


THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Sociopolitics in Small-Scale Sedentary Societies

EDITED BY
STEADMAN UPHAM

1990

A SCHOOL OF AMERICAN RESEARCH BOOK



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge
New York . Port Chester . Melbourne . Sydney

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Politics and surplus flow in prehistoric communal societies

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The writing of this chapter was initiated in the field, where one of us (Keene) was living on an Israeli kibbutz. The kibbutz is a moderate-sized agro-industrial community within which social labor is communally appropriated and where a strong ideology of social equality prevails. The kibbutz as an institution has severed the link between the labor a person performs and the reward she/he receives. One works according to one's ability and receives according to one's needs. Kibbutzim comprise 3 percent of the national population, and produce 60 percent of the nation's agriculture and 8 percent of its industrial output. Kibbutzim often outcompete more conventional enterprises in national and world markets, especially in the production of agricultural produce and technology, plastics, and chemicals.

What does the kibbutz have to do with this volume? For us, there are three points of significance. Foremost among these is that the existence of the kibbutz throws a wrench into conventional social evolutionary typologies. Though large (some numbering up to 2,000 people), kibbutzim are relatively non-hierarchical and egalitarian. Though actively integrated into a competitive global economy, kibbutzim are communally run. Though possessing a complex technical division of labor, differential compensation is virtually nonexistent. With its

juxtaposition of categories and processes typically held in opposition, the kibbutz has forced us to confront the limits of what is (and was) possible where the organization of human social forms is concerned. It has forced us to rethink the utility of many assumptions and generalizations that inform contemporary archaeological thought. We have had to consider turning our ideas inside out, thereby opening up the past to new and perhaps unconventional interpretations.

Second, kibbutz life underscores the effects of analyses at different scales. Relationships on the kibbutz are not constant or uniform on a day-to-day basis. Inequalities continually arise and are mediated in a variety of ways over the course of days, months, or years. These inequalities are situational and transitory rather than institutional. Struggles over what constitutes equality, what is tolerable and intolerable, are continual. Kibbutz society is in a constant state of becoming, of self-definition and redefinition. The tendency for archaeologists, particularly within the evolutionist paradigm, to treat culture or society as a fully integrated, seamless object of analysis (e.g., Brown and Price 1985) masks these important tensions and struggles and disguises significant variation within the generic categories we call egalitarian and non-egalitarian society. It consequently prevents us from confronting the self-productive capacity of society and the role of human agency and intentionality in social change.

Finally, interaction with other observers of kibbutz life has demonstrated how the "facts" of kibbutz existence can support many different conclusions about the success of this social arrangement. The kibbutz is a controversial institution, especially within Israel. Whereas we see the kibbutz as communal, egalitarian, lacking in class divisions, and successful, others have argued that it is unequal, has well-established social classes, and is a relative failure in terms of adhering to its original ideals. To some, the kibbutz is unequal because it contains a rather rigid sexual division of labor. It is bourgeois because it has acquired, for all of its members, the creature comforts of a consumer society such as swimming pools, televisions, and air conditioners. It is not socialist because it actively participates in the world capitalist system by buying and selling on the world market. It is a failure because its members now live in modest comfort, compared to the spartan existence of the early pioneers.

The status of the kibbutz is, of course, a complex debate, but it has everything to do with the focus of this volume. People understand the

world in different ways. They mold their observations to conform to their own experiences, to the way they expect the world to be ordered. The terms equality, commune, exploitation, and hierarchy are emotionally and politically laden, evoking the same kinds of strong responses as terms like fascism, sexism, communism, capitalism, and slavery. As investigators of the world, then, we must consider not only the extent to which we are talking about the same thing, but the extent to which the categories we use constrain our imagination and thus our conclusions about what is real and possible in past or present.

The kibbutz is irksome because it is not easily explicable with models of organizational variation in use today. Indeed, some typologists have gone so far as to isolate kibbutzim as "intentional" as opposed to "natural" communities, thereby excluding them from the realm of anthropological generalization (cf. Greenwood 1985; Keene 1986). Social forms in the past are emerging as similarly problematic, as material evidence for organizational variation in prehistory accumulates. In this chapter, we will elaborate a framework which we feel can be uniquely productive for illuminating some of the dynamics responsible for producing this variation. We will accomplish this task within the scope of the volume's topic by elaborating an historical materialist approach to the question of political organization and change in small-scale societies. Our concern is to link political dynamics to economic processes of surplus extraction and distribution. We believe that the relationships between power and surplus flow at all ranges of societal complexity are many and varied, and that the task of exposing such variation has barely begun.

