in the museum was part of a secret operation and anyone who leaked information would be taking a great risk. As Valland later reported to Jaujard, "He looked me in the eyes and said that I could be shot. I calmly replied that no one here is stupid enough to be unaware of such risks." Yet she continued to provide crucial information to Jaujard, noting the destination of art shipments in the Reich. She would eventually use these invaluable notes after the Liberation while assisting the Allied forces with the recovery of looted art in Germany.⁴⁷


Valland's work was dramatized in the 1964 film *The Train*, directed by John Frankenheimer and starring Burt Lancaster. The film is based on an August 1944 episode in which Valland helped prevent von Behr from making a final shipment to Germany, just as Allied forces were approaching Paris. She contacted French railway workers, impressing upon them the importance of keeping the train in France. The workers agreed to stage mechanical "accidents" that prevented the train from reaching the Franco-German border. After a few days of delays, which surely enraged von Behr, General Leclerc's forces were able to take over the train at the town of Aulnay in the Aube department. In a strange twist of fate, the son of Paul Rosenberg, a formerly prominent Jewish gallery owner, was part of this Allied force and discovered that works belonging to his father were among the train's precious cargo.⁴⁸

Though Valland was instrumental in repatriating thousands of pieces, her notes also reflect the tragic loss in Paris of so-called degenerate art. In July 1943, the Nazis decided to apply the artistic purification methods they had used in the Reich. While they recognized the value of some modernist works for the price they would fetch on the art market, particularly impressionist and postimpressionist paintings, the Nazis considered degenerate pieces unusable and even dangerous. The head of the ERR

technical service, Robert Scholz, traveled to Paris on a mission on 19 July, meeting with his colleagues at the Jeu de Paume, including Walter Borchers, an art expert who had recently returned to Paris from Berlin. At this meeting, the Nazis were to determine the fate of paintings that had been sequestered at the Louvre—modernist works that could be shipped to Germany, sold for a good price or, in the case of degenerate art, destroyed. Scholz and Borchers relayed a message, ostensibly from Hitler himself, that works by Courbet, Monet, Degas, and Manet would be saved, more for their monetary than aesthetic value. The ERR also created categories of paintings that could sell at a good price on the international market, including pieces by Bonnard, Vuillard, Matisse, Braque, and Dufy. While these paintings earned a kind of clemency, the ERR condemned hundreds of others as *enjuivés* (“Jewified”) and destroyed them. They targeted portraits of the Jewish elite in the Rothschild and Lévy-Hernandes families, regardless of the artist, and paintings by Masson, Miró, Klee, Ernst, Léger, Picasso, and Kisling. Nazi agents sliced the canvases with knives and piled the vandalized works in the Jeu de Paume garden. A note handwritten by Valland describes the scene, which she later called an artistic “holocaust”:

23 July 1943: The massacred paintings sequestered at the Louvre were brought back to the Jeu de Paume (in filled trucks, around five or six hundred pieces) and burned under the Germans’ watchful eye in the museum garden from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Impossible to save anything.⁴⁹



Note written by Rose Valland after watching Germans burn hundreds of “degenerate” paintings in the Jeu de Paume garden. Photo: Archives des musées nationaux, R32 1, page 116.



Paintings labeled “degenerate” by the Nazis, held at the Jeu de Paume in a space that Rose Valland dubbed the “Room of Martyrs.” Photo: Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes, Direction des archives.

Although it remains difficult to know exactly how many works of art the Nazis looted in France, Allied recovery teams in Germany located 61,233 objects from 216 French families.⁵⁰ The number of works taken from each collection varied widely. Some 5 percent of the despoiled collectors provided 75 percent of the looted works. Collections from four families—Rothschild, David-Weill, Kann, and Seligmann—together contained more than ten thousand objects. Among the pillages carried out in Paris, the vast majority took place in the capital’s prestigious western neighborhoods. Of the 131 known pillages, 13 were in the seventeenth arrondissement, 28 were in the eighth, and 70—more than half—took place in the sixteenth. Although a high percentage of works were looted from the very wealthy, the majority of despoiled collections held fewer than twenty objects.⁵¹ In response to this widespread plunder, the Vichy regime enacted legislation to assert its control over Jewish assets on French soil.

Asserting French Sovereignty

The German art pillages prompted vehement and persistent protests from a wide range of French officials, all of whom had an interest in keeping the nation's artistic patrimony on French soil. None, however, denounced the confiscation of Jewish-owned art in principle but instead argued that German looting violated French national sovereignty.

It is important to place this assertion of French sovereignty within the broader scope of the Vichy regime's anti-Semitic legislation. The regime enacted its own anti-Semitic policies, without German pressure, in order to eliminate Jewish presence from the public sphere. This objective resulted in the Jewish Statute of 3 October 1940, which excluded Jews from positions of influence—education, the arts, journalism, publishing, and the upper ranks of the civil service—and established a quota system in the liberal professions, such as law and medicine. In July 1941 a second statute widened restrictions against Jews, one of fifty anti-Semitic measures implemented in 1940 and 1941.⁵²

For Vichy leaders such as Xavier Vallat, commissioner of Jewish affairs from March 1941 to March 1942, the purge of Jews from positions of influence was necessary to protect French national culture against foreign elements and to provide employment opportunities for French citizens—"true" French people. The basis for this official anti-Semitism was more cultural than racial; decorated veterans and individuals from distinguished families repeatedly received exemptions from exclusionary measures, as they or their relatives had provided a valuable service to the French nation.⁵³

Jews who had fled the country, however, were considered traitors. Many of these émigrés had left behind sizable assets—businesses, real estate, art collections—all of which the Vichy regime sought to keep out of German hands and liquidate for its own benefit. To prevent the Germans from controlling the Jewish assets, the Vichy regime created an agency of provisional administrators, or *Service de contrôle des administrateurs provisoires* (SCADP).⁵⁴ This division established a network of Aryan (non-Jewish) trustees who managed the liquidation of Jewish assets, which would be auctioned off to Aryan buyers. This arrangement suited the Germans perfectly, as the French would handle the administrative details of Aryanization, leaving the Germans free to muscle their way into the abandoned homes and seize portable items such as works of art, books, musical instruments, and furniture.⁵⁵

Following the Vichy law of 23 July 1940 nullifying the citizenship of emigrants, another law of 5 October 1940 provided for the liquidation of emigrants' assets, which would be sold at public auction to benefit a national charity program called *Secours national* (National Aid). There was a precedent in France for this kind of seizure and public sale of "enemy" assets, a common wartime practice. During World War I, French authorities seized works of art from German nationals living in France, such as the prominent modern art dealer Daniel-Henri Kahnweiler. From 1921 to 1923, thousands of Kahnweiler's former holdings were auctioned off at the Hôtel Drouot in four different sales.⁵⁶

The state property administration within the Ministry of Finance, the *Direction générale de l'enregistrement des domaines et du timbre* (hereafter "Domaines"), managed the liquidation of Jewish assets. French finance officials at the time were concerned that the Germans were undermining the National Aid program by seizing works of art that otherwise would have been sold at public auction. Lucien Hubert, legal adviser to the French delegation for occupied territories, called the National Aid program "a work of charity and social solidarity par excellence." In order to keep expanding the fund, Hubert explained to German authorities, it was "highly desirable" that Jewish assets be liquidated in the "most methodical and useful manner."⁵⁷

Of course, this act of "social solidarity" was meant to benefit French citizens and exclude state enemies. However, in July 1941 the *Commissariat général aux questions juives* (CGQJ; Commissariat for Jewish Affairs) submitted a curious proposal. Drawing a sharp distinction between wealthy and indigent Jews, the commission regretted that some of the "obligatory measures" taken by the Vichy regime to "eliminate Jewish influence in our political and economic life" had created hardship for the less fortunate. Funds from the National Aid program, the commission argued, should also help destitute Jews: "It is both moral and reasonable that the funds to assist suffering Jews come from the liquidation of assets belonging to wealthy Jews." The commission suggested that 10 percent of the proceeds from the sale of Jewish assets could be deposited into a special fund for "Jewish solidarity." At a finance ministry meeting, a representative from National Aid, M. Hyon, opposed the idea on the grounds that it would be unwise to allot part of the resources to a specific cause without knowing how much funding would be needed overall. Furthermore, he found it "shocking" to suggest "giving resources from National Aid to the

Jews.” A representative from the public treasury, the Caisse des dépôts, explained that the CGQJ should merely request funds from his office to aid indigent Jews rather than create a separate program for Jewish solidarity. In the end, the CGQJ abandoned the proposal.⁵⁸

The Vichy regime accumulated considerable funds for National Aid through voluntary donations and the sale of seized real estate. In the 1940 winter fund-raising drive, it collected 65 million francs in donations from the unoccupied zone and 85 million from the colonies. According to a report issued by the director of the Domaines agency for the Seine department, by August 1942 his office had collected just under 888 million francs through the sale of seized assets.⁵⁹

While members of the finance administration contested the German art looting in terms of lost proceeds for National Aid, the Direction des musées sought to prevent an irreversible loss of the nation's cultural heritage. Though works of art belonging to individuals were private property, French officials still considered them part of *le patrimoine national*, a collective asset worthy of state protection. Jérôme Carcopino implored Admiral Darlan to confront the Germans on this issue, arguing that the looted collections constituted “a considerable part of the French artistic patrimony.” In a similar letter to Fernand de Brinon, Carcopino claimed that some of the “ownerless” paintings that had belonged to Jewish émigrés “would be worthy of the national collections.” Admiral Darlan also encouraged Brinon to pursue negotiations with the Germans to show the occupier that the French would not “bow down before such unjustifiable measures, which not only prevent the legal liquidation of assets that have been sequestered but also greatly harm the National Aid program and the country's *patrimoine artistique*.”⁶⁰ Various divisions of the French government thus had their own reasons for defending the cultural patrimony. As Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton put it, “The focus was no longer Jews, but a patriotic defense of French national treasure. What pushed Vichy to near panic was its sense of powerlessness.”⁶¹

Under these conditions, an unlikely coalition was developing among French officials. Jaujard, who later earned a Resistance medal, held a common interest with the Vichyite leadership, including Darlan, Carcopino, and members of the CGQJ. Vallat viewed the issue of art collections within his broader mandate to remove Jewish influence from the French economy and to liquidate Jewish assets for the National Aid program. He thus strongly opposed the German pillages and in August 1941 submitted

an impassioned report to Werner Best in the MBF. Vallat argued that the Jewish assets were private property and thus enjoyed protection under article forty-six of the Hague Convention. The French state, following the law of 5 October 1940, was not absorbing these assets but using proceeds from their sale to benefit National Aid. Jewish assets that were under the control of a provisional administrator also remained private assets, he argued, and as such also were protected under the Hague Convention.⁶²

Vallat then emphasized the important “humanitarian mission” of the National Aid program. In another stunning example of French naïveté, he suggested that these problems related to seized Jewish assets could be solved “in a very simple way”: Domaines representatives could enter the Louvre, the Jeu de Paume, and properties occupied by the Germans and inventory the cultural objects in question. The Germans would then hand over selected objects to the Domaines agents upon French request, providing a “favorable solution to problems that have arisen in this area.”⁶³

While Vallat could be seen as a potential ally to the museum office in keeping the Jewish collections out of German hands, Jaujard certainly did not want the paintings to be bought at auction by Germans who benefited from a favorable exchange rate or other foreign dealers and collectors. Under Jaujard's leadership, museum officials thus developed a strategy to acquire—*à titre définitif* (permanently)⁶⁴—certain Jewish-owned works of art for public museums. Knowing that the seized collections contained masterpieces that would be worthy of the Louvre and other public museums, Jaujard sought to prevent public sales of the most valuable works.

