

much less to the *cura animarum*. There is, nevertheless, a continuity between Boniface and Trent that is more real than apparent. The emphases are different, but the fundamental idea is the same. In fact, the Tridentine seminary legislation improved on rather than rejected the solution of the problem of the education of the parochial clergy which had held the field from the promulgation of Boniface VIII's constitution *Cum ex eo* in 1298.

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Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being

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I

PARTLY owing to recent concern with religious language¹ among linguistic analysts, partly because of efforts to restore analogy of intrinsic attribution to the place indicated by certain Thomistic texts,² a marked renewal of interest in the problem of analogy in St Thomas Aquinas has made itself manifest in the last few years. The interest stimulated by discussions on analogy during the twenties and thirties of the present century³ never did as a matter of fact fade away, in spite of the warning by Gilson that the pertinent texts are comparatively few in number and surprisingly restrained in scope,⁴ and of the claim by Lyttkens that analogy of proportionality does not "play that central part in St. Thomas, which is ascribed to him in Thomistic quarters."⁵ The present revival of investigation has the merit of breaking away from the confines in which the topic was restricted by the traditions of Cajetan and of Suarez. In the one tradition, analogy of proper proportionality was the sole truly metaphysical type. In the other, analogy of intrinsic attribution alone played that role. Other procedures that used the name of analogy were judged narrowly from these respective viewpoints.⁶

¹ E.g., James F. Ross, 'Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,' *International Philosophical Quarterly*, I (1961), 468-502.

² E.g., T. Marguerite Flanagan, 'The Use of Analogy in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*,' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (1957), 21-37. Ralph J. Masiello, 'The Analogy of Proportion according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas,' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (1958), 91-105.

³ E.g., J. M. Ramírez, 'De Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam,' *La Ciencia Tomista*, XXIV (1921), 20-40; 195-214; 337-357; XXV (1922), 17-38. J. Le Rohellec, 'De Fundamento Metaphysico Analogiae,' *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), XXIX (1926), 77-101; 664-691; 'Cognitio Nostra Analogica de Deo,' XXX (1927), 298-319. T.-L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931). Gerald B. Phelan, *Saint Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, 1941). For the other notable contributions, see the working bibliography in George P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 303-313. The pertinent texts of St. Thomas are collected and analytically indexed by Klubertanz, pp. 163-302.

⁴ Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), pp. 105-106.

⁵ Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World* (Uppsala, 1952), p. 475.

⁶ On the traditions see Lyttkens, pp. 205-241; Klubertanz, pp. 7-12.

The present discussions have the freshness and the verve that come from sincere efforts to transcend these traditional limitations and treat the problem against the broader background of its actual history. The explanation of being through analogy has roots that extend much too deeply into the long history of western metaphysics to allow its solution to be given in a framework of sixteenth century thought.

The whole problem, moreover, is now approached in a way that permits it to be treated of, much more than previously, on its own merits and just in itself. This will be readily appreciated by those who remember the enthusiasm with which analogy was advocated in the twenties and thirties as the master key for opening all the innermost chambers of Thomistic metaphysics. Its privileged function was taken for granted. The whole conatus of the discussions was to establish it as well as possible on the basis of the limited Thomistic texts, and then use it as a tool in explaining the doctrine of being. In the setting developed by Cajetan true metaphysical analogy was restricted to analogy of proper proportionality. As a courteous bow to the Aristotelian background of the doctrine, analogy of attribution was allowed in one way or another to be contained virtually in proper proportionality when applied to the problem of being.⁷ But any application of analogy of attribution in its own right and intrinsically to being, had to be regarded as Suarezian in inspiration and fundamentally anti-Thomistic. The stage was not set for an overall discussion of the general problem of analogy in metaphysics, apart from previous commitment to a determined role already given it for the explanation of being. Today, however, the atmosphere seems sufficiently clear to allow hope of profit in a meta-analogical investigation of the topic.

As is well known and is recognized by all the participants in the discussion, the roots of the problem, historically, are to be sought in the Aristotelian treatises. Aristotle's general doctrine was that being was expressed neither univocally, nor purely equivocally, but still "in many ways."⁸ This provided a clearcut framework for the later Scholastic developments of the topic. In the Neoscholastic writings, accordingly, there were the two extremes of univocity and equivocality, with the broad area between them handed over indiscriminately to the domain of analogy.

⁷ E.g., John of St. Thomas, *Ars Logica*, II, 13, 4; ed. B. Reiser (Turin, 1930) I, 490a 4-13. Le Rohellec, *Divus Thomas*, XXIX (1926), pp. 82-83, tries to make this situation more palatable by maintaining that attribution does not of its nature exclude proportionality, and so, *per accidens*, may allow the form to be inherent in the secondary instances.

⁸ *Metaph.*, I 2, 1003a33-b15; K 3, 1060b32-1061a10.

The fidelity of this situation to its historical roots is very much open to question. Even with the concession that "equivocal by chance"⁹ was identified with the purely equivocal by Aristotle, the rich fields of meaning between it and the univocal were not brought by him under the one designation "analogical." Rather, analogy was only one among several manners in which a notion could be "expressed in many ways" without thereby becoming equivocal by chance.¹⁰ There are a number of these ways applied by Aristotle to being,¹¹ but analogy is conspicuously not one of them.¹² As the doctrine was handed down to the Scholastics by Boethius, "equivocals by design" (*consilio*) were distinguished from "equivocals by chance" (*casu*); and under "equivocals by design" were included, along with other types, analogy (*secundum proportionem*) and reference.¹³ There need be little surprise, then, to find St. Thomas calling "equivocal"¹⁴ what the Neoscholastics would place under analogy.