Impeding such exposition are notions about what constitutes "simplicity" and "complexity" in social forms. Consider, for example, the following set of terms: hierarchy, power, prestige, aggrandizement, inequality, tribute. These terms have traditionally been regarded as closely related correlates of complexity in human society (e.g., Flannery 1972; McGuire 1983; Brown and Price 1985). The literature on complexity manifests a tendency to use these terms interchangeably, in the bargain confusing hierarchy with inequality and conflating necessary conditions with causes (e.g., while surplus or large populations are necessary to sustain tributary systems, they do not necessarily require or promote such systems). This conflation has given us a rather coarse-grained analysis of the processes by which social organizational changes in general, and in "complex" systems in particular, develop. Our aim in

this chapter is to begin to question some of these linkages, so as to prepare the ground for new organizational models.

We must note at the outset that, in contrast to other authors, we are not concerned here with a particular political development, be it the emergence of differential access to resources, decision-making hierarchies, mechanisms for maintaining economic inequality, or direct, coercive rule. Rather, we are concerned with the *interaction* between political and nonpolitical walks of social life and how the archaeological record can be used to explore these interactions. We believe that our ability to distinguish between several conceivable outcomes in a specific case will be greatly enhanced if the complexity and potential variability of these interactions is appreciated.

We begin by sketching the epistemological foundations of our approach, as these guide our reformulation of social theory. Next, we outline historical materialist concepts of society and social change and justify this orientation by noting some problems with alternative conceptualizations. We then outline a theory of "communal" social forms which highlights surplus flow and its structural position in society, and illustrate what this theory comes to in an archaeological context using data from the American Southwest. We close by underscoring the advantages of our approach for studying political development in small-scale societies.

A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

While much energy is devoted in our profession to the refinement of methods and the clarification of facts, relatively less attention is given to epistemological issues: what theory is, and how equally coherent theoretical alternatives can be evaluated. In this section we offer a brief summary of our particular epistemological position as a way to clarify and contextualize the theoretical formulation which follows.

The theory of knowledge to which we subscribe is one best described as *dialectical*. This epistemology draws from the philosophies of a diverse group of thinkers, the most sweeping and systematic of which has been articulated by Althusser (1974). Resnick and Wolff (1982, 1987) have been particularly successful in clarifying a dialectical epistemology, and what follows is greatly indebted to their recent review and reformulation of the work of Althusser and others working within a broadly defined dialectical tradition.

A dialectical epistemology implies a particular conception of the relationship between "thought" and "experience" (i.e., "reality"). Specifically, it understands that relationship as reflexive or intereffective: thought structures experience, and vice versa. For a dialectical epistemology, what people experience (i.e., what they accept as the "facts" of their social existence and historical past) is conditioned by prior beliefs about what the world is like, how it is organized, and how it changes. These beliefs are shaped by a variety of cognitive and noncognitive (i.e., personal, professional, social) factors. Althusser used the term *overdetermination* to describe the myriad influences affecting the knowledge process. Just as thinking is overdetermined (i.e., affected by more than one factor) by experience, so too is experience overdetermined by thinking, inasmuch as thought informs the strategies and policies people use to cope with and participate in the world around them.

A dialectical epistemology thus views knowledge as a *construction*, with concepts representing the building-blocks or raw materials of such constructions. A key implication of this position is that no uniquely correct or "true" way of knowing exists. Rather, truth is conceived as relative to the respective processes of thought which produce it. What a thinker determines to be the truth of existence depends upon the particular way she/he experiences the world through concepts, theories, and methods. People select different facts of experience to scrutinize and relate, and have different ways of producing, defining, ordering, testing, and reworking the concepts which give such facts meaning. For a dialectical epistemology, knowledge of the world is fully conventional and situational (Scholte 1981). It is constructed in conformity with particular sets of fundamental beliefs and presuppositions, and is fully dependent upon the time, place, and social position of the thinker.

This understanding of the knowledge process has traditionally represented a minority position in Western thought and continues in that role today. Epistemologies that sharply contrast with a dialectical view underpin the bulk of Western science. Within archaeology, for example, the dominant epistemology is a positivist one which, *contra* dialectics, maintains the possibility of acquiring truly "objective" knowledge of experience and of establishing absolute criteria for evaluating different knowledge claims. For positivism, the objective truth of experience lies outside thought, in the former's myriad observable facts. These facts simultaneously serve as the object for, and measure of,

thought. Knowledge acquisition for positivism is, accordingly, about *discovery* rather than construction: different theories of the world are evaluated against a presumed theory-independent, empirical "factuality" and, depending on their ability to square with that factuality, are eternally categorized as true or false (Harvey [1973]; for recent archaeological discussion of the regulative ideals of positivist epistemology see Schiffer [1981]; Binford [1982]; Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman [1984]).