Joining forces with the Ministry of Finance, the Direction des musées developed a strategy in which the museum administration would exercise a *droit de préemption* (right of first refusal) of important collections that otherwise would be sold at auction. It was an idea promoted by art connoisseurs outside the museum administration. In March 1941, Louis Hauteceœur received a handwritten letter from Prince Poniatowski, a Frenchman from a noble Polish family. The letter omits his first name, but it was most likely Charles Casimir (1897–1980). A self-described collector for forty years, Poniatowski was concerned about “a very sensitive issue,” the fate of Jewish art collections that might be sold at auction, particularly from the Rothschild family. Such a sale, in his view, would be highly undesirable. But at the same time, one would not want critics of the regime to claim that the government “creates laws but does not enforce them.” The prince proposed that the state seize the works of art and distribute

them among provincial museums "that had suffered the most during the war." Drawing inspiration from Napoleon's looting, he pointed out that "Bonaparte did not *sell* seized paintings; he gave them to the Louvre." Such a policy, he argued, would surely have a positive effect on the revival of tourism.⁶⁵ Hautecoeur responded that the state lacked the authority to seize the collections outright but could acquire sequestered assets through a right of first refusal. He assured the prince that his office was requesting funds for "the eventual acquisition of these collections."⁶⁶

The museum administration's right of first refusal was not new; the office had held this right in all public art sales since 31 December 1921. During the Occupation, however, the Direction des musées had to cooperate with other French agencies involved in the liquidation of Jewish assets. In April 1941 the Domaines agency created a committee to oversee the liquidation process, the Comité supérieur de séquestres et liquidations. Jaujard served on the committee as the fine arts representative as the museum office developed its own plan for sequestering art collections. Agents from the museum administration, rather than those from Domaines, would search sequestered homes formerly owned by Jewish émigrés—even those currently occupied by the Germans. The agents then would make a list of the most valuable works for which the museum administration would exercise its right of first refusal, regardless of the objects' estimated value. Using some tricks in creative public accounting, the museum office would then pay Domaines for the works of art, and the funds would be transferred to National Aid. Trucks from the National Aid office would transfer the selected works to the Louvre, other public museums, and art storage depots. Objects not chosen by the Direction des musées would be sold at public auction "as soon as possible," with proceeds benefiting National Aid. Foreseeing German opposition to the plan, committee members would request assistance from top leaders in the Vichy government in taking "all necessary measures" to negotiate with the occupier. In the end, the museum office did not search sequestered properties but, through cooperation with the Domaines agency, was indeed able to sequester pieces from several prestigious Jewish collections in the unoccupied zone and exercise its right of first refusal.⁶⁷

The fine arts budget increased significantly in 1941 and 1942 to accommodate the planned acquisitions. In January 1941, representatives from various agencies, including Jaujard, met to discuss the liquidation of Jewish assets. At the time, Jaujard estimated that the Direction des musées

would need a special credit of 10 million francs to exercise its right of first refusal. He emphasized to Louis Hautecoeur that this first credit should not be less than 10 million, "given the importance of works of art in certain collections, particularly those from the Rothschild family."⁶⁸ However, as the Domaines agency managed to secure sizable collections in the unoccupied zone, this amount grew substantially. The Direction des musées sequestered works from prestigious collections belonging to four members of the Rothschild family (Maurice, Henri, Robert, and Edouard), Elie-Joseph Bois, Paul-Louis Weiller, Edouard Jonas, the Bonn family, Jacques-Ernest May, and—showing a willingness to seize assets from all state enemies, not just Jews—the Bonne-Foy Masonic Lodge of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.⁶⁹ The Direction des musées also exercised its right of first refusal in a unique case involving the highly covered collection of Dutch paintings belonging to the heirs of Adolphe Schloss, which I will examine separately.

By January 1942 the Ministry of Finance had approved special art acquisition credits totaling 60 million francs for the sequestered items, plus another 6 million to buy other nonsequestered objects on the art market, for a sum of 66 million francs. These credits enabled the Direction des musées to carry out its right of first refusal on sequestered collections and, at the same time, compensate National Aid. (In the end, these funds were not used to purchase works from the May, Bonn, or Schloss collections.) In comparison, the original fine arts credit for acquisitions in the 1941 and 1942 budgets was 7 million francs each year, for a total of 14 million.⁷⁰ Thus, the new credit of 66 million francs was almost five times greater than the original acquisitions credit for those two years—this during a wartime economic crisis. The finance ministry approved this stunning budgetary increase because of the importance of "keeping these works in the national patrimony."⁷¹ Although one might argue that these sums were a fictional creation of public accounting, they represent a widespread consensus among high-level officials—from committed collaborationists to active Resistance members—that the art was worth protecting through acquisition. Quiet protection of art would not necessarily require the direct intervention of various ministries and advisory councils; *pur-chasing* them does, and one can trace this cooperation in letters produced by the fine arts office, the finance ministry, and advisers to the national museum administration.

Descriptions of the sequestered collections by museum officials have been remarkably consistent, from postwar memoirs written by those who

experienced these events to more recent texts, such as the fine arts volume in the Martéoli report. All of these accounts describe the exercised right of first refusal as “simulated acquisitions” designed to keep precious works of art out of German hands. Valland explains, “It was by no means a way to profit from easy and beneficial acquisitions, but to remove threatened works of art from the German sphere of influence, by integrating them into the national collections for the occupation period.” She further denies the financial importance of the sequestrations, as the state was both debtor and creditor, asserting that the transfer of funds was “little cause for concern.” Lucie Mazauric also echoes this perspective in her memoir (1978), picked up more recently by Lynn Nicholas in *The Rape of Europa* (1994). René Huyghe boasts that he “offered to save” the private collections by sequestering them. Similarly, in the Martéoli report published in 2000, the volume on art looting submitted by the Musées de France calls the sequestered collections “the method created by French museums to attempt to shield from Nazi appetites some key elements of the national patrimony, in particular those of the Rothschild collections.”⁷²

However, a close analysis of wartime documents from the national museum archives leaves no doubt that French officials believed they were permanently acquiring these covered works of art for the Louvre and other museums. Two case studies provide particular insight into the wartime perspective of museum officials: the collections of Robert and Maurice de Rothschild (sequestered together) and the Schloss family.

The Robert and Maurice de Rothschild Sequestration

The French branch of the Rothschild family had been an important aristocratic dynasty since the early nineteenth century, when James—the son of Mayer Amschel Rothschild of Germany—settled in Paris and extended the family’s banking network in France. The family fortune in France had been built on banking, investment in railroads across Europe, and Russian oil. Its vast assets included numerous historic homes—one hundred buildings in Paris alone, the Laite and Mouton vineyards in the Bordeaux region, precious jewels, rare-book collections, and several racing stables. The Nazi confiscation of Rothschild assets in France was a tremendous coup, as the dynasty was a symbol of international Jewish wealth and political influence.⁷³

The ERR estimated that the family also held some five thousand

works of art and targeted four collections in particular. Three were owned by Rothschild cousins, all grandsons to James, born between 1868 and 1881: Edouard, Maurice, and Robert. Edouard was a partner in the Rothschild bank and considered the head of family in France. Maurice was a senator from the Hautes-Alpes who had a playboy reputation but showed fortitude in July 1940 by opposing the law that granted Pétain full powers. Robert and Edouard bought out Maurice’s share of the family bank on 26 September 1939 after a contentious and high-profile family dispute. The fourth great art collection was owned by Henri, a distant cousin from the British branch of the family who was a trained physician and lived in Paris.⁷⁴

Just as Jaujard and his colleagues sought art sanctuaries in French rural chateaux, so did the Rothschild collectors. They scattered the collections in national museum depots and placed important works in other chateaux throughout the countryside. The collectors themselves then joined the exodus. Edouard and Robert went to the United States, Maurice to Canada, and Henri, who was in Switzerland when the war began, relocated to Portugal for medical treatment. The Vichy law of 23 July 1940 stripped French citizenship from all of them, setting into motion French spoliation of their extensive assets along with the Nazi plunder.⁷⁵

By the middle of 1941, the Germans had already looted thousands of objects from the Rothschild collections in the occupied zone. In the unoccupied zone, however, French authorities were able to sequester pieces from all four collections. In April 1941 the Domaines agency seized works from Robert’s collection that had been discovered in an abandoned truck in Auvergne—Rembrandt portraits, Fragonard’s *The Kiss*, and paintings by Degas, Cézanne, Picasso, and Renoir. By July the same year, French authorities had also seized forty-six cases of art and fifty-eight tapestries owned by Maurice. The tribunal of the Hautes-Pyrénées in southwestern France had ordered the sequestration of the collector’s assets, and French authorities transferred them from the small town of Argelès-Gazost to a medieval castle in nearby Lourdes. The collection included Persian artifacts, Boucher’s *Danaë*, Fragonard’s *The Swing*, and paintings by Goya and Greuze. The Direction des musées coordinated with the Domaines agency to sequester the two collections together, storing them at the Calvin Institute in Montauban, which also held national museum pieces.⁷⁶

The standard postwar narrative, from 1944 to the present, is that the Direction des musées then pursued a fictional acquisition, with phony

public accounting, in an effort to keep these pieces out of German hands. Yet there is consistent and compelling evidence in the archives—internal documents of the Direction des musées, particularly between René Huyghe and Jacques Jaujard—that at least some French curators and fine arts officials believed they were pursuing true and durable acquisitions.

On 4 July 1941, Huyghe explained to Jaujard the impact that sequestered pieces could have on the Louvre's holdings. Highly valuable works such as those in the Robert and Maurice de Rothschild collections were becoming "more and more difficult for a museum like the Louvre to obtain." Over the past several years the Louvre had been incapable of buying the high-quality works of art that would maintain its world-class collection. "Our credits," Huyghe explained, "have not kept pace with the increase in prices." If the Direction des musées were able to obtain the sequestered works, the acquisition would not only substantially enrich museum collections but also provide a much-needed "moral benefit" to the French people: "The state's ability to maintain a growth policy for the Louvre museum would be a sign that the defeat did not lead to French laxity and that our country considers itself faithful to its civilizing mission."⁷⁷

Huyghe then analyzed the inventory of the Robert de Rothschild collection, noting the works that would best complement the Louvre's permanent collection. Of particular interest were two portraits by Rembrandt. "While the Louvre is among the top museums with Rembrandt pieces," Huyghe explained, "his early years as a portrait artist are unfortunately quite poorly represented; these two masterpieces," with a combined estimated value of 5 million francs, "would fill a gap in our collection." Another "gap would be filled" by the acquisition of a portrait by the English painter Gainsborough, estimated at 2 million francs. The collection, moreover, contained three high-quality Renoirs that were "completely different from what we have already shown to the public." One was a still life, "a veritable masterpiece with striking lyricism," all the more valuable to the Louvre, according to Huyghe, since "we do not have any still-life paintings by Renoir." *The Bathers* by Cézanne, estimated to have a value of 500,000 francs, would also complement the museum's current holdings.⁷⁸ Huyghe's language in this letter reflects the mission of the Louvre to house an encyclopedic range of objects, an idea that dates to its establishment as a national museum during the French Revolution.⁷⁹ In order to fulfill this ambitious mission, curators must constantly expand the museum's holdings and "fill gaps" in the collections.