Are these discrepancies between Neoscholastic use and its historical antecedents merely a matter of terminology? Or do the variations in terminology indicate deep doctrinal divergencies? The real difficulties and problems raised by the present-century discussions could hardly be so persistent if the trouble were just with words. Moreover, no misunderstanding has even arisen from the arbitrary restriction of the term "univocal" to denote things that have the same definition as designated by the same word. Etymologically it signifies merely designation by one word, whether the things so designated are different

⁹ Aristotle, *E N*, I 6, 1096b26-27. The example of *Zōion* for "animal" and "painting," as given by Aristotle in the *Categories* (1, 1a1-6) is classed by Boethius (see *infra*, n. 13) as an "equivocal by design." The other Aristotelian examples are *kleis* (*E N*, V 1, 1129a29-31) for "key" and "collarbone," and *onos* (*Top.*, I 15, 107a19-21) for "donkey" and "windless." These examples are not of the purely equivocal type found for example in "date" as a day of the month and as the fruit of a palm.

¹⁰ I have discussed this topic at some length in *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 49-63.

¹¹ *Metaph.*, Δ 7, 1017a7-b8; E 2, 1026a33-b2.

¹² See G. L. Muskens, *De Vocis Analogias Significatione ac Usu apud Aristotelem* (Groningen, 1943).

¹³ Boethius, *In Cat. Arist.*, I; PL LXIV, 166BC.

¹⁴ E.g.: "... sicut ille qui docet in scholis dicitur magister, et similiter ille qui praeest domui dicitur magister domus, aequivoce, et tamen propinqua aequivocatione propter similitudinem; uterque enim est rector, hic quidem scholarum, ille vero domus. Unde propter hanc propinquitatem vel generis vel similitudinis, non videntur esse aequivocationes, cum tamen sint." *In VII Phys.*, lect. 8, (ed. Leonine) no. 8. Cf. *De Ente*, c. IV (ed. Roland-Gosselin), p. 35.24-28; CG, IV, 29, Sed licet; ST, I, 13, 10, ad 4m; *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi) no. 1982. On St. Thomas' conception of the different grades of equivocality, see *In VII Phys.*, loc. cit.

in definition or not. Correspondingly the term "equivocal" signifies, etymologically, equal designation by the same word. Only by linguistic use is it restricted to things that differ in definition. The Aristotelian technical terms that these words were used to translate were open each to both meanings. *Synonymon*, the term translated by "univocal," is found used by the Stagirite¹⁵ for the designation of things that are not univocal in the established technical sense of the word. *Homonymon*, technically rendered by "equivocal," is likewise found used by Aristotle in the now established sense of univocal.¹⁶ Yet these facts have never caused any real trouble in the discussions on univocity and equivocity.

Why then should etymological considerations be of any real concern in the philosophical use of the term "analogy"? Etymologically, the word means "proportion" or "according to a ratio." As is well enough known, its technical use in philosophy was taken by Aristotle from its application in mathematics. Originally it meant equality of ratio in different sets of terms.¹⁷ As two is to four, so six is to twelve. The ratio in both sets is half. Transferred to use outside the mathematical order, it changes the required equality in ratio to similarity in relations: "the second is related to the first as the fourth is to the third."¹⁸ In this way as sight is to the eye, so intelligence is to the soul.¹⁹ Such analogies run through all the categories of being, and constitute a wider basis for grouping things than do the genera.²⁰ They require four terms, since the similarity is between two relations, with each relation demanding two terms. In mathematics the same number could function as two terms, namely as the two inner terms of the analogy. Two is to four as four is to eight is a perfectly legitimate type. It may be transposed to read that four is to eight as two is to four. What is not allowed is to use the same term in the first and third positions. Two is to four as two is to x is merely repetition, not analogy. The advantage of analogy is that when three of the terms are known the fourth can be reached. Knowing that the ratio of three to x is that of two to six, you know as a conclusion that x is nine.

¹⁵ *Metaph.*, α 1,993b25. Accordingly St. Thomas, *In II Metaph.*, lect. 2, uses *univoce* (no. 292) and *univocatione* (no. 293) for predication according to various degrees of perfection.

¹⁶ See Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.*, 514b13-18. Cf.: "Quinto secundum aequivocationem, idest secundum communicationem nominum, . ." St. Thomas, *ST*, III, 2, 6c.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *EN*, V 3,1131a29-b17.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Po.*, 21,1457b16-18.

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Top.*, I 17,108a11.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Metaph.*, Δ 6,1017a1-3.

So understood, analogy offers alluring prospects of application in philosophical problems. Knowing what sight is and what the eye is, knowing also the relation of the one to the other, and knowing what intelligence is and that intelligence has a corresponding relation to soul, one should have the means of reasoning to what soul is. Yet, as is quite obvious, considerable care is demanded in the use of this procedure outside mathematical fields. One must be sure that one has independent knowledge of the three terms, and that the third term is really susceptible of a proportion similar to that which holds between the other two. This cannot be expected to turn out as facile as in the univocal relations between mathematical terms. The ratios in the sets of terms will not be strictly the same, but only similar. Great caution, therefore, will have to be used in the further application of a proportion taken from any one set of the terms.

But does this mathematical origin of the notion require that the term "analogy" be kept restricted to four-term relations in its philosophical use? Actually it has not been, as anyone acquainted with mediaeval metaphysics is well aware. It became current as the designation of the Aristotelian predication by reference to a single nature, for instance in the predication of being through reference to a primary instance. This involved only a two-term relation, as in the relation of an effect to its cause or a of sign to the thing signified. St Thomas, in fact, could introduce the application of analogy to important philosophical problem without even mentioning the four-term kind.²¹ Is this seemingly alien extension of the word "analogy" workable in terms of its own proper vocabulary, or is it bound to engender confusion?