Versions of dialectical and positivist epistemology have long been at odds within the history of thought, over complex issues of justification and evaluation (Keat and Urry [1981] consider this confrontation in social science generally, Gibbon [1984] in archaeology specifically). Full consideration of these issues falls outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to note that the evaluation of competing arguments and theories is not excluded from a dialectical epistemology (Tibbetts 1986; Saitta 1987a), nor does a dialectical epistemology deny the importance of empirical inquiry. Rather, it recognizes the relationship between theoretical and empirical work to be a profoundly overdetermined one, having far-reaching consequences for thought and society. An awareness of, and active interest in, this overdetermined relationship is what underlies a dialectical approach to paradigm growth and evaluation. In the next section, we review the key assumptions and concepts that anchor our interaction with the empirical world.

CONCEPTS OF SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Every research strategy in anthropology is anchored by a set of organizing principles considered applicable to the study of all societies. Historical materialism is no different from other research strategies in this respect. It maintains and continually reworks a particular set of guiding assumptions and analytical principles. The origins of these ideas lie in the work of Marx, with whose "ghost" social scientists have maintained a continuing (if usually implicit) dialogue over the past century (Wolf 1982a:20; Bloch 1983:124-40).

There is much disagreement and debate in historical materialism over just how Marx is to be read and his ideas utilized. Historical materialism is a continually changing position in the social sciences, and the last two decades have witnessed particularly intense examina-

tions and reformulations of Marxian theory. These debates have centered on the relative contributions of economic "base" and ideological "superstructure" to social change, the role of agents in sequences of change, and other issues. We are unable to review these debates here. We note, however, that out of these debates we have distilled the following five guiding assumptions:

1. It is human labor that secures and reproduces successful human interaction with the environment. Through specific and historically variable sets of social relations, human labor is deployed along with tools, skills, organization, and knowledge ("information") to wrest energy from the environment. This labor is conceived to be of two kinds. Necessary labor is the amount of labor required to reproduce the laborer in an immediate, personal sense. It is that portion which is directly consumed by the producer. Above this amount, individuals perform surplus labor which unites them into a productive, interdependent whole. Extracted surplus labor is conceivably targeted toward many ends. These include replacement of the tools and other factors of production used up in the extractive process, production of subsistence reserves to protect against accidents and environmental perturbations, care of unproductive and infirm individuals, meeting of administrative overhead, satisfaction of common social needs as in ritual and ceremony, and so on (Wolf 1966; Cook 1977). The amounts of both kinds of labor performed in society are not fixed quantities in any given society or at any particular time. Rather, they are fully socially determined and vary with historical and environmental circumstances (Hindess and Hirst 1975; Friedman 1979; Cook 1977).

2. The nature of human interaction with the environment is irreducibly social. The way humans are organized socially governs the way they transform nature, and nature thus transformed affects, in turn, the architecture of human social organization (Wolf 1982a:73-74). Stated differently, what is extracted from nature, the way it is extracted, and how the resulting product is distributed are processes which are all socially mediated. They take place in and through culturally designated entities (family, commune, firm, etc.), and are reproduced by symbolic and ideological means (Godelier 1978:406; Rowlands 1982:167; Bender 1985a:53).

3. A certain amount of social differentiation necessarily attends the

mobilization and allocation of surplus labor. Such differentiation stems from the fact that any economic process of appropriating surplus labor requires that a whole host of other economic and noneconomic processes (specifically, processes regulating the exercise of power, access to property, exchange, etc.) also be in place to support that appropriation. To the extent that reproduction of these processes depends upon the allocation of at least some surplus to agents who participate in them, distinctions may be drawn between people who extract and receive social surplus. These distinctions exist alongside, but are not necessarily congruent with, social distinctions established by relations of power, property, and exchange.

4. In light of the differential placement of individuals vis-à-vis the surplus labor process and processes of power, property, and exchange, all manner of conflicts and struggles are conceivable over such matters as the form in which surplus labor is extracted, the amounts of necessary and surplus labor performed in society, the amounts of surplus allocated or shared out, and surplus labor's various conditions of extraction. Such conflicts and struggles are in turn seen to unite individuals sharing similar (though again, not necessarily congruent) interests in a variety of alliances and coalitions that stand against other such alliances and coalitions. The individuals participating in these alliances pursue strategies aimed at reproducing or realizing change in the organization of human production.