In all, Huyghe estimated that nearly 13 million francs would be necessary to acquire the desired works of art from the Robert de Rothschild collections alone, plus a similar amount for those of Maurice de Rothschild and Edouard Jonas, another Jewish émigré. Huyghe added that it was difficult to give accurate price estimates since currency values had shifted dramatically since the beginning of the war. Thus, he deliberately gave high estimates so that "no one would suspect the state of exploiting the situation to benefit from favorable conditions."⁸⁰

At the time, Huyghe was serving as the art storage depot director at Montauban and was able to view the collections firsthand. Jaujard suggested to him that curators from the national museums "would have an interest in examining this collection soon, planning for an eventual acquisition." There were pieces of interest to the departments of art objects (sixteenth-century gold and clockwork pieces, eighteenth-century Gobelins and Beauvais tapestries), sculpture (fifteenth- and sixteenth-century statues), and Persian objects (tapestries, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century figurines).⁸¹

Thus, in October 1941, a group of French curators—Aubert, Merlin, Salles, Vandier, Mauriceau-Beaupré—traveled to Montauban, joined by a M. Porcher from the Bibliothèque nationale, who would inspect some historic manuscripts. According to Mazauric, they made the trip to decide which departments and museums would temporarily house the objects, until they could be returned to their rightful owners.⁸² Yet the tone in this correspondence does not convey an interim arrangement. The group, which included Huyghe and Chamson, discussed which museum departments would acquire the objects and even disagreed on the appropriate destinations, suggesting a long-term acquisition. Even at the end of July 1944, the curator at the decorative arts museum, Jacques Guérin, told Jaujard that he was still dissatisfied with the works destined for his collection: "I am surprised . . . that in the Maurice and Robert de Rothschild collections there were not more significant objects found for the decorative arts [museum], even considering the priority that is naturally granted to the Louvre museum. The items on the lists that you provided are so few and, based on their description, are of such mediocre quality; that I find myself forced to voice these objections."⁸³ Though the Allies had already landed at Normandy and were working their way toward Paris, and the fall of Hitler and Vichy appeared increasingly certain, disputes continued over which museum would display the sequestered items.

A Unique Case: The Schloss Collection

The curators' belief that they were pursuing true acquisitions is also evident in the case of the Schloss collection, a coveted cache of more than three hundred paintings by Dutch and Flemish painters, from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries. This case provides a unique example, as the collection's Jewish owners remained in France during the Occupation and maintained their French citizenship. The museum administration exercised its right of first refusal on forty-nine paintings in the collection, yet the sequestration is entirely absent from the Marttéli report. The reason may be that the collection did not have the same legal status as the other sequestered collections. Since the owners were citizens, the collection escaped provisions of the 5 October 1940 law that allowed the French state to liquidate assets of Jews who had lost their citizenship. Thus, it is not included in the report's analysis of sequestered art. Through a complicated turn of events, however, the Direction des musées temporarily held pieces from the collection, aggressively pursuing a permanent acquisition for the Louvre. The events surrounding the Schloss collection, therefore, are best understood in light of the wartime policy toward sequestered objects.⁸⁴

The stunning art collection contained 333 works by Dutch and Flemish old masters—precisely the period and “Germanic” style most covered by Göring and other Nazi collectors. Adolphe Schloss, a Jewish emigrant from Austria who acquired French citizenship in 1871, had amassed a significant fortune in the late nineteenth century as a commodities broker. He painstakingly built the vast art collection, which included paintings by minor Dutch artists and some works attributed to Rembrandt, Rubens, Ruisdael, Van Dyck, Van der Neer, and Frans Hals. Schloss displayed the paintings at the family's luxurious *hôtel particulier* (private townhouse) on the avenue Henri-Martin in Paris, and the collection earned an international reputation for its quantity and quality. On the eve of the Second World War, art experts generally agreed that it was the finest Dutch art collection in France.⁸⁵

Adolphe Schloss died in 1911, leaving the collection to his wife, Lucie. In the late 1930s, René Huyghe learned that Mme Schloss was willing to donate or sell part of the collection to the Louvre. He met with her in person, wisely cultivating a relationship between curator and patron, and secured an oral agreement that she would donate several paintings to the Louvre. However, she passed away in November 1938 before making the donation and left the collection to five adult heirs. As there was

no record of Huyghe's oral agreement with Mme Schloss, the heirs felt no obligation to honor it.⁸⁶ When war with Germany appeared imminent the following year, the oldest son, Lucien, moved the collection from Paris to the chateau of Chambon near Tulle in the Corrèze department (not to be confused with Le Chambon-sur-Lignon in the Auvergne, where villagers sheltered thousands of Jews). A trusted friend of the family, Maurice Renaud, owned the property and was also head of the Jordan bank in Paris. The chateau thus seemed a safe hiding place both for the art collection and some Jewish bank assets. And for the first two years of the Occupation, the art collection indeed remained safe from military operations and Nazi looting.⁸⁷

But Vichy and German authorities alike knew that the valuable collection had been hidden somewhere in the unoccupied zone, and both sides scrambled to locate it. For Pierre Laval, the collection could provide much-needed leverage with the Nazis, not to mention millions of francs for the state budget. In March 1943 he instructed the CGQJ to launch the search from the French side. The radically anti-Semitic Louis Darquier de Pellepoix had replaced Xavier Vallat, whom the Nazis had considered too moderate, as director of the CGQJ in May 1942. From the German side, Hitler and Göring both had a keen interest in locating the collection, and Gestapo agents were told to use all means at their disposal to find it.⁸⁸

The role of French agents in the ensuing pillage is remarkable, dispelling notions that looting in France was merely “a German affair.”⁸⁹ On 8 April 1943, Henry Schloss, one of Adolphe's sons, and his wife were at a bus station in Nice, heading to a funeral, when they were forced into a car. Inside the car were Edmond Favier, the commissioner of Jewish Affairs for Marseille; Georges Perrier, a police inspector; and Jean-François Lefranc, an art dealer. They said Laval himself had ordered Henry's arrest, demanding that he reveal the location of the hidden art collection. The group went to Henry's villa in Saint-Jean-Cap-Ferrat, where Lefranc further demanded to know where Henry's brother Lucien was residing. Henry feigned ignorance when, as luck would have it for Lefranc, a telegram arrived from Lucien, with the sender's address in Lamastre. A French police report indicates that Lefranc told Favier, “Don't worry about Lucien; the Germans will take care of him.” When Henry refused to reveal the location of the art collection, he was imprisoned in Marseille. German authorities also arrested Lucien in Lamastre, and both brothers received trumped-up charges of “Gaullist intrigues.”⁹⁰

The actual plunder of the art collection was a combined Franco-German effort, though far from a friendly collaboration. Lefranc was a wily businessman who took on the role of detective to find the collection and was able to track down a key witness who knew approximately where it was hidden: the truck driver who had transported it from Paris. Lefranc knew the collection was somewhere near Tulle and suspected it was in the chateau of Chambon. Darquier named Lefranc provisional administrator for the collection and instructed the prefect of the Corrèze département, Fernand Musso, to provide a requisition order that would enable Lefranc to seize it.⁹¹ On 10 April 1943, Lefranc, Favier, and Perrier went to the chateau and presented the requisition order to Henri Tixier, who turned out to be director of the storage depot there for the Jordan bank. Tixier was unable to prevent the men from searching the chateau, where they found the cache of paintings in the strong room, along with other Jewish assets. They placed seals on the eighteen cases of paintings and left them in the chateau as Lefranc strategized his next move. He went to Paris to arrange the transfer, convincing Darquier that the paintings must be evaluated by experts there. But Lefranc was playing a double game, having already contacted Bruno Lohse in the ERR, to offer his services in locating hidden art collections. Lefranc, naturally, would require a share of the loot for his efforts. A rather naïve Darquier, most likely unaware of Lefranc's scheming with the Germans, also met with Von Behr and Lohse to discuss the planned transfer of the Schloss collection to Paris, seeking reassurance that the ERR would not interfere in French management of it. Lohse reported the French demands to Göring, who was "very interested in the collection," and authorized Lohse to satisfy Darquier's request.⁹² Lohse thus gave Darquier "his word" and a written confirmation that the Nazi agency would not disrupt the French operation. Meanwhile, Abel Bonnard had learned of the discovered collection and ordered the provisional administrator of the chateau, Jean Petit (appointed by Lefranc himself), to keep the collection on-site and wait for further instructions.⁹³

Yet once again, Germans took control of the plunder, illustrating the rivalry between experts loyal to Göring and those working for Hitler on the Linz project.⁹⁴ On 15 April, Petit learned that police inspectors "from Paris" had traveled to the Corrèze to seize the collection. The next afternoon a moving truck and a luxury Salomon convertible carrying several men stopped in front of the chateau. An "Alsatian" police officer with a

strong German accent got out of the convertible, accompanied by Favier, Petit, and four armed French police agents. The Alsatian presented a phony French police identity card and informed the chateau owner, Maurice Renard, that the agents were seizing Jewish assets stored there. Petit protested to no avail, having received instructions to bar the paintings' removal. The Alsatian turned out to be Emil Hess, an officer in the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst, security service of the SS). (The more famous Rudolf Hess was at the time a prisoner of war in Britain.) The French "police-men" were members of the notorious French Gestapo of the rue Lauriston, nicknamed the "Bonny-Lafont" gang after its leaders. Lohse would later claim that the Germans had respected a Vichy demand that French agents oversee the transfer, but Lefranc was unable to provide a suitable truck. As the collection was in the so-called unoccupied zone, Von Behr arranged a civilian rather than military escort led by Hess. French workers loaded all the paintings into the moving truck, owned by a French company based in Tulle, and the agents set off for Paris with the Schloss collection and Petit, perhaps against his will.⁹⁵

Yet once the prefect Musso learned of the seizure, he alerted Laval and ordered French police forces to halt the two vehicles, which they did near Limoges. After a tense standoff between the armed agents on both sides, Hess directed the convoy to an occupied army base in Tulle (the Germans had occupied all of the French territory in November 1942, following Allied landings in North Africa). Both Laval and Pétain demanded that forces under the German commandant in the southern zone return the collection to Chambon. Warning to "avoid controversy,"⁹⁶ Göring ordered Lohse to contact S.D. forces in Limoges and relinquish the collection to Lefranc, who placed it in the city's Bank of France vaults.⁹⁷ It was a significant concession by Göring to release the collection, even temporarily. Though Göring's methods may appear rapacious, Petropoulos points out that the Reichsmarschall actually sought to maintain an outward appearance of respectability when acquiring art, and he may have felt an obligation to acknowledge French sovereignty in the southern zone.⁹⁸ Because the collection was found there and belonged to French citizens, the German embassy would need to negotiate with Vichy; Göring could not act alone.⁹⁹ Also, by mid-1943 his influence was waning in the Reich, supplanted by that of Himmler and the SS, and Martin Bormann in the Nazi Party Chancellery. The status of Bormann, in particular, rose during the war, as he also was Hitler's private secretary

and financial manager of the Linz project. No Nazi leader could seize a collection so coveted by Hitler and his Linz curators—certainly not Göring in 1943.