Clearly, the question cannot be settled through merely etymological considerations, nor even on the basis of historical precedents. In the case of the terms for univocals and equivocals, the etymology was non-committal; and there are instances of their use in senses opposed to those that became technical. From these angles there appears no reason why "analogy" should not be given new senses in philosophical vocabulary. The problem, rather, centers around linguistic techniques. Given that linguistic uses of a word and its derivatives are already firmly established, can a new technical use of that word be introduced without giving rise to impossible linguistic situations? If such situations are inevitably entailed by the new use of the word, its application in this sense may be expected to cause notable confusion.

²¹ E.g., *CG*, I, 34.

Finally, even if the extension of the word "analogy" to two-term relations be granted, is it even then capable of signifying all the procedures found in the wide area between univocity and pure equivocality? Or are there in this area other ways of predication that cannot by any accepted understanding of the word be brought under the heading of analogy? Is analogy, in whatever different ways it has been used, wide enough to serve as the approach to being in a Thomistic context? Or is it just one among several required approaches to the problem? If it happens in its actual use to be only one among many approaches, is there any way of bringing these further approaches under its sway, and so to establish it as a single term that covers the whole area between pure equivocality on the one hand and univocity on the other? Is it at all possible to make the situation that simple, at least from a viewpoint of external systematization?

These, then, are questions that arise when the problem of being is approached against a background that excludes univocity and pure equivocality, and seeks to cover the whole intermediate territory by a procedure or procedures named analogy. By the same token, though, any such procedure that may in Scotistic fashion be explained in terms of concepts one the same and the others different, is completely excluded from the discussion. That procedure would obviously be univocity, as understood in the Aristotelian setting. In the species of a genus there is the same generic concept and there are the concepts of the differentiae.²² The specific concepts accordingly are partly the same and partly different. But both sameness and difference are each effected by respective univocal concepts. Not at all in this sense are the things in the intermediate territory both same and different. Here, partly the same and partly different does not mean the same by one concept and different by another concept. Rather, the one concept that renders the things the same is the concept that renders them different. Conversely, the concept that makes them different is the concept that makes them coincide under the one notion.²³ Identity and yet differentiation by the

²² On the problem of analogy among things denoted univocally by a generic concept, see Armand Maurer, 'St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus,' *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 127-144.

²³ See Gerald B. Phelan, *Saint Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, 1941), pp. 29-30. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. IV, (ed. Zammit) no. 36, regards the analogous things as simply (*simpliciter*) different but in some way (*secundum quid*, *idest secundum proportionem*) the same. If this terminology is to be used, the *secundum quid* cannot be conceived in any univocal manner. Both the difference and the sameness have to be essential to the notion—"eandem formam in pluribus inveniri essentialiter dissimilem simul et essentialiter similem"—J. Le Rohellec, 'De Fundamento Metaphysico Analogiae,' *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), XXIX (1926), 89. No infinite regress in the notions, therefore, is commenced.

one feature is the only way a notion can escape falling under either the one or the other of the two extremes, univocity and pure equivocality. To fall into the area dealt with by the present discussion, the one notion must exercise both functions. It has to both unite and differentiate without the aid of any other concept. In approaching God from creatures against this background, there is no question of taking a concept that is univocally common to God and creatures, and crossing it with another univocal concept that restricts its extension to God. That is the procedure of Duns Scotus.²⁴ To speak of God and his perfections without univocity means, on the contrary, that each of the concepts used is of itself different while of itself the same, in its respective application to God and to creatures.

II

The accepted Latin equivalent for the Greek *analogia*, in classical Latin, in St. Augustine, and among the Scholastics,²⁵ was *proportio*. But *proportio*, just as "proportion" in English, could mean a two-term relation. You may say, for instance, that the proportion of three to six is half. From the meaning of this mathematical relation *proportio* was given the transferred sense of any relation whatsoever between two things, according to the mediaeval understanding of the term:

... proportio secundum primam nominis institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem determinatum excessum vel adaequationem; sed ulterius est translatus ad significandum omnem habitudinem cuiuscumque ad aliud.²⁶

In consequence, the two-term relation came to be viewed simply as a *proportio*, and a new name was required for the four-term relation in the original Aristotelian analogy. Regarded as a likeness of proportions, the four-term type was called proportionality.²⁷ Hence arose the technical designation "analogy of proportionality." According to the

²⁴ Texts of Duns Scotus illustrating this way of forming concepts about God may be found collected in my study 'Up to What Point is God included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?', *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 165-172.

²⁵ See J. M. Ramirez, 'De Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam,' *La Ciencia Tomista*, XXIV (1921), 22-23, footnotes, for some instances.

²⁶ St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m; ed. Vivès, XI, 485a (*ST*, Suppl., 92, 1, ad 6m). Cf.: "... proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum, et aequale, sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur." *ST*, I, 12, 1, ad 4m.

²⁷ See St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, II, 11c.

Aristotelian analysis, four-term analogy could be the foundation of metaphorical predication: "That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D."²⁸ In metaphor the sense of one term is transferred to the sense of another, on the basis of the analogy. In the predication "Lindbergh was an eagle," the sense of "eagle" is transferred to the sense of "intrepid flier," on the ground of the relations of Lindbergh and an eagle to their respective ways of flying. In this type of analogy the proper sense of the predicate is not applied to the other term. "Metaphorically" is thus opposed to "properly" by Cajetan,²⁹ and accordingly with John of St. Thomas metaphor becomes known technically as "analogy of improper or metaphorical proportionality,"³⁰ in contrast to "analogy of proper proportionality," in which there is no transference of sense.