5. In contrast to traditional and many contemporary forms of evolutionist thought in anthropology (especially those invoking some form of "stage theory"), historical materialism accepts that nothing is predetermined or guaranteed with regard to how or in what direction a particular society will develop or evolve. No "laws of motion" can be constructed for the transformation of one kind of society into another; rather, social change is understood to be contingent upon the particular tensions, conflicts, and impulses produced in societies as a consequence of the complex social dynamics that constitute them. For the theorist interested in labor extraction and allocation, relevant developments include, among others, change in the socially determined amounts of necessary and surplus labor produced in society, change in the way a particular form of surplus extraction is secured by the political, economic, and cultural conditions with which it coexists, and change in the

social prevalence of one or another form of surplus extraction, if more than one way of extracting surplus exists in society.

For historical materialism, then, questions about political change are considered against the backdrop of surplus labor flow. Stated differently, surplus flow serves as an "entry point" (one of many that are conceivable) for examining political change. With this approach, questions about political change invite inquiry into the formal mechanisms of surplus labor appropriation and allocation existing in society, how these arrangements relate to (i.e., are sustained and compromised by) political processes, and what social tensions and conflicts are in evidence as a result (Saitta and Keene 1985). Such analysis produces not only an understanding of the overdetermined nature of particular episodes of political change, but also insights of general interest concerning the ways political and economic processes interact in human social life.

A JUSTIFICATION

Why have we adopted this labor-theoretic approach to political analysis, especially given the significant "middle-range" problems associated with operationalizing the concept of surplus and with distinguishing from each other changes in the amount, mechanisms, and conditions of surplus production in society? We do so because we believe contemporary Marxian and non-Marxian theories of political evolution are themselves too narrowly "political" in emphasis. Although we cannot elaborate a full critique here (see Saitta 1987b), this political bias is apparent in the centrality accorded concepts of "power" and "domination" in Marxian models of social structure (e.g., Miller and Tilley 1984; Spriggs 1984), and in the emphasis on "decision-making" and "information management" in non-Marxian approaches (Plog and Upham 1983; Lightfoot 1984). This political bias has a number of limiting theoretical effects. First, it masks patterns of variation by encouraging strict conceptual oppositions between "leaders" and "followers," "dominant" and "dependent" producers, and "elite" and "nonelite" segments of society. By their nature these categories allow little room for imagining alternative social positions, patterns of differentiation, and alliance. Further, these oppositions all too often coincide with, and help sustain, strict correspondences between political practices and economic and cultural practices. Thus, for example,

in many current models elites exercise power and authority as they simultaneously extract surplus production and exert ideological hegemony. This view allows little opportunity for exploring the conceivably much more problematic articulation of political and nonpolitical processes in small-scale societies.

The overriding political interest of contemporary social theory has a second significant effect where the matter of change in small-scale societies is concerned. The theories of development produced by current approaches have a certain teleological quality: change turns on the working out of built-in drives to political competition and expansion which ultimately push societies to absolute limits established by the environment, or occurs by default as leaders reach an upper limit in their ability to manage increases in the volume of interactions and exchanges occurring over time (e.g., Friedman and Rowlands 1987; Kristiansen 1982; Upham 1982; Lightfoot 1984). Lost in such theories is a sense of the always contingent, mediated nature of social relations and the overdetermined nature of historical development (Gledhill 1981; Saitta 1987b).

We believe the need exists for an approach to political life in small-scale societies in which received generalizations about the internal logic of these societies are relaxed, assumed correspondences between different variable states are broken, and greater latitude for imagining different logics (that is, different combinations or "mixes" of political, economic, and cultural relations) is introduced. We believe that a labor-theoretic approach can fill this need. The surplus labor process is by and large a blindspot in Marxian and non-Marxian approaches in archaeology. Even where surplus flow is explicitly considered, the focus is on how *already extracted* surpluses are used to secure social existence (and, more specifically, on how they are channeled into political alliance relations or relations of "social reproduction"), rather than on the extraction process itself: the precise form surplus extraction takes, how this form is sustained by distributions of surplus, and how surplus extraction is specifically overdetermined by a variety of other social processes.