The collection stayed in Limoges for several weeks as French and German officials planned their next steps.¹⁰⁰ On the French side, the Direction des musées had a crucial opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal on the Schloss collection. René Huyghe explained to Jaujard that “specialists around the entire world” were familiar with the collection and that it should not be “sold or removed from France without the Louvre keeping some key pieces [*quelques pièces capitales*].”¹⁰¹ Yet museum officials needed to work with the Jewish affairs agency to manage the liquidation. On 10 June 1943, René Huyghe and Germain Bazin first met with Louis Hautecœur, who as fine arts director had the administrative clout to discuss the matter with both Darquier and Laval. Hautecœur informed Laval of the Louvre’s desire to exercise the right of first refusal and arranged a meeting for Darquier, Bazin, and Huyghe, which took place on 17 June. Huyghe explained to Darquier that before the war Lucie Schloss had agreed to donate some paintings to the Louvre. This oral agreement, according to Huyghe, gave the Direction des musées “legal rights” as well as “special *moral rights* to certain pieces in the ensemble.”¹⁰² Persuaded by Huyghe’s arguments, Darquier supported the Louvre’s plan to purchase some pieces but wanted to secure Laval’s approval as well, knowing the collection was of keen interest to Hitler. The following day, Laval approved the transfer of the collection to Paris, where it could be inspected and evaluated.¹⁰³

On 9 August, Jaujard requested Bonnard’s approval to sequester the Schloss paintings in the same manner used for the Maurice and Robert Rothschild collections. Given the “exceptional importance of the Schloss collection, considered by those who are familiar with it as worthy of the national patrimony,” he urged Hautecœur to secure Bonnard’s quick approval of the plan. This would then enable the Direction des musées to work with the Domaines administration in liquidating the collection.¹⁰⁴ The next day, Jaujard wrote to Bonnard directly, clarifying that at no point did the Direction des musées negotiate with German authorities regarding their right of first refusal.¹⁰⁵ This side of the liquidation was a *French* affair. With Bonnard’s authorization, on 10 August 1943 the chauffeur Néric, who had transported the collection from Paris to the chateau of Chambon, took it from Limoges to the Aryanized Louis Dreyfus bank in Paris, which served as a CGQJ depot.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, the Germans allowed the French to select paintings first, another remarkable concession, given the ferocity of Nazi looting over the previous three years. Göring, not Hitler, initially had consented to the terms presented by the French, perhaps wagering that it was best to allow the Louvre to choose a limited number of pieces and still acquire quality paintings for his own collection. When Hitler learned of the events in Limoges, however, he was furious, abhorring the thought of receiving mere French rejects. Yet he allowed plans for the French selection to move forward, ordering Bormann’s staff to acquire remaining pieces for the Linz collection.¹⁰⁷ The affair had caused considerable embarrassment at Hitler’s headquarters, and no one in German services wanted to accept responsibility for it. Even the administrative head of the ERR, Gerhard Utikal, denied involvement in the deal and protested Göring’s handling of it to the Reich Chancellery. Göring in turn blamed Lohse and other underlings in Paris.¹⁰⁸

Louvre curators thus were able to exercise the right of first refusal with Hitler’s acquiescence. Between 13 and 23 August 1943, representatives from several French agencies created an inventory of the Schloss collection. These officials included Huyghe and Bazin representing the Louvre, Lefranc, police officials, and members of the CGQJ. Huyghe and Bazin were in the enviable position of choosing the best pieces for the Louvre. They selected forty-nine works, for which the Direction des musées would pay an estimated 19 million francs. Ever since, French accounts of the selection process have been similar to those regarding the sequestered Jewish collections, in that they describe the procedure as a way to keep precious works of art away from the Nazis, enabling the museum office later to return the works to Jewish owners.¹⁰⁹ However, wartime and postwar correspondence reveals that Huyghe, Jaujard, and their colleagues were pursuing a permanent acquisition for the Louvre that, in their minds, would greatly enhance the museum’s collection and ensure its status as a world-class institution.

Huyghe, in particular, appears to have maintained this belief, quite enthusiastically, well into 1944. Having surveyed the collection, he wrote an extensive report to Jaujard explaining the urgency of this acquisition and the importance of receiving the special credit from the finance ministry. The Schloss collection included paintings by great masters, “the absence of which we have long regretted at the Louvre and which have become extremely rare.” He cited the example of a *Pietà* by Petrus Christus and works by Rembrandt, Ruysdael, Van der Neer, Brouwer, Van der Heyden, and Jan Bruegel the Elder. The Louvre already held some works

by these artists, Huyghe explained, but the works that he and Bazin had selected for purchase would further enhance the museum's collection. A landscape by Rembrandt, for example, "allows us to fill a notable gap that we have not hoped to be able to address, as there are only about a dozen known landscapes by this master."¹¹⁰

For Huyghe, the acquisition would also enable the Louvre to fulfill an important educational mission. He wrote to Jaujard, "You know that I have always wanted the Louvre museum not only to show interest in masterpieces that are vital to its prestige, but also to complete its collections from a historical standpoint." Paintings at the Louvre create "the world's Pinacotheca where one can study all schools of painting with the fewest gaps," giving the Louvre an "imperious duty" to complete collections "each time it is possible for us to do so." He continues, "I cannot argue strongly enough that this group of works be acquired for our museum through a special credit. . . . It would be deplorable if this entire collection went abroad, which will surely happen if the Louvre does not keep a portion of it." With "this acquisition, the Louvre's gallery of Dutch painting . . . would become the top Dutch gallery in the world, just after the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam and the Mauritshuis at The Hague. It thus would greatly enhance our museum's prestige."¹¹¹

Paintings chosen by Bazin and Huyghe included a Rembrandt landscape, *Venus and Cupid* by Jan Gossaert, three portraits by Corneille de Lyon (a.k.a. Corneille de la Haye), and *Enchanted Island* by Jan Bruegel the Elder. On 13 September 1943, Abel Bonnard approved the acquisition and the forty-nine paintings remained in the hands of the Direction des musées.¹¹² The key French players in this story—Jaujard, Huyghe, Lefranc, and Bonnard—all were pleased by the outcome. Lefranc proclaimed to Bonnard that the deal benefited France, as "the national museums could enrich their collections from the Dutch period with forty-nine paintings of exceptional quality, including one of the rare Rembrandt landscapes." He also felt that the arrangement would benefit all of Europe: "We should also congratulate ourselves if the majority of paintings in the collection go to the museums of a country with an old culture, our neighbor."¹¹³ Hitler did not view the affair quite so favorably, though the director of Bavarian museums, Ernst Buchner, reassured him that the pieces destined for Linz were indeed high quality.¹¹⁴

Officials in various French administrations worked to finalize payment for the paintings—another indication that they expected the Direc-

tion des musées to acquire them permanently. The advisory committee and technical council of the national museums both unanimously approved the acquisition of the forty-nine paintings in their meetings of 30 September and 6 October 1943, respectively.¹¹⁵ The head of the technical council, Gabriel Cognacq, urged Finance Minister Pierre Cathala to sign the decree that would provide funding needed by the Direction des musées. He underscored the urgency of the situation: "We would be sorry if these extremely important paintings, which would make the Louvre collection of canvases in the Dutch school the most complete in the world, went to foreign museums!"¹¹⁶ On 29 March 1944, Bonnard further urged the budget office to settle the payment, and approval finally came at the end of April. The funds were not transferred before the Liberation, but the fact remains that fine arts officials persistently sought to settle the payment and the budget office approved it; in the minds of these men, the payment was not fictional.¹¹⁷

When Louvre curators went to the Dreyfus bank to collect the chosen paintings, they encountered German officials from various services: art experts Erhard Goepel and Bruno Lohse, Helmuth von Hummel representing Bormann, and Rudolf Schleier of the German embassy in Paris.¹¹⁸ Curators working with Voss on the Linz museum project bought most of the remaining paintings, with funds paid to the CGQJ, and sent them to the Jeu de Paume.¹¹⁹ The Germans considered the estimated price of 60 million francs "very favorable" and noted that the "general atmosphere for negotiations" was "extremely amicable since the Louvre was freely able to choose some pieces." Lefranc had proposed a deal with Lohse: Lefranc would help the Germans find hidden art collections and receive 25 percent of objects located in the occupied zone and 50 percent of those found in the unoccupied zone. His cut of the Schloss collection was far less, but he was indeed rewarded with twenty-two paintings, which he promptly sold on the booming Paris art market.¹²⁰

After the Liberation, in 1947, Lefranc would be sentenced to five years in prison for his shady dealings.¹²¹ But in May 1944 Huyghe effusively praised him for facilitating the Schloss acquisition. As referenced in the Introduction, he wrote a friendly note to Lefranc expressing remorse that he had not been able to thank him in person while Huyghe was briefly in Paris:

I greatly regret it because I would have liked to shake your hand and tell you how much I appreciate all of your dedication in promoting the Louvre's interests in the Schloss

affair. I assure you that I have not forgotten the difficulties in the negotiations you pursued, remaining constantly aware of our interests, and the very effective role you played in getting into the Louvre some masterpieces that greatly enhance the value of our Dutch gallery.¹²²

Given the context of May 1944, when the Allied landing was widely anticipated and the Nazi defeat increasingly likely, Huyghe clearly did not expect to return the paintings to the Schloss family. The office of Abel Bonnard provided another gracious note to Lefranc: "I should like to express my thanks, not only for your scrupulous probity but also the zealousness with which you achieved this result."¹²³

The Direction des musées thus benefited, at least temporarily, from a partnership with Lefranc, a rogue who enriched himself through Vichy's Aryanization program. In doing so, they also negotiated with Darquier, who led Vichy's anti-Semitic agency during the regime's collaboration in genocide and later claimed that only lice were killed at Auschwitz.¹²⁴ A defender of the Direction des musées might argue that Huyghe and his colleagues strategically played a double game to keep at least some of the paintings on French soil, safeguarding them until they could be returned to the Schloss family. This line of thinking, however, is untenable given numerous internal Direction des musées documents and correspondence with Lefranc that reflect the officials' elation at the prospect of permanently acquiring the paintings for the Louvre. Furthermore, after the Liberation, museum officials held the paintings for nearly two years while Huyghe unsuccessfully tried to persuade the family to sell or donate some pieces to the Louvre, a point to which we shall return.