The historical development of the terms "analogy of proper proportionality" and "analogy of improper proportionality," therefore, should make clear the force of the terms "proper" and "improper." These characteristics do not apply to the analogy itself. In both cases there is four-term analogy, fully in agreement with the original mathematical model. Both are properly analogy. The designations "proper" and "improper" in these expressions affect only the sense in which one of the terms is applied. The contrast is between the proper sense of that term, and a transferred sense. But both types exhibit the original notion of 'analogy' in as proper a sense as the notion can have outside the mathematical order.

What help can four-term analogy offer for the Thomistic explanation of being? Three ways have been proposed. One is the explanation of the divine being through analogy with essence and existence in creatures. The other is the investigation of accidents as analogous with substance, again in terms of essence and being. The third is the inquiry into the perfections contained in subsistent being, through analogy with the

²⁸ Aristotle, *Po.*, 21,1457b16-19; Oxford tr. R. R. Boyle, 'The Nature of Metaphor,' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXI (1954), 274-275, would reject this traditional basis of metaphor, on the claim that metaphor is "a denial of all analogy." However true this claim may be from the viewpoint of external literary form, philosophically the transfer of sense in metaphor is made clearly on the basis of analogy. From a philosophical standpoint, therefore, no hesitation need arise about regarding metaphor as a type of analogy. Cf. discussion in *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIV (1957), 283-301.

²⁹ *De Nominum Analogia*, c. III, (ed. Zammit) no. 25.

³⁰ *Ars Logica*, II, 13, 3; ed. Reiser, I, 484b38-40.

perfections found in creatures. Are any or all of these applications of analogy justifiable from the viewpoint of metaphysics?

The first application of the four-term analogy would run: "As a creature is to its being, so is God to his proper being." The difficulty lies in the number of terms. Are they four, or are they really only three? A creature is other than its being, and so gives rise to two really distinct and proportional terms. But are God and his being two distinct terms? In reality they are but the one term, for they are strictly identical. Even the concepts of the divine essence and the divine being exhibit no intrinsic distinction. Intrinsically the concept of the divine essence contains being and nothing else — *esse tantum*. The only difference here is in the words used to express them, a difference that arises not from anything in the divine essence and being, but just from the difference between essence and being in creatures. There is of course no question here of the verbal expression "divine essence" as analogous to the verbal expression "divine being." The problem concerns at least the content of the two concepts. Their content is intrinsically identical, and not at all proportional. There are only three terms, and the three are not arranged in a way that would allow one to function as two, according to the model "three is to six as six is to twelve." The single term is not shared by both couplets, but would have to function as both terms in one of the couplets. The model would then become "three is to six as twelve is to twelve." It obviously does not work. Rather, one would say that twelve is related to twelve quite differently from any proportional way. It is identical with itself, not proportional to itself. Identity does not set up one of the two proportions required by the Scholastic notion of proportionality, namely a similarity of proportions.

At any rate, in a passage that has left itself open to different interpretations from the viewpoint of analogy, St. Thomas sharply distinguishes the identity of God with his being from the relation of creatures to their being:

Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit.³¹

Since the text has been read to mean that God is related proportionally to his being as creatures are to theirs, and in quite opposite fashion to signify that God is not related to his existence proportionally, as creatures are, the interpretation has to be thrown back upon the overall

³¹ *De Pot.*, VII, 7c.

notions involved in the statement. Certainly identity is a relation for St. Thomas.³² There is no difficulty in translating the *se habet* in the sense that God is related to his own being because he is identical with it. But can it mean that he is proportional to his being? According to the etymology of *proportio* and according to the mathematical examples given to illustrate it, this interpretation is impossible. Proportion seems from its very notion to require difference in the proportional terms, for instance in three as half of six. There does not seem to be any use of the word that would allow three to be proportional to three, or six to be proportional to six. Yet the requirement for the Scholastic analogy of proportionality was a likeness of proportions. In the present case one of the required proportions is lacking. There does not seem any possibility, then, of predicating being of God and creatures by analogy of proportionality, as proportionality was understood by St. Thomas.³³

It is clear, moreover, that in this case analogy cannot be a means of increasing knowledge about God. It has to presuppose that three of the terms are already known, namely creatures, their being, and God. The fourth term will be identical with the third, since God is identical with his being. The knowledge of both the essence and the existence of God is presupposed by this attempted analogy. It cannot result in new knowledge, in imitation of a mathematical model like "two is to four as six is to x ."

Is the second application of analogy of proportionality, namely in the case of substance and accidents, possible with regard to the predication of being? If each accident, including relation, has its own proper act of existing, corresponding to its essence and really distinct from its essence and from the being of the substance on which it depends,³⁴ there is hardly

³² "...relatio identitatis, quae distinctionem operari non potest, sicut dicitur idem eidem idem." CG, IV, 10, Nam relatio. Cf. ST, I, 28, 1, ad 2m; In V *Metaph.*, lect. 11, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi) no. 912.

³³ So Lyttkens, p. 475, n. 6; M. S. O'Neill, 'Some Remarks on the Analogy of God and Creatures in St. Thomas Aquinas,' *Mediaeval Studies*, XXIII (1961), pp. 208-209. For the contrary view and interpretation of the text, see James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being* (St. Louis, 1949), 293-294; 'Some Basic Propositions concerning Metaphysical Analogy,' *The Review of Metaphysics*, V (1952), 470-472.