In short, current approaches to social life in small-scale societies tend to treat surplus production as an effect of, or reducible to, political power relations. By reaffirming the overdetermined relationship between political and economic processes in society, we invite alternative understandings of society and social change. In the next two

sections we outline and empirically elaborate a model of "communal" society that illustrates the productivity of this approach.

ON THE SPECIFICITY OF THE COMMUNAL FORMATION

We use the term "communal society" to describe our object of study because it addresses the form of labor extraction in these societies with greater specificity than does the term "small-scale." We avoid alternative terms like "kin-ordered" (Wolf 1982a), "nonhierarchical" (Braun and Plog 1982), "middle range" (Feinman and Neitzel 1984), and the more traditional categories of "egalitarian" and "tribal" for the same reason. We also prefer the term communal because it can accommodate a broader range of behaviors and variable combinations. For example, communal relations of surplus appropriation are not necessarily incompatible with political hierarchy, as the case of the kibbutz illustrates. Here, hierarchy may at times be critical to the maintenance of the commune (see also Blasi 1986). To preclude such a combination is unnecessarily to restrict our imagination of alternative organizational possibilities for prehistoric societies.

There are many connotations attached to the term communal society (Berthoud and Sabelli 1979). We define communal social formations as organizational arrangements in which the social surplus labor performed by direct producers is appropriated by a collective body which *includes* those producers (Amariglio 1984:5). Under communal forms of surplus appropriation, extractors of surplus labor are, simultaneously, performers of surplus labor. The social group as a whole (the commune) serves as the presupposition for all productive activity. Access to necessary factors of production is guaranteed to all members, and all members participate in determining the division between necessary and surplus labor.

We emphasize that our concept of communal formation does not refer to a single organizational entity. Communal relations of production do not preclude the possibility of significant variation in the political, economic, and cultural means by which these relations are secured. The notion of communal appropriation does not imply organizational "simplicity," perfect equality of access to means of production, or a situation in which the production and distribution of surplus occurs without account. For example, it is not inconceivable for

some communal relations to involve technical divisions of labor involving specialized production of strategic use-values (e.g., subsistence items, tools, containers, etc.), extended social divisions of labor based on forms of socially regulated *unequal* access to various strategic factors of production, and centralized forms of economic redistribution, political planning, and dispute mediation. Moreover, we can imagine certain conditions of communal production entitling some communal agents to shares of extracted surplus without their necessarily having to participate in communal relations of production as performers of surplus labor.

Such arrangements establish a complex social dynamic within even the "simplest" of communal societies concerning how, and how much, surplus is produced and allocated. Recall that such dynamics are always understood to be conditioned by specific sets of ecological and historical circumstances. Thus we can go no further in elaborating our model of communal sociopolitical dynamics without turning to the archaeological record for specific case material. We discuss such material in the next section.

A SOUTHWESTERN CASE STUDY

Our case material comes from the American Southwest, where archaeological research is currently undergoing an exciting period of development (Cordell 1984a). In recent years, much received wisdom about the prehistoric past has undergone reevaluation. Questions about the level of organizational "complexity" attained by prehistoric social forms in the area have been raised anew. Debates have emerged between those emphasizing the egalitarian nature of past societies (Graves et al. 1982) and those emphasizing their nonegalitarian, hierarchical character (Upham 1982; Lightfoot 1984).

Room for a third class of models is created, however, if we accept that the existence of political hierarchy *necessarily* implies very little about its wider institutional context and articulations. On this understanding, it is possible to construct models of Southwestern politics which allow for political complexity but which also preserve ideas about egalitarianism and communalism. We offer here a historical materialist model of the ancient Pueblos as communal societies, one which distinguishes surplus flow from the exercise of power. In this framework, "empowered" political agents are ultimately *subsumed* to the commune, receiving

communally extracted shares of surplus as compensation for performing a variety of political, economic, and cultural functions necessary for reproducing communal relations of production. These functions include determining productive needs, regulating flows of strategic use-values, and arranging ceremonies (one could cast a similar interpretation of the Iroquoian situation: see Trigger, this volume). The social positions of these political agents are many and varied and, further, thoroughly problematic. These agents are continually "squeezed" in different ways by the structure of communal social life. They struggle with each other and with the commune over the amounts of surplus produced and distributed in society and over the precise way these surplus flows are secured by various other social relations (e.g., by the way labor is divided, work coordinated, resources distributed, production planned, ceremonies organized, etc.). Out of these dynamics come impulses to social development conceivably having little to do with the testing of technoenvironmental limits to economic intensification as in a Marxian model, or "scalar" limits to effective decision-making for managing the social order as in non-Marxian models of change.