I have found no evidence that French museum officials discussed any kind of acquisition plan regarding the collections that were placed in the national museum depots for safekeeping. Jaujard's efforts to protect the collections in 1939 and 1940, partly through the false donations, appear to be genuine. It was only after the implementation of the Vichy regime's anti-Semitic laws, after extensive German looting was under way and the French developed an administration devoted to the liquidation of Jewish assets, when *le patrimoine* was seriously threatened, that any language of "acquisition" or "enriching collections" appears in French correspondence.

An important distinction must also be made between individuals who seized art in wartime France out of ideological zeal or personal profit and those who sought to expand public museum collections. Whereas the Nazis under the leadership of Rosenberg and Göring were driven by an

ideological quest, linked to their goal to eliminate altogether the European Jewry, and scoundrels like Lefranc enriched themselves enormously through the sale of art, there is no evidence that French museum officials were motivated by ideology or personal greed. Rather, it was a case of institutional opportunism—not for individual profit but for the enrichment of French museums.¹²⁵ Their ultimate objective may have been noble, to preserve *le patrimoine* and make it available for public display and education. But the fact remains that they sought to exploit the liquidation of Jewish collections. Some curators and staff members such as Valland may have genuinely believed that Jaujard and Huyghe always meant the acquisition to be temporary, until the paintings could be returned to the Jewish owners. However, as we will see in Chapter 11, the recent accounts published by the Musées de France that reiterate this perspective, in a time of hailed transparency, are seriously flawed.¹²⁶

Outside the museum administration, numerous French dealers and gallery owners sought to make a quick profit from the confiscated works of art. Unaffected by Vichy's exclusionary laws, they benefited from the flourishing art market and were willing accessories in the sale of plundered works. Some, like Lefranc, profited by serving as provisional administrators of seized galleries for the CGQJ. An estimated 80 percent of French dealers, moreover, sold works to German buyers during the Occupation, many knowing that the pieces came from looted collections, and often without recording the transactions.¹²⁷

The Art Market Boom

For most people living in France, the war's outbreak in 1939 began a period of instability, insecurity, hunger, and deprivation. For many art dealers, however, the Occupation provided unprecedented prosperity. Parisian galleries and auction houses had just begun to recover from the debilitating economic crisis of the 1930s when the conflict began. As inflation rose, the value of the franc plummeted and consumer goods grew increasingly scarce. In this uncertain financial environment, art became a safe investment. Unlike other assets, high-quality works of art were likely to appreciate, and they were often easy to transport and hide from tax agents. Art was even commonly used as currency in international trade agreements. As Raymonde Moulin explains, "A deed of sale for a painting could easily compensate a banker for handling an overseas financial transaction."¹²⁸

A number of French art dealers gained huge profits during the Occupation as eager buyers drove up prices. In 1941 and 1942 the Hôtel Drouot auction house in Paris alone sold more than a million objects. Small, decorative paintings were particularly popular, along with landscapes and still-life paintings. Works by Dutch masters sold for the highest prices, but modern paintings by Degas, Renoir, Cézanne, and Seurat skyrocketed in value. In December 1942, for example, Hôtel Drouot auctioned works from the estate of dentist Georges Viau, an avid impressionist collector, for more than 53 million francs, with one Cézanne landscape alone fetching 5 million. Prices only went up from there. By March 1944, some modern paintings sold for 50 percent more than the price paid for comparable works in 1942.¹²⁹

This prosperity in the art world, however, was limited to a privileged and particularly savvy segment of the population. Jews, communists, and Freemasons were banned from all aspects of art production and commerce. Excluded artists were not allowed to exhibit or sell works in galleries, and Jewish gallery owners and dealers were forced to close down their businesses. Prominent gallery owners Paul Rosenberg and Georges Wildenstein fled for the United States, lost their French citizenship, and suffered huge financial losses when German and French authorities confiscated their holdings in France. Other galleries remained in business under new names. Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler sold his Galerie Simon to his non-Jewish sister-in-law, Louise Leiris, an arrangement that allowed the gallery to operate under her name. For non-Jews, the exclusionary laws created some new opportunities. Ambitious dealers and gallery owners replaced their Jewish counterparts through Aryanization initiatives, at times further profiting from sales of art seized from Jewish collections.¹³⁰

The Germans fed the art market boom in Paris, boosting supply by selling looted works that did not suit the tastes of Nazi collectors. Dealers working for Hitler and Göring also purchased works at a lopsided exchange rate set by the armistice agreements that greatly favored the Germans. This system was made possible by the willing cooperation of numerous German and French art historians and experts who appraised objects, and dealers who were willing to sell them, often fully aware that they came from looted collections. Nazi leaders relied on the assistance of German dealers who either lived in Paris or had extensive contacts in the French capital. For example, Walter Bornheim of the Galerie der Alte Kunst in Munich assisted Göring with some of his purchases. Karl Haber-

stock, a prominent German dealer based in Berlin, siphoned off more than a hundred works for Hitler and the Linz curators. Other curators from long-established German museums such as the Nationalgalerie in Berlin also shopped for new acquisitions in Paris. The Dutch art market experienced a similar boom, as dealers hunted down coveted pieces for Nazi chieftains.¹³¹

Alarmed by the unusually high number of objects being sold to Germans and other foreign buyers, French authorities sought to implement export restrictions on older works that were considered part of the French cultural patrimony. The effort to restrict the flow of art involved not only the fine arts division but also the Ministry of Industrial Production, which oversaw domestic commerce; the finance ministry for its role in managing international commerce; the French customs office; and the CGQJ, which sought to facilitate all transfers of Jewish assets. Jean-François Le-franc explained the export problem to Darquier as a “veritable hemorrhage,” an “irreparable loss for our national patrimony as well as a material loss totaling billions of francs.”¹³²

Concerns about the art market’s threat to the nation’s cultural heritage prompted a law of 23 June 1941 restricting the exportation of certain works. Although the law was implemented under unusual circumstances, it was not a new idea. Spain and Italy had similar laws in effect, and France had already tried to enforce export restrictions. A French law of 31 August 1920 had required export visas for works of art, but it was repealed in December 1921 because of logistical difficulties encountered by French customs services.¹³³ Louis Hautecoeur first proposed the new export law to Jérôme Carcopino in March 1941. He was prompted to do so by impending sales of works emanating from pillaged and sequestered Jewish collections. Hautecoeur argued in an apparent oxymoron that these works were among “the most precious of our private patrimony [*notre patrimoine privé*].” Here, he is not referring to the private assets of Jewish collectors—an individual or family’s financial patrimony—but privately owned works of art that are part of the French national patrimony.¹³⁴

While one might expect Hautecoeur to underscore the flow of art across the Rhine, he was particularly alarmed by the potential threat of wealthy buyers across the Atlantic. He reminded Carcopino that in the 1930s American financier Andrew Mellon had acquired from the Hermitage Museum works by Van Eyck, Rembrandt, Raphael, and Leonardo da Vinci for 125 million francs. Fine arts officials were acutely aware that by

1940, the center of the art world was already shifting from Paris to New York. Although sales to German buyers easily outpaced those to Americans during the Occupation, particularly after the United States entered the war in December 1941, Hautecoeur sought to stem the flow of art to both countries. He asked Carcopino, "Should we take a risk and watch foreign countries—that is to say, the United States and perhaps Germany, which has millions to spend from Occupation payments, buy hundreds of pieces that were among our nation's treasures?" The only way to prevent such a loss, he argued, was to take immediate measures and "temporarily ban art exports."¹³⁵

Hautecoeur suggested that the administration could model the new legislation on the Spanish system. Individuals who wished to export a work of art of "national historic or artistic interest" would be required to obtain authorization from the fine arts administration, which had one month to review the dossier. If no response was issued within this time period, the export visa would be granted by default. The new law also incorporated Hautecoeur's view that the ban should apply to works created before 1900, a parameter that included impressionist and postimpressionist works while exempting more recent objects. Hautecoeur claimed that this exemption would allow French dealers to generate income by exporting contemporary works. But it also reveals an aesthetic distinction between older and more recent works, which in his view were not truly part of the French *patrimoine*. The export ban thus applied to furniture created before 1830 along with paintings, engravings, drawings, sculptures, and decorative objects created before 1900. The law also banned exports of archaeological objects found in metropolitan France and Algeria. According to the new regulations, the seller would provide an estimated value of the object, which the state could choose to buy at the stated price. Once sellers received the export authorization, they paid a 5 percent tax on the items, which was designed to prevent sellers from exaggerating the works' value. The fine arts administration would use the tax proceeds to acquire works of art that otherwise would be exported. Any illegal attempt to export protected works would be punished by a fine at least equal to and at most double the value of the work, which would be impounded.¹³⁶

Although the law initially may have appeared to solve the export problem, several factors stymied its implementation throughout the Occupation. Most important, and not surprisingly, the Germans opposed it. All cultural legislation applicable to the occupied zone first had to be

reviewed and approved by Jonathan Schmid, head of the administrative staff in the MBF. Knowing that the Germans would not accept the law in its original form, Carcopino developed a compromise known as the "Carcopino-Schmid accord." This "accord" was actually a letter from Carcopino to Schmid dated 15 July 1941, in which the former exempted exports to Germany for the duration of the war. Carcopino wrote:

I declare by the present letter in the name of my government that . . . the aforementioned law as applied in the occupied zone will not oppose the exportation of works of art to collectors living in the German Reich and in other territories where Franco-German accords are in effect, that is: Danzig, Eupen, Malmédy, Moresnet, the protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, and the eastern annexed territories.¹³⁷

He allowed this exemption on the condition that Schmid would not require an amendment to the law itself stating the exemption, which might prompt foreign dealers to funnel all of their imports from France through Germany. In reality, however, most exports indeed were going to the Reich; Germany's exemption from the law virtually nullified it.