³⁴ The present reaction against Cajetan and Bafiez goes to a seemingly unwarranted extreme in claiming that a real distinction between an accident's being and the being of the substance in which the accident inheres was unknown to St. Thomas; e.g., Cornelio Fabro, 'L'Obscurcissement de l' 'Esse' dans l'Ecole Thomiste,' *Revue Thomiste*, LVIII (1958), pp. 460-465. See also other instances listed in J. S. Albertson, 'The *Esse* of Accidents according to St. Thomas,' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1953), pp. 271-272, n. 14. To maintain that being is really distinct from thing in creatures, however, does not at all mean

any problem. There will always be the four terms, the proportion between the two terms in each set, and the required likeness between the proportions. As substance is to its being, so is quality to qualitative being:

... vel unum analogia seu proportionem, sicut substantia et qualitas in ente: quia sicut se habet substantia ad esse sibi debitum, ita et qualitas ad esse sui generis conveniens.³⁵

The same holds in regard to the other accidents, even in the case of relations:

In nobis enim relationes habent esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae: unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit.³⁶

The reason for the ever present proportionality throughout the categories is the key Thomistic doctrine that finite form always limits and specifies a produced act of being:

Quia enim forma est principium essendi, necesse est quod secundum quamlibet formam habitam, habens aliquam esse dicatur. ... Si vero sit talis forma quae sit extranea ab essentia habentis eam, secundum illam formam non dicitur esse simpliciter, sed esse aliquid: sicut secundum albedinem homo dicitur esse albus...³⁷

According to this overall doctrine, the kind of being a thing has is determined by its substantial form and its accidental forms. The being, accordingly, corresponds to the form it actuates. Knowing that an existent substance is extended, you know thereby that it has an added accidental act of being that corresponds to its quantity. You can conclude that the accidental being is other than the substantial being, because the accidental being is proportional to and determined by the accidental form, while the substantial being is proportional to the substantial form. In this way analogy of proportionality is a means of increasing metaphysical knowledge.

an obligation to regard created being as a *res* in the fashion of Giles of Rome. Nor does it mean that all created being is substantial being. The *inesse* of an accident is a real existential act really distinct from substantial being as well as from accidental essence. It cannot make the essence it actuates exist in the manner of a substance, though such seems to be the view of the opponents here; e.g., "This second *esse* is not a second act of existing; that would make the accident into a substance joined to another." Clifford G. Kossel, 'Principles of St. Thomas's Distinction between the *Esse* and *Ratio* of Relation,' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIV (1947), 93, n. 4.

³⁵ St. Thomas, In III *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 8 (no. 12).

³⁶ CG, IV, 14, (Leonine manual) no. 7c.

³⁷ In Boeth. *De Hebdom.*, c. II; ed. Mandonnet, *Opusc.*, I, 174.

The notion of being that is so established throughout the categories by analogy of proportionality is quite evidently neither univocal nor purely equivocal. The one notion, namely actuation of essence, is present in all instances. There is accordingly the required similarity of proportions. But "actuation of essence" has its formal determination from the essence itself, and so differs with each formal difference of essence. There can be no question of its being the same in one notion and different in another notion, since every form, as the above text makes clear, is just by itself a formal determinant of being. The same notion, accordingly, exhibits both the likeness and the difference. It belongs in the area between univocity and pure equivocality. It is, moreover, a notion that is superior to all its instances, even though it is shared primarily by substance and by the other instances secondarily and in dependence upon substance.

Finally, there is the application of analogy of proportionality to make explicit the perfections of subsistent being. If unity, truth, goodness, and beauty are shown to follow inevitably upon being and to correspond to the being a thing has, subsistent being will possess these characteristics in the highest degree, because it is being in the highest degree. Further, since the perfection of a thing corresponds to its being, no perfection of anything will be lacking in subsistent being.³⁸ If the perfection contains no defect or imperfection in its proper notion, like goodness or intelligence, it is predicated of God in its proper sense. If its notion, on the other hand, involves limitation or imperfection, like hearing or feeling, it has to be applied to God in a transferred sense that involves no limitation. In the second case the proportionality is that of metaphor.³⁹ Even if a perfection with no limitation in its own notion, like truth, is applied to God in the limited sense in which it is found in creatures, there is only a metaphor.⁴⁰

This method of analogy undoubtedly yields much positive knowledge of God. It shows how innumerable divine perfections follow upon the divine being. It establishes the divine attributes. Through metaphor it expresses the divine nature and qualities in the appealing way that is so important for religious and moral life. Yet the reservations are drastic. Always the third term of the analogy, namely God himself, remains in one sense utterly unknown. In the same sense the fourth term of the analogy, that is, the divine perfection that is reached through the analogy with creatures, will likewise remain utterly un-

³⁸ St. Thomas, *ST*, I, 4, 2c.

³⁹ *De Ver.*, II, 11c.

⁴⁰ *De Ver.*, I, 7c.

known. Metaphysical reasoning shows that the existence known through judgment in a sensible thing is caused efficiently by something else and ultimately by subsistent being.⁴¹ The reasoning is based not upon anything known quidditatively through the first operation of the mind, simple apprehension, but upon an act that is known by way of an active synthesizing in the second operation of the mind and not at all in the manner of a still life object able to serve as a starting point for quidditative knowledge.⁴² The result is the anomaly that the metaphysician knows with certainty that God exists without knowing his existence, for the divine existence is the divine essence.⁴³ That God exists, is a quiddity. But creatures provide no starting point for knowing it as a quiddity. Yet every perfection in God is his existing:

Quidquid autem est in Deo, hoc est suum proprium esse; sicut enim essentia in eo est idem quod esse, ita scientia idem est quod scientem esse in eo; unde, cum esse quod est proprium unius rei non possit alteri communicari, impossibile est quod creatura pertingat ad eandem rationem habendi aliquid quod habet Deus; sicut impossibile est quod ad idem esse perveniat.⁴⁴

Every perfection in God, then, is as utterly unknowable to men as is his being. Hence arises the peculiar situation that one can know that God is good, in the proper sense of the notion "good," without having even the faintest notion of what goodness in God is, just as one does not know at all what the divine existence is. Similarly one can know that God is truth, that he is intelligence, that he is wise, and so on, all according to the proper notions of these attributes, without having the least notion of what they are on the divine level. The positive theology has to be complemented everywhere by the concomitant negative theology:

... et iterum cognoscitur *per ignorantiam* nostram, inquantum scilicet hoc ipsum est Deum cognoscere, quod nos scimus nos ignorare de Deo quid sit.⁴⁵

Needless to say, the same holds all the more for metaphor, in which the notion is applied not in its proper meaning but only in a transferred sense.