The existence of the "commune" as a fundamental presupposition for Puebloan social life, and the subsumption and problematic position of elites within the communal social structure, is suggested by ethnographic, ethnohistoric, and archaeological data (Saitta 1987b:87-95). Variation in the latter seems particularly well disposed for further expanding our understanding of diverse patterns of communal political organization and change in the past. This variation takes the form of evidence for local forms of specialization in the production and exchange of ceramic and stone manufactures (Plog 1980; Longacre 1966; DeGarmo 1976; Robertson 1983); intra-settlement differentiation in household size and storage capacity (Lightfoot 1984); and the discontinuous distribution of "exotic" non-local and labor-intensive items across samples of contemporaneous settlements and households within settlements (Upham 1982; Lightfoot 1984).

One of us (Saitta 1987b) has examined data from several prehistoric settlements in the Zuni area (figure 8.1) to show what an examination of this kind of evidence from a labor-theoretic perspective might provide. Limitations of space preclude a detailed exposition of the specific data and bridging arguments used to tie those data to a theory of communal formations. Suffice it to say that analytical emphasis focused on aspects of the prehistoric "built environment" (architectural relationships and




Figure 8.1 The Zuni area.

patterns of space use), using fairly traditional lines of investigation (room-set patterns, ratios of nonresidential to residential built space, and the structure of spatial "sequencing" [Saile 1977]).

The subject of this inquiry was a group of settlements in Togeye

Canyon, New Mexico, located just off the eastern edge of the Zuni Indian Reservation. These settlements date to the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. This is a time period of great organizational flux, if not social "upheaval" in the Zuni area (Anyon et al. 1983). Stuart and Gauthier (1984:131) characterize the period as a "calamitous" one marked by the fragmentation of earlier Chacoan-San Juan Basin social networks, substantial population redistributions to higher elevations, and a restructuring of regional settlement and trading patterns in the form of an "upland economic network." Thus we might expect material patterns on the local level to suggest tensions and struggles relating to the reformation of social boundaries and the principles used to extract and distribute communal labor (Handsman 1985).

While we are still far from reaching a fully satisfying resolution of how groups were organized in Togeye Canyon, why the area was eventually abandoned in the mid thirteenth century, and what long-term political change in the Zuni area involved, preliminary examination of the Togeye data from a labor-theoretic perspective does provide a productive basis for addressing these issues. As understood through our approach, the Zuni data suggest an unlikely combination of features for at least some prehistoric communal societies in the area. This organizational structure involves a delicate, tenuous balance between social subgroup autonomy and interdependence. Briefly, room-set analysis at the largest settlement considered, the 150-room Pettit Site (figure 8.2), discloses a number of different institutional "sites" at which communal relations in Togeye Canyon were transacted. The most basic of such entities is reflected in the persistent association of a single habitation room with (usually) one storage room. These basic organizational units are in turn grouped into larger blocks of rooms, which may represent distinct descent groupings. In most cases, one or more roomblocks can be associated with a single ceremonial room or kiva, which are widely assumed to be indicative of wider, non-lineage-based integrative ties (Steward 1937; Hill 1970).

This "modular" arrangement of architectural units is typical of Puebloan settlements. It suggests the presence in Togeye Canyon of small social units akin to "households" whose productive activities were embedded in, and overdetermined by, institutional relationships of wider scope involving both lineage and nonlineage processes. The ratio of kivas to secular rooms at the Pettit Site is on the order of 1:23, suggesting a relatively high degree of social integration (Steward 1937).




Figure 8.2 The Pettit Site.

However, the existence in roomblocks of what we term “limited activity” rooms renders this interpretation problematic. These rooms contain architectural features reminiscent of kivas and are suggestive of the “clanhouses” described by some Puebloan ethnographers. It is

interesting that when these rooms are figured along with kivas into the computation of nonresidential to residential room ratios, the ratio increases to about 1:6. To us, and adapting arguments advanced by Johnson (1978, 1982), this ratio suggests that those social entities likely possessing the effective capacity to set means of production in motion (our descent groupings) retained a certain amount of socioeconomic autonomy. Further, the fact that many limited activity rooms show evidence of having been remodeled from earlier habitation rooms suggests the establishment, from time to time, of potentially *competing* spheres of socioceremonial integration within the settlement. Evidence for the active maintenance of social boundaries between adjacent roomblocks (e.g., abandoned rooms with secondary debris throughout their fill precisely bracket several of the roomblocks at the site) also buttresses this interpretation.