Moreover, the law created widespread confusion among French civil servants. The director of customs, J. Leroi, was not consulted about technical aspects of the law and pointed out several major flaws. First, he opposed the visa application procedures, according to which works of art would be stored in the customs office, potentially creating security problems. He also found that the law duplicated other measures that already banned the exportation of works created before 1801. "The new measures," he explained, "add nothing to measures already taken" to protect "our national artistic patrimony." Far from increasing the powers of the government in limiting exports, the law "would reduce them considerably with regard to German sales, that is, those sales that require the closest vigilance." Leroi suggested that the state should "repeal purely and simply the law of 23 June 1941." In addition, the original text stated that an administrative decree would detail the law's implementation. Since no decree was ever published, some officials claimed that the law was never truly in effect. Despite this significant detail, the fine arts administration worked to implement the law anyway, at times even applying it to German exports, despite the Carcopino-Schmid accord.¹³⁸

As there was little consistency in the export law's implementation, it seems to have created more administrative confusion than genuine protection of the cultural patrimony. The most clever buyers and sellers simply

learned to work around the bureaucratic entanglements. Many sold or exchanged works on the black market, ignoring the export regulations altogether. Létranc reported to the CGQ that a highly organized network in Spain illegally received works of art from France and rerouted them to the United States. Dealers also clandestinely exported works to Switzerland, passed them off as Swiss works, and transferred them across the French border once again into Spain, where they finally were shipped to American collectors.¹³⁹

One case in particular illustrates the inability of French legislation to halt the exports. It involved a seventeenth-century Gobelins tapestry known as *Dance of the Satyrs*. In January 1943 Werner Grote-Hasenbalg, an art dealer in Berlin and official buyer for the governor of Danzig and western Prussia, submitted an application to buy the tapestry for 1.2 million francs. Had officials truly followed the Carcopino-Schmid accord, the application would have been unnecessary since the sale involved a German buyer. Nonetheless, officials on both sides continued with the application process. The fine arts administration inadvertently let pass the one-month review period without issuing a decision. Realizing the error, which involved a piece of significant historic interest, the domestic commerce office of the Ministry of Industrial Production asked Grote-Hasenbalg to resubmit the application. He agreed to do so, and in the meantime, Guillaume Janneau, head of the fine arts division charged with the conservation of furniture and tapestries (*Mobilier national*), reviewed the dossier and determined that the work was "a precious document for the history of French tapestry, and no similar piece from this time period is in the national collections."¹⁴⁰ Thus, the education ministry denied the export request.¹⁴¹

However, Grote-Hasenbalg claimed to have understood that the letter from the commerce office was in fact an export authorization and the second application was a mere formality. He proceeded with the shipment and even resold the tapestry after it arrived in Berlin. Several meetings ensued among French and German cultural officials as the French sought to requisition the tapestry. A German official from the Kunstschutz of the MBF, Hans Möbius, proposed to Janneau an exchange: Germany would return the *Dance of the Satyrs* on condition that the French provided a tapestry of equal value and beauty. Janneau believed this would be an effective solution for both sides, provided that the tapestry had not been destroyed in recent Allied bombing of Berlin. However, in March 1944 the

Germans refused the first tapestry proposed by Janneau, and the exchange was never carried out. Bureaucratic confusion thus allowed part of the artistic patrimony to slip away to Germany.¹⁴²

In November 1942 officials at the finance ministry, still alarmed by the number of works of art being shipped to Germany, suggested that the French administration create a maximum annual value for art exports to the Reich. Louis Haecoeur relayed the idea to Abel Bonnard, explaining that unless the administration established limits on exports to Germany, "the impoverishment of the national patrimony" would compound "the impoverishment of the French market." Germany had imposed a similar restriction on exports to France in the mid-1930s, establishing a maximum annual value of 2 million francs. Bonnard supported the idea in principle, but negotiations never took place and no ceiling was established.¹⁴³

Despite Haecoeur's efforts, numerous works of art flowed to Germany, legally and illegally. Of the known art exports in the first half of 1942, pieces worth 18 million francs went to Germany alone, a full 80 percent of the overall value of exports (22.5 million francs). One inventory shows fifty-six shipments to the Reich between November 1942 and 10 February 1943, worth more than 31 million francs. The list includes a request by a dealer named Schirthof to export "furniture and tapestries" worth 6,586,480 francs; another dealer's application to ship "nineteenth-century paintings" worth 11,512,880; and the above-mentioned tapestry bought by Grote-Hasenbalg for 1.2 million.¹⁴⁴ Despite the law's limited impact during the Occupation, it was validated by the postwar provisional government and remained in effect until 1992, when it was replaced by European Economic Community legislation.¹⁴⁵

The Vichy regime's approach to Jewish art collections shows the extent to which notions of public and private blurred in its defense of *le patrimoine national*. French officials believed that the nation's cultural heritage lay not only in public museums but also in private collections threatened by Nazi looting. French officials tried all diplomatic channels to protest German pillaging of Jewish collections, not in defense of the owners' private interests but in defense of French sovereignty and cultural heritage. Various government divisions sought to seize the works of art themselves, either to benefit the National Aid program or to enrich public museum collections. A central goal of the museum administration was to

prevent an exodus of masterpieces to foreign collections abroad by banning exports and exercising its right of first refusal in public art sales.

By purchasing works that otherwise would have gone to auction, the museum office hoped to enrich collections in the Louvre and other public museums, not as a temporary wartime measure but permanently. In a wartime example of patrimonialism, Jauyard, Huyghe, and their colleagues opportunisticly pursued museum acquisitions that potentially could harm the interests of the Vichy regime's Jewish victims. One could argue that they did indeed keep important works of art on French soil, thus saving them from the Nazis and possible disappearance or destruction in Germany. However, I wish to emphasize the justifications behind their actions: the defense of national treasures for the common good. Officials were very quick to make plans to acquire the works for museums, and they were not playing a double game—for example, using the language of national sovereignty to appease Laval or the Nazis, while protecting Jewish assets. Rather, they aggressively pursued the acquisitions from seized collections, hoping for a revival of the Louvre's international stature and taking advantage of an unforeseen opportunity to expand French museum collections.

Though the Nazis limited wide-scale looting to privately owned art collections, they sought to acquire certain key pieces from the Louvre and other national museums through proposed art "exchanges." Jauyard and his colleagues in the museum administration were forced to hone their diplomatic skills in facing this additional threat to their control over the French patrimony.

10

Art as a Negotiating Tool

The Basel altar is too significant to find an equivalent object; it is too important for an exchange; it could only pass from France to Germany as a gift, within general conditions and circumstances recognized by the leaders of the two countries, and only then would this idea rise to a higher and magnificent plane where two great countries would recover their dignity.

—Abel Bonnard, 29 December 1943

Marshal Göring instructed me on 11 January 1944 to let you know that he would accept the Basel altar as a gift from the French nation, as a token of gratitude for measures taken by German authorities to protect and preserve historic sites and art in France during and after the 1940 campaign.

—Hermann Bunjes to Abel Bonnard, 26 January 1944

THOUGH THE NAZIS PRIMARILY TARGETED Jewish-owned collections in their looting operations, top leaders restively sought to acquire several key masterpieces from French art museums, either for themselves or fellow party members. Ribbentrop and Göring, in particular, proposed art "exchanges," in which the works they sought from French museums would be traded for pieces from German collections. In order to carry out their plans, the Germans needed ready accomplices in the French government, which they found in two heads of government: Admiral François Darlan and Pierre Laval. Pursuing broader goals in Franco-German collaboration, both statesmen were willing to facilitate German schemes to appropriate masterpieces from French museums.

- ADS T 137; "Enlèvement des statues. Motion votée par le Conseil municipal réuni en séance plénière," 15 February 1943, ADS T 137; letter from Léon Lamblin, secrétaire général des beaux-arts to the prefect of the Savoie, 11 April 1944, ADS T 137; letter from the prefect of the Savoie to the secrétaire général des beaux-arts, 10 May 1944, ADS T 137.
41. Letter from the mayor of Chambéry to the prefect of the Savoie, 16 February 1945, ADS T 137; "La Sasson . . . quelques dates," dossier Falguière, Musée d'Orsay documentation center; on the restored Rousseau monument, see Jutet et al., *Regards sur Chambéry*, 189.
42. This assassination was part of a larger series of violent attacks against German authorities beginning in July 1941. In October of that year alone, 162 violent acts were committed throughout France. In response to the rise in Resistance activities, largely attributed to communists and anarchists, the Darlan government produced a flurry of legislation to maintain public order. See Paxton, *Vichy France*, 223–228.
43. Duméril cited in Gildea, *Marianne in Chains*, 230.
44. Chanepic, *Nantes et la Loire-Inférieure*, 63–65; "Avis," *Le Phare de la Loire*, 22 October 1941, 1.
45. Laborie, *L'opinion française sous Vichy*, 254.
46. Cited in *Le Phare de la Loire*, 23 October, 1941, 1.
47. Decree establishing the composition of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 25 October 1941, ADLA 138W0081.
48. Minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 10 November 1941, ADLA 138W0081; Musée d'Orsay and the Institut national d'histoire de l'art, CD-ROM, *À nos grands hommes*.
49. Minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 10 November 1941, ADLA 138W0081.
50. Minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 17 November 1941, ADLA 138W0081.
51. Minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 27 November 1941, ADLA 138W0081.
52. Letter from Léon Lamblin to the prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, 27 November 1941, AN F21 7073.
53. Letter from the prefect of the Loire-Inférieure to the inspector general of industrial production, 9 February 1942, ADLA 138W0081.
54. Cited in letter from the Commission for the Mobilization of Non-Ferrous Metals to Major Sachert, 13 February 1943, AN 68 AJ 312.
55. Letter from Sachert, for the Militärbefehlshaber, to the Commission for the Mobilization of Non-Ferrous Metals, 18 February 1943, AN 68 AJ 312.
56. "La statue de Villebois-Mareuil a repris sa place," *Le Phare de la Loire*, 20 February 1942, 2.
57. Letter from the Feldkommandant von der Forst to the prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, 11 February 1942, ADLA 138W0081.
58. Minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 21 September 1942, ADLA 138W0081.
59. Statement attached to minutes of the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Depart-

- mental Commission, 21 September 1942, ADLA 138W0081; minutes from the meeting of the Loire-Inférieure Departmental Commission, 21 September 1942, ADLA 138W0081.
60. Letter from the secrétaire général des beaux-arts to the prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, 15 January 1943, AN F21 7073.
61. Letter from the prefect of the Loire-Inférieure to the secrétaire général des beaux-arts, 10 February 1943, AN F21 7073.
62. Letter from the Ministry of Education to prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, n.d., AN F21 7073.
63. Letter from Abel Bonnard to Henri Orion, mayor of Nantes, 27 March 1944, AN F21 7073.
64. Letter from Lamblin to Bonnard, 18 March 1944, AN F21 7073.
65. Agulhon has linked the decline in public statuary since 1945 to three phenomena: an artistic shift away from figurative sculpture, a crisis of liberal optimism, and the reduction of open public space in the wake of urbanization. See "La statuomanie et l'histoire," 165.
66. According to Sonia Mazey and Vincent Wright, prefects' actions were highly individualized, despite the goal of the Vichy regime to create a unified prefectural corps. See their article "Les préfets," in Azéma and Bédarida, *Le régime de Vichy et les français*, 267–286.
67. Alon Confino describes the "multiplicity" of memory and social experiences that simultaneously shape local, regional, and national identity. See "Collective Memory and Cultural History," 1386–1403.
68. On notions of dominant memory, see Sherman, *Construction of Memory in Interwar France*, 7.
69. On official constructions of memory in postwar France, see Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*; and the epilogue in Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 601–632.

Chapter 9

Chapter epigraph source for Utkal is AN 3W 122; for Huyghe, AMN R32 3(3).

1. "Rapport de Mlle Rose Valland de 1941 à 1944," AMN R32 1; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 59–70; Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 127–128.
2. The commission published several volumes on the various areas of spoliation. All of these reports are public documents that may be consulted online at www.ladocu.mentatfrancaise.fr. For a general overview of the commission's findings, see Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, *Rapport général*.
3. Wiewiorka, "Des spoliations aux restitutions," in Bruttman, *Persecutions et spoliations des Juifs*, 15–18.
4. Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, *Rapport général*, 79.
5. Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 17.
6. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 90.
7. *Ibid.*, 3–16, 262–307.
8. On the plunder of patrimony outside France, see Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, part 1; and Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, particularly chapters 2, 3, 4, and 7.