⁴¹ *De Ente*, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 34.7-35.16. *ST*, I, 2, 3c (2a via).

⁴² See J. Owens, 'Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas,' *Mediaeval Studies*, XXII (1960), pp. 284-297.

⁴³ *CG*, I, 12; *ST*, I, 2, 1c; I, 3, 4, ad 2m. Cf. "penitus (utterly—tr. English Dominican Fathers) manet ignotum," *CG*, III, 49, Cognoscit; "omnino ignotum," *In Epist. ad Rom.*, I, 6 (ed. Vivès, XX, 398b).

⁴⁴ *De Ver.*, II, 11c.

⁴⁵ *In De Div. Nom.*, c. VII, lect. 4, (ed. Pera) no. 731. In this regard the pertinent texts of St. Thomas have to be interpreted "not in the order of the quidditative concept, but in that of judgment." E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 106.

III

In classical Latin, *analogia* retained the status of a term borrowed from the Greek. With *proportio* handed down as its equivalent, however, it was easily acclimatized in mediaeval Scholasticism in the same meanings as *proportio*, namely as a definite relation of one quantity to another, and then as any relation of one thing to another.⁴⁶ Accordingly it was at hand to designate the two-term relations involved in the Aristotelian predication by reference to one nature (*pros hen*). These relations could be that of cause to effect, as a medicine is healthy because it causes health. They could be that of sign to thing signified, as a color is healthy because it is a sign of health. They could be that of effect to cause, as a treatise is medical because it proceeds from medical art.⁴⁷ In every case, however, the relation was two-term. With *proportio* understood in this sense, *proportionalitas* was required to designate the four-term relation. Against this background the two-term kind was regarded as analogy of proportion and the other type as analogy of proportionality.⁴⁸ For the same reason the two-term sort was called analogy of simple proportion, in contrast to the multiple proportions involved in proportionality. In the Latin Averroes,⁴⁹ the Aristotelian predication by reference had been described as *per attributionem*. In consequence "analogy of attribution" also became an accepted Scholastic designation for this type. As the Aristotelian example of "health" made the denominating form extrinsic to all but its primary instance, the denomination through reference to it was regarded by St. Thomas as *ab aliquo extrinseco*, in contrast to denomination *ab aliqua forma sibi inherente*, as in the case of secondary instances of the good.⁵⁰ Against this background, in the wake of the Suaresian emphasis on the intrinsic participation of being, the designation "analogy of intrinsic attribution" was coined for the latter type.

A sharp difference may be expected between the way in which a thing is denominated from an intrinsic characteristic and the way in which it

⁴⁶ On these meanings of *proportio*, see *supra*, nn. 25-26.

⁴⁷ See St. Thomas, *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 3, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi) nos. 2196-2197.

⁴⁸ *De Ver.*, II, 11c.

⁴⁹ Averroes, *In IV Metaph.*, comm. 2, (Venice, 1574) fol. 66r1 (B).

⁵⁰ St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 2m. Cf. ad 3m, and the end of the corpus of the article; also *In I Eth.*, lect. 7, (ed. Pirotta) no. 96. On the use of the Aristotelian model "healthy" in St. Thomas, see W. W. Meissner, 'Some Notes on a Figure in St. Thomas,' *The New Scholasticism*, XXXI (1957), 68-84.

is denominated from an extrinsic nature, even though in both cases the denomination is made in reference to a primary instance. In the one case the reference itself is not the notion predicated. In the other case, namely the extrinsic, the notion predicated is exactly the reference:

... dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis,... et in talibus, quod denominatur per respectum ad alterum, non denominatur ab aliqua forma sibi inherente, sed ab aliquo extrinseco ad quod refertur. Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa; ... et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum;...⁵¹

What does this mean? According to the Aristotelian illustration, "health," the reference to a primary nature is the notion predicated of the secondary instances. When you say that spinach is healthy, you mean "Spinach is a cause of health." Spinach is considered to be related to health as the cause of health. Exactly that reference "cause" is what you predicate in this instance, as even the structure of the sentence "Spinach is a cause — of health" shows. The relation of cause is in the spinach and so can be a notion predicated of it. But in a mess of cooked spinach there is nothing that even remotely enjoys health. The denomination, accordingly, is from the extrinsic primary instance to which the spinach is referred when it is called healthy as a cause of health, but the notion predicated is the reference itself. What is predicated is "health-causing," not "health," though the denomination is of course from "health."

On the other hand, the denominating notion itself is predicated when it expresses a characteristic intrinsic to the secondary instances, like goodness in creatures. In this case the reference is not the notion predicated but rather the cause of what the notion expresses. When a sensible thing's goodness is understood as a participation of the primary good, it is known as good through reference to something else, and yet as possessing inherent goodness. Its own inherent goodness is here the notion predicated of it, though with the understanding that it is participated goodness. The reference to the primary instance is not what is predicated, as it was in the previous case. When you say "My Cadillac is good," the notion you are predicating is not "participation," as was the notion "cause" in "Spinach is healthy." The notion you are predicating now is "good." But when you realize that the Cadillac, despite its perfection, has only participated goodness, you are

⁵¹ St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 2m.

understanding the predicate "good" in reference to its exemplar and efficient cause, somewhat as Plato understood things in the light of Ideas:

... unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effectis; et sic unumquodque dicitur bonum sicut forma inherente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam, et ulterius per bonitatem primam, sicut per exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatis creatae. Quantum ad hoc opinio Platonis sustineri potest.⁵²

Where a cause leaves its likeness impressed upon its effects, therefore, it produces the ground for reference on the basis of an inherent characteristic. In this way the being of secondary instances is an imitation of the primary being. The same holds for the other characteristics of creatures:

... non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accedens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.⁵³

Being, accordingly, is found in all created things as an imitation of the first being. Being, therefore, and not the reference to their cause, is the notion predicated of them. As the imitations are of various degrees, they are differentiated as imitations. There is no difficulty then in placing this type of predication in the area between univocity and pure equivocity, for the likeness and the difference are both found in the one characteristic. The primary instance is not an inferior of the characteristics, but is the characteristic itself. The secondary instances, however, are the characteristic's inferiors, even though there is order of prior and subsequent in their partaking of it. Accordingly God does not come under the common notion of being, but substance and accidents do:

Sed duplex est analogia. Quaedam secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno quod eis per prius et posterius convenit; et haec analogia non potest esse inter Deum et creaturam, sicut nec univocatio. Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum.⁵⁴

⁵² *De Ver.*, XXI, 4c.

⁵³ *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 10.

⁵⁴ *In I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 820.

Being, then, is an inherent characteristic in all its secondary instances. In all these instances it exhibits an imitation in various degrees of its primary instance. Since some knowledge of a thing can be gained from its likenesses, created things provide in this way a means of knowing their creator.⁵⁵ But the same caution as before is necessary. In the procedure from effects to cause God is reached as being only, for he is reached as one whose nature is to be. But the human mind has no proper quidditative concept of being. It knows being originally through judgment, and then conceptualizes it under the common notions of act or perfection. But it is not conceived under any concept proper to being. Hence on the basis of the imitations in creatures one can know that God exists and that he has all their perfections, without knowing what the divine existence is or what the perfections are in God.

With this important reservation, however, the ways to God from imitations in creatures may readily be seen to occupy the basic place in metaphysical procedure. Through them the existence and nature of God are reached, as far as is possible for unaided human reason, and the third term is thereby provided for reasoning about the divine attributes through proportionality. But may the two-term relation be designated as "analogy" in English? The *Oxford English Dictionary* (s.v.) lists as obsolete the use of the term to express the correspondence or proportion of one thing to another. There is no harm in using an obsolete word to render in English the technical designation of a mediaeval Scholastic procedure. Any other way of translating it in the texts of St. Thomas would be intolerable. But once "analogy of attribution," "analogy of simple proportion," and "analogy of proportion" are conceded as technical terms, can the further English vocabulary of analogy be used meaningfully in their regard? Can you say, with any meaning, in English, that spinach is analogous to health because it is the cause of health? Can you say that a rosy color in the cheeks is analogous to bodily health because it is a sign of health? Can you say that a scalpel and surgical art are analogous as instrument and skill? These are instances of extrinsic attribution. But does intrinsic similarity fare any better? Would you say there is an analogy between a son and a father because of their similarity in looks or character? Is an imitation leather purse described as analogous to a genuine one? In present day

⁵⁵ See *De Pot.*, VII, 7. In *De Ver.*, II, 11, any *determinata habitudo* is denied between creatures and God. The reason is that the creature is finite, while God is infinite (*ibid.*, arg. 2m). The effects are "non proportionatos causae" (*ST*, I, 2, 2, ad 3m), and so do not provide perfect knowledge of the cause.

English, rather, the vocabulary of analogy is at home only in the four-term relations.⁵⁶

IV

Finally, there are types of equivocity that do not in any way come under the caption "analogy," and nevertheless are applied to being. St. Thomas writes of Avicenna:

Similiter etiam deceptus est ex aequivocatione entis. Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale,... Sed ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia.⁵⁷

Here the equivocity is in the notion of being as existential act and as the nature that possesses or is able to possess existential act. Both thing and existential act are called being (*ens*). No attempt is made to name this "analogy." One could hardly say that an existent thing is analogous to its own existence. Even before it exists one would not speak of an analogy between it and its existence. But there is not pure equivocity either, for a thing is called a being obviously on account of its relation to its being. It is a type of mixed equivocity, and yet is not analogy.

The difference in status between a thing in act and a thing in potency, mentioned in the preceding text, is listed by Aristotle as one of the ways in which a notion may take on various meanings. It is a way expressly applied by him to being.⁵⁸ Another way is the predication of the same term essentially and accidentally. This likewise is applied to being.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ The restriction of "analogy" to four-term relations opens the problem of a suitable term to cover the whole area between univocity and pure equivocity. There are a number available, e.g., systematic ambiguity, equivocity (by design), multisignificance, multivalence, and so on. "Equivocity" corresponds to the traditional Boethian nomenclature. It does not seem to have recognized uses outside the present context, and so does not give rise to confusion. "Equivocal" is as wide in meaning as "ambiguous," and is not restricted in English to pure equivocity. The connotations of deliberate deception arising from the use of "equivocate" and "equivocation" in the moral field need not enter into the metaphysical area. Even these terms, however, do not necessarily imply pure equivocity, as can be seen in the difference between the conventional "I do not know" in the sense of non-professional knowledge, and "But I already have a date for tonight" with the meaning of one in the ice-box for the evening snack. Nor does the effort to get a suitable notion to cover the whole area mean that all the types are brought under a univocal concept, any more than the one concept of pure equivocity makes its various instances univocal.

⁵⁷ In *X Metaph.*, lect. 3, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi) no. 1892.

⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Metaph.*, A 7, 1017a35-b8; E 2, 1026b1-2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 1017a7-22; 1026a33-34.