While our inquiry hints at the relative autonomy of sub-village social groups, at the same time it suggests some significant intergroup dependence in basic productive ventures. Intrasite variation in room size and artifact content suggests the existence of a distinct set of manufacturing rooms for ceramic containers and for stone and bone tools. These rooms are differentially distributed among blocks of rooms. We take this differential distribution as suggesting a measure of lineage or lineage subgroup specialization in the production of strategic use-values. The notion of specialization we have in mind is taken from Cross (1983), in which the production of certain use-values is limited to a small percentage of individuals in a group or to a number of groups within a larger polity. On this view, specialization does not imply market relations, a social class division, or the necessary withdrawal of specialized craftspersons from subsistence production. Rather, it only suggests that the subsistence package of primary producers depended upon the realization of necessary labor in the form of use-values produced elsewhere in an extended division of labor.

This situation could also imply, however, the existence of a set of political agents who received subsumed shares of surplus labor as compensation for regulating the circulation of raw materials and finished products, determining levels of social need, and in general negotiating a balance between the lineage and nonlineage processes shaping the commune. Such subsumed shares might have been realized in the form of work parties that tended “elite” gardens, maintained their houses, or prepared their food (Titiev 1944; Upham

1982). Clues to the existence and complexity of such institutional arrangements in archaeological contexts can be detected by combining information on the number of distinct levels of social integration in a society with information on the different kinds and amounts of nonresidential space in use. The relevant bridging arguments are found in McGuire (1983:127), who understands the resulting "heterogeneity index" as quantifying the distribution of a population between residence groups and institutions. The heterogeneity index of 9.70 produced for Toge Canyon (for further discussion see Saitta [1987b:185-87]) approaches those generated by McGuire for peak developmental periods in the Hohokam culture of southern Arizona (10.01) and the Casas Grandes culture of northwestern Chihuahua (12.67), periods when "complex" sociopolitical structures helped regulate high population densities, the production and distribution of craft items, and a range of activities associated with irrigation agriculture (LeBlanc 1986; Minnis 1984).

If we allow for the plausibility of this complex communal arrangement (one admitting high residence-group autonomy in the conduct of jural and socioceremonial matters, significant residence-group interaction and interdependence in productive activities, and a relatively complex subsumed political structure involving a number of different agents who regulated the productive activity of subcorporate task groups, the distribution of strategic use-values, and labor across residence groupings), then we have an extremely fertile basis for theorizing an array of social tensions and struggles capable of transforming the communal formation from within. Any number of organizational loci where these dynamics can be played out are conceivable. For example, tensions and struggles are imaginable within descent groups concerning access to strategic use-values that are produced by individuals or sets of individuals, but to which other corporate members have sanctioned claims (see Sacks [1979:117] for further elaboration of this point). This dynamic can lead to alliances being struck across descent groupings between subcorporate units charged with specialized production of strategic use-values. Individuals in such alliances would, as a consequence, be forced to struggle with competing social identities and positions, inasmuch as they would understand their labor both in relation to overall social labor and in relation to the extended, lineage-based division of labor. We can also imagine tensions erupting between primary producers and subsumed recipients of surplus labor over the

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Table 8.1. *Space utilization at the Pettit Site*

Type of space	Total amount of space (m ²)
Habitation	424.95
Storage	283.11
Manufacturing	90.59
Limited activity	137.18
Kiva	124.90

Table 8.2. *Activity indices for the Pettit Site*

Index	Value
Manufacturing	0.21
Storage	0.67
Kiva ^a	0.62

^aIncludes limited activity rooms and kivas.

division between necessary and surplus labor, as this affects the share realizable by the latter. Finally, struggles are imaginable among subsumed communal agents over shares of communally appropriated surplus, as well as at the level of individual subsumed recipients who, like primary producers, are faced with conflicting corporate and noncorporate allegiances and interests. Together, these dynamics would present severe obstacles to the oft-assumed easy "decomposability" of small-scale societies along kin lines (e.g., Sahlins 1972 [1965]; Braun and Plog 1982; McGuire 1983).

Preliminary data from Toge Canyon is in hand which justify further research in this direction (tables 8.1 and 8.2). These data are in the form of measures of per capita storage and ceremonial space, achieved by dividing the amount of space given to each kind of functional activity at a settlement by the total amount of habitation space (after Lightfoot 1984:94-96). If we allow that storage can represent an important allocation of communal surplus labor in part for the support of various subsumed functionaries, then we might expect indices of per capita storage space to be relatively high where complex communal political structures exist. Similarly, if we allow that ceremonial space can represent an arena where lineage and nonlineage claims on surplus labor are asserted, negotiated, and resolved, then we

might expect indices of per capita kiva space also to be relatively high where struggles over surplus flow abound.