9. Francis Rey, "Violations du droit international," 8–9; Sandholtz, *Prohibiting Plunder*, 71–100.
10. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 164–165; Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 142–143, 181.
11. Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 25; on the Nazi "cleansing" of German museums, see also *ibid.*, 22–25; Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 51–58.
12. Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 23.
13. Cited in Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 125.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 21; Petropoulos, *The Faustian Bargain*, 55.
16. Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 24–30.
17. Wiewiorka, "Des spoliations aux restitutions," in Bruttman, *Persecutions et spoliations des Juifs*, 16–18.
18. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 131.
19. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 214.
20. "Pillage du Quai d'Orsay et des dépôts d'archives et d'objets d'art par les Allemands; Note préliminaire," AN 3W 357. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 125; on confiscations from the French foreign office and the Musée de l'armée, see Rey, "Violations du droit international," 43.
21. Telegram from German Foreign Affairs Special Commando to the German Foreign Office in Berlin, 13 January 1941, AN 3W 357.
22. From Jacques Jauiard to Louis Hautecoeur, "Ordonnance du 15 juillet concernant les collections particulières," AMN R20 6 1.
23. Bazin, *Souvenirs de l'exode du Louvre*, 93; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 115.
24. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 115–116.
25. Summary of relations with the Kunstschutz from Jacques Jauiard to Louis Hautecoeur, "Collection Wildenstein," 21 August 1940, AMN R20 6 1; on the Souches raid, see letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Fernand de Brinon, 23 June 1941, AN 3W 121; secret telegram from Gerum to Major Heidschuh, German High Command of the Armed Forces, and to the Army Secret Police, 30 August 1940, AN 3W 357.
26. Secret telegram from Gerum to Major Heidschuh, German High Command of the Armed Forces, and to the Army Secret Police, 30 August 1940, AN 3W 357.
27. On the pillage of Georges Mandel's home, see *ibid.*; on the home of Maurice de Rothschild, see Rapport de la Geheime Feldpolizei, Gruppe 627, 7 September 1940, AN 3W 357; on the Künsberg group pillages, see Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 129.
28. "Exposé Wolf-Meremich," in Cassou, *Le pillage par les Allemands*, 166–168.
29. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 130.
30. Gerhard Utkal, ERR, 3 November 1941, AN 3W 122.
31. Letter from Alfred Rosenberg to Franz Xaver Schwarz, Nazi Party treasurer, 18 September 1940, CDJC CXLIII-275.
32. Utkal in Cassou, *Le pillage par les Allemands*, 94–98.
33. Alfred Rosenberg to Hans-Heinrich Lammers, cover letter for report, "Kampf um Europa: Grundsätze einer europäischen Neuordnung," 1 August 1944, CDJC CXLIII-358.
34. Alfred Rosenberg report, "Kampf um Europa: Grundsätze einer europäischen Neuordnung," submitted to Lammers, 1 August 1944, CDJC CXLIII-358.
35. Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 19; Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 133.
36. Letter from Göring to Rosenberg, 21 November 1940, CDJC XIII-28a.
37. Letters from L. Wassermann, 3 and 4 May 1941, CDJC XXI-27–28. She addressed them to "Monsieur le ministre," but it appears she sent them to the Commissariat général aux questions juives. Response from the CGQJ to Wassermann, 10 May 1941, CDJC XXI-29. Letter from Xavier Vallat to Fernand de Brinon, 23 June 1941, document 48, in Cassou, *Le pillage par les Allemands*, 210–211.
38. Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 23; Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 131.
39. See Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 87; letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Admiral Darlan, 29 May 1941, AN 3W 121.
40. Bazin, *Souvenirs de l'exode du Louvre*, 93.
41. For statistics on private collections seized from depots, see Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 23.
42. Simon, *Battle of the Louvre*, 72–73. On the embassy's holdings, see Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 18.
43. Letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Admiral Darlan, 29 May 1941, AN 3W 121.
44. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 51.
45. Jacques Jauiard, "Activités dans la Résistance de Mademoiselle Rose Valland conservateur des musées nationaux," n.d., AMN R32 1; Bouchoux, *Rose Valland*, 9–20; online biography also by Bouchoux, "Rose Valland, sur 'le front de l'art,'" available at <http://musea.univ-angers.fr>.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Notes from Rose Valland to Jacques Jauiard, 8 February 1944, AMN R32 1; on Valland's role in the recovery effort, see Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 221–230.
48. Valland's account of the events is in *Le front de l'art*, 184–186. The film's fictionalized depiction is far more dramatic, in which French Resistance members in several towns alter station names to make the Germans think that they have crossed the German border when they have merely traveled in circles. The fictionalized von Behr character in *The Train* is played by Paul Scofield. See Frankenhimer, *The Train*, DVD.
49. Notes from Rose Valland to Jacques Jauiard, 23 July 1943, AMN R32 1. See also Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 178–182, in which the "holocaust" reference appears. Valland contradicts herself in these two sources regarding the date of the fire. In her memoir, she writes that the fire occurred on 27 May 1943 but later indicates that the meeting with Scholz and Borchers took place in July 1943. Her handwritten note, however, clearly indicates that the fire was set on 23 July 1943, which appears to be the correct date.
50. Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 37.
51. *Ibid.*, 21–24.
52. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 3; Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 355.
53. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 3–21; Paxton, *Vichy France*, 168–179.

54. As Marrus and Paxton point out, the SCAP initially operated only in the occupied zone in conjunction with German laws, and the Vichy regime later extended it to the unoccupied zone. See Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 8.
55. *Ibid.*, 101–103; Michèle Cone examines the impact of Vichy's anti-Semitic policies on Jewish artists, dealers, and gallery owners in *Artists under Vichy*, 116–130.
56. Moulin, *The French Art Market*, 17–18.
57. "Note verbale," Lucien Hubert to the MBF, 18 December 1940, CDJC, XXI-19.
58. Statement from the CGOJ, "Fonds de solidarité juive," n.d., AN AJ38 1150; Ministry of Finance meeting minutes, 13 July 1941, AN AJ38 1150.
59. *Le Phare de la Loire*, 1 December 1941, 2; letter from Domaines to head of Pétain's civil affairs office, 24 September 1942, AMN R20 4 2.
60. Letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Admiral Darlan, 29 May 1941, AN 3W 121; letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Fernand de Brinon, 23 June 1941, AN 3W 121; letter from Admiral Darlan to Fernand de Brinon, 10 June 1941, AN F21 8090, dossier 4.
61. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 103.
62. Report from Xavier Vallat to Dr. Werner Best, MBF, 5 August 1941, AMN R32 2.
63. *Ibid.*
64. A letter from the Domaines agency to Jaujard dated 5 August 1941 indicates the following: "Il serait entendu que les biens que votre administration désirerait conserver à titre définitif seraient cédés à l'état par contrat soumis à l'homologation du président du tribunal civil, conformément aux articles 6 et 10 de l'arrêté interministériel du 23 novembre 1940" (my emphasis), AMN R20 4 2.
65. Prince Poniatowski to Louis Hauteceur (his emphasis), 13 January 1941, AN F21 8090, dossier 4.
66. Louis Hauteceur to Prince Poniatowski, 14 March 1941, AN F21 8090, dossier 4.
67. "Extrait du procès verbal du Comité supérieur de séquestres et liquidations," 8 August 1941, AN F21 7095; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, III–113.
68. Jacques Jaujard to Louis Hauteceur, 30 January 1941, AMN R32 2.
69. The list of sequestered collections provided by Le Masne and Schulmann does not include those of Jacques-Ernest May or the Schloss or Bonn families, perhaps in part because state funds were not used to purchase works from these collections. However, Direction des musée documents include all three in lists of sequestered collections. See Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 28–29; Georges Salles to Albert Henraux, president of the Art Recovery Commission, 16 February 1945, AMN R32 3.
70. For the original acquisitions credits, see "Budget de 1941: Développement par chapitres des modifications apportées au budget de l'exercice 1941," Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1941, AN F21 4723; Genet-Delacroix, "Le budget des beaux-arts sous l'Occupation," in *La direction du budget*, 436. For the new acquisitions credit, see letter from Jacques Jaujard to the Direction générale d'enregistrement, des domaines, et du timbre, 21 January 1942, AMN R20 4 2.
71. Letter from the budget office, Ministry of Finance to the Direction générale d'enregistrement, des domaines, et du timbre, 3 March 1942, AMN R20 4 2.

72. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 112–113; Mazauric, *Le Louvre en voyage*, 134–136; Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 136; Huyghe, *Une vie pour l'art*, 121; Le Masne de Chermont and Schulmann, *Le pillage de l'art en France*, 28.
73. Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 43–46.
74. *Ibid.*; Lortman, *The French Rothschilds*, 178–220.
75. Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 43–46; Lortman, *The French Rothschilds*, 178–220.
76. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 114; Mazauric, *Le Louvre en voyage*, 134–136. Mazauric asserts that the Domaines agency seized pieces from Maurice's collection in September 1941, but fine arts correspondence indicates that this had occurred at least by early July. See letter from René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 4 July 1941, AN F21 4723.
77. Letter from René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 4 July 1941, AN F21 4723.
78. *Ibid.*
79. In 1792, Minister of the Interior Jean Roland wrote that "this national monument must show the riches of the nation. . . . France must extend its glory through the ages and to all people." See Olive, *From Royal to National*, 22.
80. Letter from René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 4 July 1941, AN F21 4723.
81. Letter from René Huyghe to Louis Hauteceur, 2 September 1941, AMN R32 6.
82. Mazauric, *Le Louvre en voyage*, 136–137.
83. Letter from Jacques Guérin to Jacques Jaujard, 31 July 1944, AMN R32 6.
84. Archival and secondary sources give contradictory details of this affair, such as dates, key figures, and German-versus-French responsibility. I have compared the various accounts, aiming to provide the most accurate description possible.
85. Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 3.
86. Report from René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 19 June 1943, transcribed in letter from Jaujard to Abel Bonnard, 10 August 1943, AMN R32 3(3).
87. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 96.
88. Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 96; Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 172; Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 3; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 104–105.
89. Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France (Martéoli Commission), *Rapport général*, 79.
90. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 105; Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 172. (Archival sources most often spell Henry's name with a *y*; some secondary sources use the more common French spelling "Henri.")
91. Darquier claims to have named Lefranc provisional administrator of the Schloss collection, though Hamon-Jugnet argues that the French director of Aryanization refused the nomination, prompting German authorities to designate Lefranc. See Darquier de Pellepoix to Laval, 21 April 1943, CDJC XCVI-88; Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 4.
92. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; "Déclaration de Lohse au sujet de l'affaire Schloss," 15 December 1945, AMN R32 3(3).
93. Darquier de Pellepoix to Laval, 21 April 1943, CDJC XCVI-88; Judicial Police

Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 4–5; Rayssac, *L'exode des musées*, 470–479.

94. See Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 104–110.

95. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; “Déclaration de Lohse au sujet de l'affaire Schloss,” 15 December 1945, AMN R32 3(3); Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 4–5. Rayssac speculates that Petit may have been working with Hess all along, feigning his protest at the chateau. See *L'exode des musées*, 481–483.