In St. Thomas this latter way takes on a special significance, since being is both accidental and essential to all its secondary instances.⁶⁰

In neither of these ways does the predication take place by pure equivocity. A possible dollar and an actual dollar are not called by the same name merely through chance. Nor is it just by chance that the one word "is" finds itself used to say that Socrates is a man and that Socrates is cultured. In both cases "is" expresses a synthesis of Socrates with a form, in one case an essential synthesis, in the other case an accidental synthesis. There is partial sameness and partial difference in the one notion of being, as it is used of the actual and the potential, and of the essential and accidental. Yet this partial sameness and partial difference is not called "analogy." A like situation is found with regard to being in the sense of truth.⁶¹

V

This very general survey of the wide territory between univocity and pure equivocity seems to show that it cannot be covered by the one notion "analogy." Analogy and its vocabulary are perfectly at home in the area of four-term relations, whether the notion at issue keeps its proper sense or is applied through metaphor in a transferred sense. In predication through reference, where only two terms are involved, the designation "analogy of attribution" is the technical Scholastic term. But in English, this implies an obsolete use of the word "analogy," and does not allow the current vocabulary of analogy to express its meaning. To continue regarding it as "analogy," then, except in the sense of a mediaeval *cliché* that has no bearing on the present use of language, can hardly help but engender confusion. It will be expected to function as analogy, and yet will not be able to do so in the current understanding of the vocabulary. Other types of partial sameness and partial difference

⁶⁰ On this topic, see my article 'The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,' *Mediaeval Studies*, XX (1958), 1-40.

⁶¹ Aristotle, loc. cit., 1017a31-35; 1026a34-35. The complicated situation that results from trying to reduce this type and equivocity through act and potency to "analogy," may be seen in Klubertanz, pp. 140-141. In neither case does the reduction seem to be without remainder. To say that a house is ashes and smoke because it can be burned into them, expresses something that eludes the traditional Scholastic types of *analogia*; and the still life "being as truth" in the reflexive simple apprehension of the intellect differs from the active synthesizing grasped through judgment, in a way that is over and above their subsequent-prior relation and is not expressed by it. Further types of equivocity are required to cover these situations.

in the one notion, types that are important for the explanation of being, do not come even traditionally under the designation of analogy.

Analogy therefore is quite restricted in its role as an approach to the Thomistic doctrine of being. In its unchallenged sense, namely in the area of four-term relations, it does not seem to function as a means of explaining the divine being, though it does play its part in the understanding of the divine attributes, and in penetrating the recesses of predicamental being. If the name "analogy" is accepted, in the fashion of the mediaeval Scholastics, as a designation for predication through reference, it denominates a way of reaching the divine being as well as the divine attributes, and provides help in understanding the order of prior and subsequent in the categories of being. But in this case the title "analogy" has to be separated from its use in current English, in order to avoid confusion of thought. Finally, even when with these reservations one includes predication through reference under the term "analogy," there are still other types of partial sameness and partial difference that have to be used in the Thomistic explanation of being. Analogy is an important part of the approach to being in St. Thomas, but it is not the whole approach. In fact, it is very far from covering the whole approach. If it is to continue in use as a vague designation for the entire area between univocity and pure equivocality, in the Thomistic approach to being, it should be employed with full consciousness of its various degrees of ineptitude for functioning outside the fields of proportionality. Cajetan, still writing in Scholastic Latin, has been dubbed anachronistic for restricting analogy proper to its ancient Greek sense.⁶² Those who write in present-day English, however, might help avoid unnecessary confusion if they kept the vocabulary of analogy within its current English use, except for expressions clearly earmarked as literal translations of mediaeval Scholastic *clichés*.

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⁶² See R. McInerny, 'The Logic of Analogy,' *The New Scholasticism*, XXXI (1957), p. 154, n. 12.

On a Handlist of Saints' Lives in Old Norse

HANS BEKKER-NIELSEN

I SHALL be publishing in the next volume of *Mediaeval Studies* a handlist of all the Lives of the Saints written in Old Norse. Such a list will reveal not only the surprisingly large number of such Lives which have survived, but also, unless I am mistaken, provide scholars with a useful means of opening up, in a way hitherto impossible, the many problems which such texts entail. The present brief article serves to introduce the handlist now in course of preparation and to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Ole Widding, Editor-in-Chief of the *Arnagnaean Dictionary of Old Norse*, and of Rev. L. K. Shook, President of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

The handlist will treat all the extant Saints' Lives in Old Norse, supplying accurate references to manuscripts and editions as well as other relevant references and notes. Details of the arrangement of materials in the list will be given below. The joint editors of the list share the responsibility for the format in which the materials are presented, and are making an effort to include all relevant references with as rigid an economy of space as consonant with a thorough investigation. Accordingly, the editors want to emphasize in advance that their work is not a history of hagiographic writings in Old Norse, but simply a handlist which seeks to record what has been done in this branch of literature. It is hoped that the handlist will, by offering a convenient general view of the materials, also indicate what remains to be done in this field. The editors in Copenhagen share the responsibility for the selection of Old Norse texts to be included in the list.

Unfortunately Old Norse hagiography is a field often neglected by students of Old Norse language and literature, who have as a rule shown primary interest (and justly so) in the Icelandic sagas and in the Kings' sagas, with excursive sallies (sometimes both complex and mildly eccentric) into Eddic and Skaldic poetry. Native elements in Old Norse Literature have, naturally enough, attracted more notice among scholars than what have sometimes been felt to be the less endemic qualities of learned and ecclesiastical works based on or translated from foreign tongues, particularly Latin. However, some recent studies show that an appreciation of the translated literature is developing, along with the recognition that the steady influx of foreign literature into Norway and

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