Storage and kiva indices as determined for the Pettit Site (see discussion in Saitta [1987b:187–89]) are both much higher than those generated for similarly sized and dated sites in eastern Arizona that have been interpreted as seats of political power (Lightfoot 1984). Given no evidence for population pressure on available resources (i.e., arable land) in the Zuni area at this time (Kintigh 1984), we believe our storage index warrants the inference that this production was motivated to fill communal social rather than biological needs. We do not, however, see these needs as stemming from the existence of expansionist political structures as Lightfoot claims for his situation, as there are no obvious indicators of variation in house size, control of storage facilities, or differential mortuary treatment in Togeye Canyon. Nor do we see our high kiva index as warranting the inference that kivas were serving an enhanced redistributive function under conditions of subsistence stress as is commonly assumed (Plog 1974; see Dean et al. 1985 for a critique of this assumption on empirical grounds). Rather, an interpretation emphasizing the kiva's role as a locus of negotiation and struggle over the competing economic and political interests of relatively autonomous kin-groupings seems equally plausible. Data on room remodeling (mentioned above) and one instance where kivas have been constructed back-to-back have yet to be fully analyzed, but our sense is that this evidence will provide additional instructive clues to the nature of communal struggle over surplus flow in Togeye Canyon.

The ultimate impact of these tensions and struggles on Zuni area political organization is not yet clear. The Pettit Site and contemporary settlements were abandoned in the mid thirteenth century, the regional population consolidating into much larger Pueblos like Pueblo de los Muertos at El Morro (Watson et al. 1980), and the Kluckhohn Site in Togeye Canyon (Kintigh 1985). We need better control of time at sites like Pettit, as well as more analyses to complement those discussed above in order to determine what regional political organization was tending toward just prior to population nucleation. Lee (this volume) implies that the communal mode is abandoned neither readily nor easily. It is conceivable that communities like Pettit were on the verge of developing *noncommunal* relations of surplus extraction, and that abandonment was a form of resistance to impulses in this direction. Obviously, not only do we need to fine-tune our analysis of sites like

Pettit, but we must also explicate the political organization of the later, nucleated communities in order to clarify the developmental forces at work and their outcomes.

Probing available data with different schematic variants of a communal model of socioeconomic integration would help in this investigative process. For example, we can ask how different degrees of subsumed agent involvement in communal relations of surplus extraction (as communal performers *and* recipients of surplus) and their participation in external exchange relations might have propelled the communal organization in different directions. We can ask what effects different degrees of continuity in the occupancy of subsumed social positions (e.g., permanent occupancy versus some form of rotated occupancy) might have had on the communal structure. Other organizational features worthy of consideration include the character of producer participation in decision-making (whether direct or through representatives), and variation in the balance written between pooled and privatized appropriation of surplus. We might expect each of these different combinations of features to be beset with its own contradictions and developmental tendencies.

CONCLUSION

We have argued in this chapter for an approach to political development in small-scale societies which puts issues of surplus flow on the analytical agenda. By treating surplus flow as more than just an effect or reflection of power relations, we are able to theorize a wider range of organizational variants, impulses to social change, and developmental outcomes than if we simply reduce economics to politics. We have many examples of simple/acephalous and complex/chiefly societies already in hand, but are experiencing a shortage of social forms conceivably falling between these extremes. We are of the opinion that such social variation awaits our grasp, pending further development of theory capable of penetrating it.

While the specific model of communal integration presented here is in need of refinement, its deployment in the context of the American Southwest casts some doubt on the "simple and egalitarian" paradigm that has long informed interpretations of prehistoric social life in the area. Our formulation raises similar doubts about the "complex and

hierarchical" paradigm, in that we have shown how some of the same data used to support notions of political ranking and economic exploitation in the Southwest can be used to support quite a different model of prehistoric interpersonal relations. Continued effort at refinement stands to enrich our understanding not only of the ancient Pueblos, but of all those societies forming the traditional subject-matter of anthropology.

NOTE

We thank Maura Keene and Yaakov Altman for their comments on a previous draft of this chapter. Special thanks to the participants in the Advanced Seminar for a rigorous cross-examination, and to Steadman Upham for his support, criticisms, and encouragement throughout the project.