96. Rudolf Schleier, German embassy in Paris, to Martin Bormann, 26 April 1943, CDJC CXXVa, 47.

97. Déclaration de Lohse au sujet de l'affaire Schloss, 15 December 1945, AMN R32 3(3).

98. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 192.

99. Rudolf Schleier's report to Martin Bormann, 26 April 1943, shows the involvement of the German embassy, keeping Hitler's key adviser in the Party Chancellery informed. CDJC CXXVa, 47.

100. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88.

101. René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 29 May 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

102. Report by René Huyghe submitted to Jacques Jaujard, 19 June 1943, AMN R32 3(3) (my emphasis). See also letter from Jacques Jaujard to Abel Bonnard, 10 August 1943, which includes Huyghe's report, AMN R32 3(3).

103. Report by René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 19 June 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

104. Jacques Jaujard to Louis Hauteceux, 9 August 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

105. Jacques Jaujard to Abel Bonnard, 10 August 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

106. Judicial Police Commissioner Decarreux to divisional commissioner, 31 July 1945, CDJC XCVI-88; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 103–107; Hamon-Jugnet, *Collection Schloss*, 4–5; Rayssac, *L'exode des musées*, 521.

107. “Déclaration de Lohse au sujet de l'affaire Schloss,” 15 December 1945, AMN R32 3(3).

108. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 108–109.

109. In her text intended to disseminate information about works that still have not been returned to the Schloss family, Marie Hamon-Jugnet argues that the goal of French intervention was to “put the works in safekeeping until the eventual restitution.” See *Collection Schloss*, 5.

110. Letter from René Huyghe to Jacques Jaujard, 18 August 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

111. Ibid.

112. Decree signed by Abel Bonnard, 13 September 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

113. Jean-François Lefranc to Abel Bonnard, 24 August 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

114. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 108.

115. Abel Bonnard to Ministry of Finance budget office, 29 March 1944, AMN R32 3(3).

116. Gabriel Cognacq to Pierre Cathala, 26 November 1943, AMN R32 3(3).

117. Letter from Abel Bonnard to Ministry of Finance budget office, 29 March 1944; letter from Pierre Cathala to Jacques Jaujard, 26 April 1944, both in AMN R32 3(3).

118. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 108.

119. Hamon-Jugnet offers the following breakdown: 49 paintings went to the French Direction des musées, Lefranc obtained 22, leaving 262 pieces for Linz, which were sent to the Jeu de Paume. However, according to shipment records, only 230 pieces were sent to Munich in November 1943, creating a difference of 32 paintings. She cites Valland's assertion that Lohse had obtained 3 paintings, but the fate of the others is unclear. See *Collection Schloss*, 6–9.

120. On the German purchase, see secret telegram from Getlach to von Hummel, 20 August 1943, AN 3W 354. On Lefranc's proposal to Lohse, see Lohse, “Note d'archives,” n.d., CDJC XCVI-88. According to Hamon-Jugnet, Lefranc's twenty-two paintings initially were set aside for Göring, who declined the offer because of concerns that such a deal might anger Hitler. See *Collection Schloss*, 5–7.

121. Paris court of appeals, sentencing of Jean-François Lefranc, 26 April 1947, AMN Schloss papers.

122. Note from Huyghe to Lefranc, 2 May 1944, R32 3(3).

123. Letter from the Ministry of National Education to Jean-François Lefranc, 31 January 1944, Fir 13368.

124. Darquier's comment appeared in a controversial 1978 interview with *L'Express* from his refuge in Spain. French courts in 1947 had sentenced him to death in absentia. See Rouso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 139–144. The head of French police in the occupied zone, René Bousquet, held more power than Darquier in the deportations. Bousquet organized and implemented the rounding up of Jews, particularly the notorious Vel d'Hiv roundup in July 1942. Still, Darquier oversaw the implementation of Vichy's anti-Semitic legislation that made the roundups possible and aggressively pursued the Aryanization of Jewish assets. See Joly, *Vichy dans la “Solution Finale.”*

125. The Direction des musées implemented similar measures to acquire an “abandoned” collection of archaeological artifacts owned by an American citizen. The owner, Mr. Kelley, worked at the Musée de l'homme before the war and returned to the United States when the conflict began, leaving his collection of thirty-five thousand prehistoric artifacts at the museum. Under the Vichy regime, the fine arts administration succeeded in placing the collection on the national register of protected works of art. After the war, the French government sought a voluntary agreement from Mr. Kelley to keep the collection on the national register. (There is no discussion in this correspondence of Mr. Kelley's ethnic background and thus no indication that he was Jewish.) See MP 80 6 10, folder six.

126. See Le Masne de Chermont and Sigal-Klagsbald, *A qui appartenaient ces tableaux?* 107–113.

127. On the profiteering of provisional administrators, see Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 156–157.

128. Moulin, *The French Art Market*, 20.

129. Bertrand Dorléac, “Le marché de l'art à Paris sous l'Occupation,” in Ministère de la culture et de la communication, *Pillages et restitutions*, 89–96. The high-priced Cézanne landscape was *La vallée de l'Arc et la montagne Sainte-Victoire*. See “Vente de la

collection Georges Viau, déc. 1942," AN AJ40 574. On wartime price changes, see Moulin, *The French Art Market*, 21.

130. Cone, *Artists under Vichy*, 13–15; Bertrand Dorléac, *L'art de la défaite*, 145–151; Bertrand Dorléac, "Le marché de l'art," 90–91; Moulin, *The French Art Market*, 22.

131. Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 157; Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 143, 182; Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 126–128.

132. Letter from Jean-François Lefranc to CGQJ, 10 January 1944, AN F7 1368.

133. "Loi du 23 juin 1941 relative à l'exportation des oeuvres d'art," *Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, 19 July 1941, 3090; letter from Louis Hautecoeur to Jérôme Carcopino, 20 March 1941, CAC 860306; letter from J. Leroi, director of customs, to Division of Historic Landmarks, 25 September 1941, CAC 860306.

134. Letter from Louis Hautecoeur to Jérôme Carcopino, 20 March 1941, CAC 860306.

135. *Ibid.*; Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 122–128.

136. Letter from Louis Hautecoeur to Jérôme Carcopino, 20 March 1941, CAC 860306; "Loi du 23 juin 1941 relative à l'exportation des oeuvres d'art," *Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, 19 July 1941, 3090.

137. Letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Dr. Schmid, 15 July 1941, CAC 860306.

138. Letter from J. Leroi, director of customs, to Division of Historic Landmarks, 25 September 1941, CAC 860306; letter from René Georgin, director of Abel Bonnard's office in Vichy, to Ministry of Finance, office of foreign commerce, 16 March 1943, AN F21 7117.

139. While this complicated rerouting of works of art indeed took place, Lefranc also claimed that Jews controlled the network in each country. See letter from Jean-François Lefranc to CGQJ, 10 January 1944, AN F7 1368. On the repeated transfer of works of art, see also Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 164–166.

140. Janneau cited in report from Poli to Hautecoeur, 18 November 1943, AN F21 7117.

141. For details on this affair, see *ibid.*

142. Letters from Janneau to fine arts office, 3 December 1944, 10 March 1944, AN F21 7117.

143. Letter from Louis Hautecoeur to Abel Bonnard, 30 November 1942, AN F21 7117; letter from office of domestic commerce to fine arts office, 4 January 1943, AN F21 7117; letter from René Georgin, director of Abel Bonnard's office in Vichy, to Ministry of Finance office of foreign commerce, 25 January 1943, AN F21 7117.

144. Letter from office of domestic commerce to fine arts office, 2 November 1942, AN F21 7117; "Exportations à destination des territoires du Grand Reich allemand de novembre 1942 au 10 février 1943," n.d., AN F21 7117.

145. Châtelain, *Droit et administration des musées*, 611–617.

Chapter 10

Source for both chapter epigraphs is AN 3W 78.

1. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 5–16, 275.
2. *Ibid.*, 325n41.

3. Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 145; Rayssac, *L'exode des musées*, 370–371.

4. Hautecoeur, *Les beaux-arts en France*, 300.

5. *Ibid.*, 300–301; Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 145; Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 116–117. Nicholas and Valland refer to Hermine as "the Marquise," though her proper title was "Viscountess."

6. Sandholtz, *Prohibiting Plunder*, 113–114; Feliciano, *The Lost Museum*, 29.

7. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 123.

8. Letter from Jacques Jaujard to Louis Hautecoeur, 31 August 1942, AN 3W 78; Rayssac, *L'exode des musées*, 121.

9. Letter from Jacques Jaujard to Louis Hautecoeur, 7 August 1941, AN 3W 78.

10. "Enlèvement du polyptyque de 'l'Agneau mystique' à Pau par les Allemands," n.d., AN 3W 78.

11. *Ibid.*; telegram from the office of national education in Vichy to Molle, 2 August 1942, AN 3W 78; deposition of M. Molle during trial of Abel Bonnard, 1945, AN 3W 78; letter from Joseph Billiet to Jacques Jaujard, 28 August 1942, AN 3W 78.

12. Report from Joseph Billiet to Jacques Jaujard, 28 August 1942, AN 3W 78; deposition by Georges Hilaire during the trial of Abel Bonnard, 11 March 1939, AN 3W 82. The French translation of Laval's statement: "Ce n'est pas le moment de jouer les matamores."

13. Jäckel, *France dans l'Europe de Hitler*, 199.

14. Nicholas, *The Rape of Europa*, 144.

15. Minutes from the curators committee meeting, 20 November 1942, AN 3W 78.

16. Minutes from the curators committee meeting, 26 November 1942, AN 3W 78.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Letter from Abel Bonnard to Louis Hautecoeur, 8 December 1942, AN 3W 78.

19. Statement by Bonnard cited in Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 128; deposition of Jacques Jaujard during trial of Abel Bonnard, 4 May 1939, 3W 82.

20. Petropoulos, *Art as Politics*, 273. On the *Art Pacis*, see letter from Jérôme Carcopino to Georges Huisman, 19 May 1939, AN 3W 122; "Protocole d'échange," 19 May 1939, AN 3W 122.

21. "Protocole d'échange," 19 May 1939, AN 3W 122.

22. Office internationale des musées, "Preliminary observations," in *Final Act of the International Conference on Excavations*, 30 September 1937 (OIM translation).

23. Letter from Louis Hautecoeur to Abel Bonnard, 20 December 1943, AN F7 1368.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Georges Preully, "Les échanges artistiques franco-espagnols," 2 August 1941, *Comodia*, 1.

26. Mazauric, *Le Louvre en voyage*, 128; Hautecoeur, *Les beaux-arts en France*, 206.

27. Carcopino, *Souvenirs de sept ans*, 454–455.

28. Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 130–131; Hautecoeur, *Les beaux-arts en France*, 296.

29. Hautecoeur, *Les beaux-arts en France*, 295–296; Carcopino, *Souvenirs de sept ans*, 455–456.

30. Telegram from Abetz to Ribbentrop, 1 August 1941, reproduced in Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 250–251; see also Valland, *Le front de l'art*, 136.